Africa: Post Cold War Era

Editors:
Dr. Hasanat A. Satti
Omer Ahmed Sa’eed
Al-Tayib M. Osman
Abdel Al-Gayoum A. Al-Hassan
Yusuf K. Abu-Rafas
Africa
In the Post Cold War Era

Editors:
Omer Ahmed Sa’eed
Abdel Al-Gayoum A. Al-Hassan
Al-Tayib M. Osman
Yusuf K. Abu-Rafas

International University of Africa
Africa Press, Khartoum
2000
Contents

Preface ......................................................................................... VI
Introduction .............................................................................. VII
* Africans and African Americans in Changing World Trend: Globalizing the Black Experience
  Prof. Ali Mazruoi ........................................................................ 1
* Africa in the Post Cold War Era
  Dr. Sulayman S. Nyang ............................................................. 21
* Africa, Defining the State
  Dr. Awad Al-Sid Al-Karsani ..................................................... 33
* Africa and Globalization
  Ambassador Ahmed El-Tigani Salih .......................................... 49
* Ethiopian Eritrean Conflict (1997-1998)
  Prof. Hassan Makki Mohammed Ahmed ................................. 59
* The Attitude and Reaction of the Islamic Groups to UN/US Intervention in Somalia
  Dr. Mahasin Hag al-Safi ............................................................ 89
* Westernization and Cultural Alienation in Africa
  Prof. Zakaria Bashier Imam ....................................................... 101
* African Water Resources: Confrontation and Cooperation
  Dr. Samson S. Wassara ............................................................. 114
* Gender and Islam: The African Perspective
  Dr. Bilkiso Yusuf ....................................................................... 149
* Religion Between the Phenomenon of Violence and the Concept of Peace (1990-2000)
  Dr. Hasanat Awad Satti ........................................................... 189
Contributers

Authors

* prof. Ali Mazruoi
Albert Schweitzer, Professor of Humanities, Institute of Global Culture, Binghamton University, New York.
* Dr. Sulayman S. Nyang,
African Studies Department, Howard University, Washington D.C.
* Dr. Awad Al-Sid al-Karsani,
Head, Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Economics and Social Studies, University of Khartoum- Sudan
* Ambassador Ahmed El-Tigani Salih
Consultant, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Sudan
* Prof. Hassan makki Mohammed Ahmed
Dean, Centre for Research and African Studies, International University of Africa (IUA), Sudan.
* Dr. Mahasin Hag Al-Safi
Dean, Faculty of Arts, University of Khartoum, Sudan.
* Prof. Zakaria Bashier Inam,
Vice Chancellor, University of Juba, Sudan.
* Dr. Samsun S. Wassara,
Dean, Faculty of Economics and Social Studies, University of Juba, Sudan.
* Dr. Bilkiso Yusuf,
A Political Scientist and Editor, Citizen Communication, Ltd, Kuduna, Nigeria.
* Dr. Husanat Awad Satti,
Head, Department of African Studies, IUA, Sudan
Translators
Dr Abdelateef Sa’eed
Al-Tayib Mohammed Osman

Editors
Omer Ahmed Sa’eed
Abdel Gayoum Abdel Halim Al-Hassn
Al-Tayib Mohammed Osman
Yusuf Khamis Abu-rafas

Computer
Osman Idris Osman

Layout
Walid Ibrahim Y. Ali Dinar
Preface

It is commonly observed that African Studies, like oriental studies were generally undertaken by western writers who were interested in African affairs before and after the colonial period.

After independence African writers and writers of African origins have developed deep concern with studying the affairs of their continent.

In the Post Cold War Era, hot African issues were seriously tackled by some African scholars and a vast literature was produced.

The Centre for Research and African Studies (CRAS) of the International University of Africa (IUA), Khartoum has thus taken the initiative of producing a book which contains some commissioned papers written by world-wide notable African scholars, on some hot momentous African issues.

An organizing committee was formed of specialists in African affairs to design the project. Meetings and workshops were conducted, and many writers were commissioned to contribute. The result was the present first issue of Africa in The Post Cold War Era.

After doing the long term editing procedures, the editorial board arranged the papers in accordance with the main subject of the book, into three major themes. Topics directly touching on the general outlook of African issues came first, next to them are topics that handle a particular part of Africa, and finally came the topics that deal with specific problems of the continent.

Our thanks are due first and for most to the honorable contributors whose response was so quick and whole-hearted, to make the book a reality.

Next to them we convey our gratitude to Dr. Hasanat Awad Satti, the initiator and the general supervisor of this project, and to the members of the organizing committee who have drawn the whole plan of the project, specifically Mr. Yassin al-Haboub whose participation in the early stages of the project cannot be ignored, to them all we convey our gratitude and thanks, looking forward for their support and cooperation for the next issue to come out soon.

Editors
Introduction

Like Pan-Africanism, which once emerged to reflect the African national awareness in the early 1960s when nationalism was the order of the day, Global Africanism has also begun to show up within today’s Globalistional trends. In Africa Post Cold war Era, the Centre for Research and African Studies (CRAS) of the International University of Africa (IUA), introduces a number of hot African issues written by prominent African scholars and University professors the worldover.

The recent philosophical approach to the issue of African Diaspora, Africans of the blood and Africans of the soil, African Americans and American Africans, and other related issues are reconsidered by professor Ali Mazrui and others in a global African context which seeks to found the suitable future role Africans can play in the global scene.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of The New World Order has also posed a new approach to many African issues. The Western interest in African politics and the scramble of Western countries for Africa, African resources, and Africa’s water passages have contributed immensely to the creation of many African political crises and economic dilemma. Prof. Sulayman Nyang of Harvard University, Washington D.C, critically examines the role of African organizations and presents some advanced views on African issues such as self-governance, internal and external challenges. He pinpoints poverty, pathological xenophobia, violence and religious fanaticism as serious dangers encountering the development of the continent.

Despite the Africans’ long-standing struggle for an African identity, culture and sovereignty, Africa still suffers the Western remote control dominance over her politics, economy and culture. In defining the African State Prof. A. El-Karsani of the University of Khartoum, sheds light on the root causes of the African failure to rid the continent from the yoke of servitude.
Prof. Zakaria B. Imam, V.C, Juba University, also examines African cultural alienation within the framework of westernization and African multiculturalism, while Dr. Wassara of the same university, through his lengthy analysis of surface water resources and passages in Africa, highlights his views on the future of Africa. Western intervention in Africa’s regional conflicts is also critically examined by a number of African scholars. Prof. Hassan Makki, dean of the (CRAS) of the (IUA), an expert on African affairs, critically tackles the politics of the Horn together with the American intervention in the Lakes. Ambassador Ahmed Eltigani Salih handles the role of Western companies and organizations in hindering Africa’s development, independence and sovereignty.

The influence of Islam and Islamic ideology on the African political and social scene is also analyzed by a number of African scholars.

Prof. Mahasin Haj Al-Safi of the University of Khartoum has also tackled the reaction of Muslim groups in Somalia against the American military intervention in the area, which finally resulted in forcing out the American troops. While Balkisu Yusuf, a Nigerian political scientist, through an Islamic approach, presents an African experience of gender role problems in Africa. Dr. Hassanat A. Satti of the (CRAS), a specialist on religions in Africa, concentrated on the peaceful role religions can play in today’s Africa.

With this edition of *Africa Post Cold War Era*, in which notable African scholar have been invited to contribute, the Centre for Research and African Studies of the (IUA) is sincerely beginning a series of commissioned works on current African issues to be produced by specialists on African affairs.

Prof. Hassan Makki Muhammed
Dean, Center for Research and African Studies,
International University of Africa,
Khartoum
Africans and African Americans in Changing world Trends:
Globalizing the Black Experience

By Dr. Ali Mazrui

What is the impact of globalization on relations between Africans and African Americans? Is globalization bringing them closer together or pulling them farther apart?

Let us first define “globalization” itself. Some analysts have seen it mainly through the expanding world markets and deepening interdependence within the world economy. Other analysts have seen “globalization” through the information superhighway and the Internet revolution. But it is possible to take an even more comprehensive view of globalization, regarding it as consisting of all the forces which are leading the world towards a global village. Globalization is thus the villagization of the world.

But for people of African ancestry is there a globalization within the globalization? Is there a globalization of the black race within the globalization of the world? I first coined the term “Global Africa” for the final episode in my television series “The African: A Triple Heritage” (BBC/PBS, 1986). By it I meant the experience of people of African descent worldwide. Until the middle of the twentieth century “Global Africa” meant the people of Africa itself combined with the African Diaspora in the Americas, the Caribbean and the Middle East. What has been happening in the twentieth century is a more extensive globalization of global Africa, making the African factor on earth more truly omnipresent and omnidirectional. Let us explore those forces which have been further globalizing the phenomenon of Global Africa.

Globalizing the Dual Diaspora

A major factor has been the dualization of the African Diaspora. There has been the new migration of Africans to the Middle East, Europe, the Americas, Australia and elsewhere, the new Bantu migration on a global scale. In a sense, this process has been creating
two African Diaspora: the new Diaspora of colonialism alongside the older Diaspora of Enslavement.

The Diaspora of Enslavement consists of survivors of the Middle Passage and their descendants. The Diaspora of Colonization are the survivors of the partition of Africa in exile and their descendants. The Dual Diaspora of Colonialism are casualties of the displacement caused either directly by colonialism or by the aftermath of colonial and post-colonial disruptions.

As part of the Afro-Atlantic paradigm, the Diaspora of Enslavement has played a major role in shaping the culture and lifestyle of the Western hemisphere. Perhaps never in history has a people in bondage exerted a greater influence on the culture of their masters.

In the case of the United States, it is arguable that whatever is uniquely American in the United States’ culture and lifestyle has been due to two very different forces: the impact of the frontier and the impact of the Black presence in the American experience. European influence were a “given.” Thomas Jefferson and the founding fathers looked to such European thinkers as John Locke and Monteségne. Euro-Americans liked to think of themselves as heirs to Greece and Rome. But where was the American personality?

Frederick Jackson Turner (1861-1932) provided one answer: the significance of the frontier in American history. He argued that the American character was decisively shaped by conditions of the frontier, which evoked such qualities as “coarseness and strength... acuteness and inquisitiveness, that practical turn of mind... restless, nervous energy... that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom.” (1) He argued that what was uniquely American in her institutions was not the Mayflower but boundless land, and the spirit of taming the rugged frontier. But Frederick Jackson Turner forgot one thing: what was uniquely American was also the Black presence alongside the Frontier. This is the presence which nurtured American capitalism in its infancy and nurtured American democracy in its maturation.

In its infancy, American capitalism needed Black labour. This is the link between America and the imperative of labour. In its maturation in the twentieth century, American democracy needed the civil rights movement and deracialization to realize its original concept
that all men are created equal. It was the Blacks who held American democracy accountable to its own ultimate ideals. The echoes were heard all over Africa in the new Afro-World Wide Web. The Afro-Atlantic paradigm was at work again. The civil rights movement fed into the feminist movement.

Young capitalism often needed young black labor, but more mature U.S. democracy needed more mature Black stimulation. The World Wide Web has forged U.S. links. The African presence in America has also deeply influenced music, literature, food culture, sports and the performing arts.

The distinction between the Diaspora of Slavery and the Diaspora of Colonialism gets more complicated with the distinction between (a) African Americans (Americans is the noun) and (b) American Africans (Africans is the noun). The great majority of African Americans are a product of the Diaspora of Enslavement. The term (African Americans) can be either hemispheric (meaning all descendants of enslavement in the Americas), or national (meaning all descendants of enslavement of the United States).

*American Africans* (or *Americo-Africans*) on the other hand, are products of the Diaspora of Colonization. They are usually first or second generation immigrants from Africa to the Americas. They may be citizens or permanent residents of Western hemisphere countries.

What is distinctive about African Americans is that their mother tongue is still an African language, (In the case of Americo-Liberian, they could still speak Liberian English). Secondly, African Americans usually still have immediate blood relatives in Africa. Thirdly, they are likely to be still attached to the food culture of their African ancestry. Fourthly, African Americans are still likely to bear African family names, though this is by no means universal, especially among Lustophone Africans.

On the whole, African Americans tend to be the more race-conscious in their political orientation than American Africans. On the other hand, American Africans might still be more fundamentally “tribal” when the chips are down.

When does an American African family evolve into an African American family? When it loses its ancestral language. The umbilical chord is language. The children of Professor Nkiru Nzegwu of
Binghamton University are still American Africans (hemispherically) because the children still speak fluent Igbo. On the other hand, my children are now African Americans; their linguistic umbilical chord has been cut.

But when American Africans become African Americans, it does not mean other ties with Africa are cut. Relatives in Africa still abound. Concern for Africa is often still intact. And the Internet is now providing a new network of Afro-Atlanticism, a new language.

In the case of African Americans, the noun is “Americans.” What kind of Americans? African Americans. In the case of American Africans, the noun is “Africans” the adjective is “American.” What kind of Africans? American Africans

Between African Americans and American Africans

We must focus not just on relations between African Americans and Africans, but also between African Americans and Africa. Do African Americans empathize with Africa? If so, how much? Indeed it is worth examining relations within the United States between American Africans and African Americans. There are areas of solidarity in those relations, and there are areas of tension.

When Amadou Diallo was overkilled by four white policemen in New York City, pouring forty-one bullets into him, it sent shock waves in the big city, not just among immigrant Africans, but also among African Americans, Latinos and other disadvantaged groups. Being fellow victims of white racism and police brutality is an area of solidarity.

And yet many African Americans feel that Africans generally are not concerned with race enough because of vastly different historical experiences. Among African Americans many give race 60% relevance in their lives, while Africans give it only 35% relevance. This difference in racial preoccupation can be a cause of stress.

The majority of Africans (or American Africans) and African Americans are in support of affirmative action. This is an area of solidarity. But who precisely gets the jobs or the educational opportunities?

In reality, the greatest beneficiaries are African Americans, but there is sometimes rivalry between African Americans and American
Africans over jobs, business opportunities, and other scarce resources. This area of profession and occupation competition can be a source of stress.

Until recently, the great majority of Africans in the United States were college graduates or in the process of acquiring college degrees. Many Africans who came to the U.S.A. came for educational purposes or got their visas and green cards on the basis of special qualifications. The majority of African Americans, on the other hand, did not have college degrees. This introduced a partial class factor between the two groups.

This class factor is now eroding for two reasons. There are more Africans in the United States who do not have a college degree and are not seeking one. Secondly, there are more and more African Americans who are exceptionally well trained and educated. So this difference is evening out between African Americans and American Africans.

Many African American heroes are also African heroes. This includes the late Martin Luther King, Jr., boxer Muhammad Ali, basketball player Michael Jordan, novelist Toni Morrison, and many African American singers. This is an area of solidarity. Even controversial Louis Farrakhan has millions of African admirers. On the other hand, African heroes are seldom well-known in black America, apart from Nelson Mandela. Only the staunchest Pan-Africanists among African Americans have ever heard of Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Julius Nyerere or Wole Soyinka.

African-American lack of familiarity with African heroes is not really a cause of stress. It just represents a missed opportunity for further solidarity.

Expanding globalization may restore the balance. In any case, African American heroes get much more global publicity because they are citizens of a super-power. It has therefore been easier for Africans in Africa to know about them than for African Americans in the United States to hear of Julius Nyerere or Kofi Annan.

Globalization has also witnessed the rise of Africans to positions of leadership in global organizations. But here it may be worth distinguishing between Africans of the soil and Africans of the blood. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the first African Secretary General of
the United Nations, was an African of the soil. Kofi Annan, the second African Secretary General is an African of the blood and soil. North Africans like Boutros-Ghali belong to the African continent (the soil) but not to the Black race (the blood). On the other hand, African Americans are Africans of the blood (the Black race) but not of the soil (the African continent). Sub-Saharan Africans like Kofi Annan are in reality both Africans of the soil (the continent) and of the blood (the race). Globalization has given Africans of the soil and of the blood new opportunities for leadership at the global level itself.

Even before the two African Secretaries General of the United Nations, Africa had already produced a black Director General for UNESCO in Paris (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). He was Amadou Mokhtar M'Bow, an African of the blood from Senegal. His openly pro-Third World policies infuriated the United States, which finally withdrew from UNESCO in 1985, followed by its compliant ally, the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom returned to UNESCO in 1997 after the sweeping victory of the Labor Party in the 1996 elections.

With regard to the United Nations itself, Africa is the only region of the world apart from Europe to have produced more than one Secretary General for the world body in the twentieth century. Europe has produced three Secretaries General, Africa two, and the other regions of the world have produced either one each or none so far.

The International Court of Justice at the Hague elected in 1994 an African of the soil as its President, Mohammed Bedjaui of Algeria. The World Bank in the 1990s has had two African Vice-Presidents: Callisto Madivo, an African of the blood from Zimbabwe, and Ismail Serageldin, an African of the soil from Egypt. In 1999 Serageldin was also a serious candidate to become the first UNESCO Director-General of the new millennium.

The Commonwealth (what used to be called the British Commonwealth) has fifty-four members. Its Secretariat is at Marlborough House in London. In the 1990s the Commonwealth has had Chief Eleazar Emeka Anyanwu as its Secretary-General. The Chief is an African of the blood from Nigeria. The largest member of the Commonwealth in population is India. The most industrialized
include Canada, Great Britain and Australia, and the largest black member of the Commonwealth is of course Nigeria.

Globalization has also permitted the emergence of Black and African moral leadership on a world scale. It began with the Nobel Prize winners for peace. Over the years these have included Ralph Bunche (1950), Albert Luthuli (1960), Martin Luther King, Jr. (1964), Anwar Sadat (1978), Desmond Tutu (1984), Nelson Mandela (1994) and F. W. de Klerk (1994).

Ralph Bunche and Martin Luther King, Jr. were of course African Americans and therefore Africans of the blood in our sense, but not of the soil. Anwar Sadat and F. W. de Klerk were Africans of the soil but not of the blood. Albert Luthuli, Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela were Africans of both the soil and the blood. All three were South Africans, as was F.W. de Klerk. But we should note that F.W. de Klerk is an “African” of the soil by adoption rather than by indigenous roots to the continent. Most North Africans, on the other hand, are indigenous to the continent, though there has been considerable racial mixture with immigrants over the centuries.

As the twentieth century was coming to a close, Nelson Mandela achieved a unique status. He became the first truly universal Black moral leader in the world in his own lifetime. Martin Luther King, Jr. achieved universal status after his death. When Dr. King was alive half of mainstream America rejected him and regarded him as a troublemaker. Mandela was fortunate to have achieved universal moral admiration without having to undergo an assassination beforehand. No other Black man in history has pulled off such a prehensile accomplishment (as distinct from a posthumous elegy). In the recognition of Mandela the human race may have taken one more step forward in the search for universalized ethical sensibilities.

Between the Global Ummah and Global Africa

Globalization has also forged new links between Islam and Global Africa, and provided opportunities for African Muslims to play a bigger role in both the global ummah and among countries in Global Africa.

When Mokhtar M’Bow was the Director General of UNESCO, he was the highest ranking Muslim of any race in the United Nations.
system. Professor M'Bow was an African of the blood from Senegal, as we indicated.

Ismael Serageldin, as one of the Vice Presidents of the World Bank in the 1990s, has been the highest ranking Muslim in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Serageldin is, as we indicated, an African of the soil from Egypt. Serageldin may also become Director General of UNESCO in the course of the twenty-first century.

Another African Muslim of the soil became head of the World Court at the Hague when Justice Mohammad Bejaoui of Algeria was elected President of the International Court of Justice in 1994.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with its headquarters in Vienna, Austria, has four African members. These are Nigeria and Gabon (Africans of the blood) and Algeria and Libya (Africans of the soil). From time to time these African countries have provided Secretaries General and other OPEC leaders, often Muslim.

And of course the Organization of African Unity, the most important continent-wide organization in Africa, has had a Muslim Secretary General throughout the 1990s. Salim Ahmed Salim is an African of the blood from Tanzania.

There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, but the only continent which has a Muslim majority is Africa. The total population of Africa is over 700 million now, of whom over half are now Muslim.

Nigeria has more Muslims than any Arab country. When Nigeria is combined with Ethiopia, Egypt and Congo (Kinshasa), the four most populous African countries, the Muslim population is over 160 million.

The population of Muslims in the United States has begun to outstrip the population of Jews. Of the 6 to 7 million Muslims in the USA 42% are black. The Nation of Islam under Louis Frakhan is part of that 42%, but only a fraction of it.

Why has there been a Black fascination with Islam? Why is the Muslim population in Global Africa still expanding?

Among African Americans there have been push-out factors in the mainstream culture, and pull-in factors in the cultural and ethical attraction of Islam. The push-out factors in the wider American society
have made African Americans feel excluded or rejected at some levels. The pull-in factors in Islam and Islamic culture have made some African Americans feel welcome and intrigued. The push-out factors in the wider American society are rooted in centuries of racial experience and the sociology of racial exclusion.

The pull-in factors in Islamic culture offer a paradoxical alternative, both cultural autonomy and religious universalism, for African Americans. Sobriety and prohibition of alcohol in the Islamic ethics have also fascinated sections of the Black Diaspora that have been decimated by drug abuse and alcoholism.

Africa is not only the first continent to have a majority of Muslims; it is also a witness to the largest continuing expansion of Islam. Conversions to Islam are faster in the Black world than in other sections of humanity.

Natural population growth among Muslims in Africa and in the world is faster than among non-Muslims. Indeed, the Muslim world as a whole is expected to become 25% of the human race in the course of the 21st century.

The largest country in population in Africa is Nigeria, which probably has a majority of Muslims. The second largest country in the African continent is Egypt, which is of course an Islamic leader.

The largest African country in the territory is Sudan, which is about two-thirds Muslim. Almost half the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (a worldwide 53 member intergovernmental Islamic fraternity) are African. Its Secretaries-General have ranged from the African of the blood Hamid Algabid (Niger) to the African of the soil Azzedine Al-Iraqi (Morocco).

Should African Muslims establish links with Global Africa as a whole? African Americans are of course a large descended population lodged in the most powerful nation on earth. Perhaps Muslims of all races in the United States should join forces with African-Americans of all faiths in a joint struggle for both racial justice and cultural dignity. The Nation of Islam and other Muslim groups in the country have sometimes adopted that principle as a cornerstone of their national agenda.

There are now at least as many Muslims as Jews in the USA and probably more, though the Muslims are more subdued and far less
powerful than the Jews. And yet, numerically there are more African-Americans than there are Jews in the whole world added together. What Black and Muslim people can learn from the Jews include the following:

(A) Solidarity in common cause
(B) Organization and mobilization
(C) Purposeful Manipulation of the political process
(D) Creative Tapping of the guilt complexes of former oppressors
(E) Turning martyrdom into a political resource

This is where the crusade for Black reparations looms into relevance. Jews have received partial compensation for the horrors of the Holocaust under the Nazis in Europe (1933-1945). In the 1990s Swiss Banks have been held accountable for illegitimate gains they might have made from Jewish victims of genocide during World War II. Also in the 1990s German manufacturing corporations are being forced to set aside billions of dollars to compensate those who had worked under slave-labor conditions during the Third Reich. A relatively few Jewish activist organizations have been able to hold powerful economic giants in Europe liable for compensation for exploited and victimized Jews. What about compensation for hundreds of years of Black enslavement? Or is that a joke?

In Search of Historic Reparations

Globalization has reawakened the crusade for Jewish reparations. Also getting globalized is the reparations movement to compensate Black people for hundreds of years of enslavement and exploitation. The fighters for the abolition of slavery became known as “abolitionists”, the new crusaders for Black compensation are the reparationsists.

In 1992 I and eleven others were sworn in before the Presidents of Africa. We were to constitute the Group of Eminent Persons to pursue and to explore the modalities and logistics of campaigning for such reparations. The “swearing in” occurred in Dakar, Senegal; Reverend Jesse Jackson came to meet with our Committee to give us moral support. So did Nelson Mandela, who was at the time newly Liberated, but not yet elected President of South Africa. We elected Chief Moshood Abiola as Chairman of our group of
Eminent Persons. Abiola was a Nigerian philanthropist and publisher. He ran for the Presidency of Nigeria and won in June 1993. However, he was not allowed to take office. The army in Nigeria aborted the electoral process. When he called a rally and declared himself President of Nigeria, he was arrested and charged with treason.

In 1996 I saw General Sani Abacha, the Military Head of State of Nigeria at the time. I asked him to continue Nigeria’s support for the reparations movement and to release our chairman of the Reparations Group, Chief Abiola. President Abacha was gracious to me, but unbending on the issue of Abiola.

Chief Abiola was still in prison when General Abacha died suddenly in June 1998. Prospects for Abiola’s release improved. Unfortunately Abiola too was suddenly taken ill and died unexpectedly on the eve of his being released from prison. The reparations movement received a severe blow because Abiola had been a man of means committed to the cause. Nigeria lost a gifted leader, and some of us a dear friend.

There is a distinct reparations movement in the United States, including a brave attempt in Congress by Representative John Conyers, to get a bill passed to appoint a commission to look into the feasibility of reparations. There is also a reparations movement in the United Kingdom with one champion in the House of Commons (Bernie Grant) and one champion in the House of Lords. Reparations has also been a topic on talk-shows in the Caribbean. Globalization has given reparations a new momentum, but just as the abolitionist movement took generations, so will the reparations crusade.

Also relevant was President Bill Clinton’s tour of Africa in 1998, the first U.S. President to go to so many African countries, meet so many African leaders, and come so near to apologizing for the wrongs that America had done to the Africans across the centuries. Of course Clinton did not offer compensation, nor was he asked for it. But the best thing next to compensation is an apology for the sins of one’s forbears. Clinton in Africa came near to expressing deep regret, though not a formal apology.
Africanizing Diana and Royalizing the Diaspora

While slavery is a matter of hereditary servitude, royalty and the nobility are matters of hereditary privilege. In the 1990s the most glabalized point of convergence between Global Africa and the internationalized royalty occurred during the brief love affair between Diana, Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al-Fayed, an African of the soil from Egypt. The international publicity which the brief and tragic love affair received was itself one of the high points of the Information Superhighway of the 1990s.

Then came the tragedy in Paris early on August 31, 1997. A British princess and an African of the soil perished together in a road crash as they tried to race away from the frenzy of the Information Superhighway. Big issues began to formulate themselves in the minds of millions. Who mourned? That question was easy. Much of the world mourned. But who celebrated the death of the British princess and her North African lover?

In the 1950s Imperial Britain would not allow an African King, Seretse Khama of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), to marry a white woman, Ruth. In the 1990s the question was whether Diana, the mother of the future king of England, would be married to an African Muslim.

The issue was partly literal and partly metaphorical. We already knew from twentieth century African history that African Heads of State could have white First Ladies. This was true of Seretse Khama when he finally became President of independent Botswana. It was also true of Leopold Senghor of Senegal, who had a French wife. What we have never had is a European or an American Head of State with an African wife or African in-laws.

We also know from twentieth century African history that it is possible for an African whose parentage is half white to be popularly elected President. Perhaps even elected more than once. This has been true of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, who was freely elected President of Ghana both in 1992 and 1996. Jerry Railings’ father was a Scotsman, his mother an African. The experience we have never had is for a Westener who is half Black being elected President of a Western country, or having siblings who are partly African.
The question which arose in 1997 before August 31, was whether William as a future king of England was going to have half-brothers and half-sisters who were essentially North African. Would a future king of England have a half-brother called Abdullah or perhaps even Nasser? Would he have a half-sister called Ayesha or Khadija? Even if the names Saddam or Qaddafi were unlikely to be borne by Diana's children, the other options were alarming enough to the British establishment.

Symbolically and metaphorically the love affair between the British Princess and the North African was posing the question of whether racial integration in the West was advanced enough to accept inter-racial mating at the very top. More literally the event which killed Diana and Dodi posed more ominous questions.

In the face of these racial and cultural scenarios, how purely accidental was the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in August 1997? Is it conceivable that extreme right wing elements in Britain wanted to ensure that the mother of a future king of England did not get engaged to a North African Muslim? Conspiracy theories have begun. Were some of the paparazzi that disappeared form the scene hired specially to cause havoc?

Eighteen thousand Muslims, who were meeting in Chicago for the annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America in 1997, were stunned over the last weekend of August to learn of the sudden death of Princess Diana. I was present at the convention. We mourned the parting of Britain's most glittering ambassador to the human race.

Some of those eighteen thousand Muslims in Chicago were Egyptian or African born, as was Diana's companion in the tragic accident in Paris. Emad (Dodi) Al-Fayed. After the shock had subsided at the Chicago convention. The speculations began to take shape among a few of the participants. In Third World countries car accidents which kill public personalities are often regarded as disguised forms of political assassinations. Kenya and the Middle East are not unique in having had their share of such suspicious car crashes. Were such manipulated auto accidents unknown in the developed world?
On August 31st, the day Diana died, Britain's largest circulation newspaper, News of the World, had asserted that Dodi Al-Fayed was unfit to marry into the British royal family. The newspaper claimed that Diana's 15 year old boy, William, was 'horrified' at the prospect of having Al-Fayed as a step-father.

Diana, Princess of Wales, was widely regarded by part of the political establishment in England as a "loose cannon" capable of making unorthodox and socially alarming moves. Her most intimate interview for the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1995 was deliberately given to a man of color, a Briton of Asian origin, to counterbalance Prince Charles' choice of Jonathan Dimbleby, the elite of the elite among British television personalities, as interviewer.

It was during Diana's interview with a man of color that she confessed to having been unfaithful (almost in retaliation to her husband's own confession of infidelity). Diana was establishing her credentials both as a modern woman and as a person who felt at ease in discussing intimate issues with a non-white interviewer before cameras.

When in July and August 1997 Diana's name began to be romantically associated with an Egyptian man from a Muslim family, her non-racial attitude seemed to rise to a new level. It became conceivable that the mother of a future king of England would be married to a race which British imperialists once despised as "wags". Would a future king of England have half-brothers called Abdul Rahman and Mahmoud; or half-sisters called Salma and Ayesha?

What is more, the Islamic factor in the background of the Al-Fayed Family added a further complication. The King or Queen of England is of necessity supposed to be the Head of the Church of England, the Supreme Governor of the Anglican tradition. Would the future King William (Diana's son) have a mother married to a Muslim? Would the British Royal Family have direct Muslim in-laws.

Curiously enough, Diana's former husband, Prince Charles, was already causing the Church of England some concern over what was perceived as a "disturbing tile towards pro-Islamic sympathies". About a week before Diana's death the British Broadcasting Corporation, in a report about whether the Anglican Church should be delinked from the British state, referred to this concern about whether Prince Charles was
getting to be too ecumenical and too accommodating towards Islam to be truly qualified for the British throne.

The BBC Report was part of its program called “Twenty Four Hors”, which was broadcast more than once in a week before Diana’s death. Charles’ pro-Islamic sympathies were sometimes traced to his 1991 lecture at Oxford University entitled, “Islam and the West”, which was a plea for greater effort by the West to understand Islam. The lecture has since been translated into various languages. The English and Arabic editions of the lecture are published by the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies, Oxford.

Prince Charles’ ecumenical spirit was manifested even earlier when he recommended that one of the titles of the King of England (or reigning Queen) be changed from “defender of the faith” (meaning the Anglican faith) to “defender of faith”, (meaning defender of all religions in his kingdom). Devout Anglicans were shocked by this broadminded ecumenicalism. Prince Charles wanted the change made before he took the oaths of office at his own coronation one day.

On the issue of religions, it is therefore arguable that both Prince Charles and Princess Diana were indeed ecumenical and personally tolerant. Under Charles’ influence the Royal family as a whole had started discussing in the mid-1990s whether lesser members of the Royal family should any longer be discouraged from marrying Roman Catholics if they so desired.

However, marrying a North African Muslim was not regarded as a viable option even for minor members of the family. And although upon her divorce Diana was stripped of the Royal title of “Her Royal Highness”, she was still Princess of Wales, and, even more fundamental, she was the mother of a future King of England.

Dodi Al-Fayed was no more devout as a Muslim in terms of practice and ritual than Diana and Charles had been devout and disciplined Christian. If Dodi Al-Fayed and Princess Diana had lived to get married, it would have been like the marriage of Prince Aly Khan (father of the present Aga Khan IV) in 1948 to the American actress Rita Hayworth. But in that case the Prince was the Muslim, the Westerner was the bride. In that earlier case the car crash was after the marriage rather than before. The car crash in Europe killed only Prince
Aly Khan. Rita Hayworth was not with him in the car. The romance was over, and she was back in the movies as an actress in the United States. (I was privileged to meet Prince Aly Khan and Princess Rita Hayworth when they visited Mombassa in Kenya in 1950, not long after their marriage).

No foul play has been proven about the death of Prince Aly Khan in 1958. Similarly no foul play may be proven about the death of Princess Diana and Mr. Dodi Al-Fayed. Indeed, in both cases, the suspicion of foul play is purely speculative. We know from eyewitnesses that there were more paparazzi than the seven who were arrested. Were the missing cones agents of death?

In Cairo the influential newspaper Al-Ahram has already published articles raising the possibility that Diana and Dodi were killed by sections of the British establishment to prevent their marriage. (See for example Al-Ahram, September 1, 1997).

Why did the French police employ an anti-terrorist special force to deal with a road accident, however famous the casualties? Why did it take an hour and a half after the accident for Diana's body to be taken to a nearby hospital? Was it really because it took that long to release Diana's body from the car wreckage? Or were there other reasons?

Accidents which appear convenient to the powerful will always provoke suspicion as to whether they were accidents at all. Diana's and Dodi's deaths may still be a simple case of an accident caused by a convergence of excessive speed, a driver under the influence of alcohol, and crazy photographers hounding a lovely princess to her death.

After all, in real life, accidents do happen, even to celebrities. Maybe there is a more universal message in Diana's death than the dilemma between chance and design. In classical times there was Helen of Troy whose beauty "launched a thousand ships and burnt the topeless towers of Ilium" In our own times there has been Diana, the Princess of Wales, whose compassionate beauty moved the world to tears upon her death.

Her British ancestors included the eighteenth century poet, Alexander Pope, who observed:

All Nature is but Art unknown to thee
All chance (is) Direction which thou cannot see
All Discord (is) Harmony not understood
All partial Evil (is) universal good

Diana’s death was indeed a (Chance) but was it also Direction a
traffic indicator for unmanly? Diana’s death was a moment of
“Discord”, but did it have the seeds of human harmony? Diana’s
“unintended homicide was indeed a case of partial Evil”. But was it
also a beacon for universal Good? In 1997, upon Diana’s death, the
world experienced the globalization of grief. Was globalization
beginning to wear a human face?

CONCLUSION

The National Summit on Africa is a movement led by
distinguished African-Americans like Leonard Roninson, Herschells
Challenor, C. Payne Lucas, and Andrew Young. The movement seeks to
draw greater attention to African problems in the United State, help to
find solutions to those problems, and strengthen the economic, trade
and cultural ties between the peoples of Africa and those of the
United States.

A literal national summit of leaders of opinion is scheduled to
take place in Washington D.C in February 2000. Meanwhile, Members
of the movement are in support of the African Growth and
Opportunity Act before the Congress in 1999, seeking new linkages
between American investors and African opportunities, and a new
equilibrium between where aid ends and trade begins. Congressman
John Conyers Jr. Of Michigan has an even more progressive concept
which aspires to have the African debt canceled.

Meanwhile, the physical African presence in the world is
expanding demographically. But the leadership of African concern is
beginning to come from sons and daughters of the continent and
Africa’s descendants in the Diaspora. In 1996, I was in Australia as a
guest of Australian organizations. My last two days were reserved for
the African community of Melbourne. I addressed them in their
hundreds about their ancestral continent. When I first visited Australia
more than a quarter of a century earlier, such a thing would not have
happened. There would not have been much of an African presence in
Melbourne.
In 1997, I was in Sweden as a guest of the Nobel Foundation. My official hosts were therefore Sweden. But on my first night in Stockholm "guess" who entertained me to dinner? Afro-Sweden! Africans who are now Swedish citizens. Also in 1997, I was in Malaysia. At the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur there were male and female African students from different parts of the continent. The students asked the University for a special African session with Ali Mazrui, and they got it. I was also stopped once or twice in the streets of Kuala Lumpur by other Africans (complete strangers) who recognized me from my television series. In the 1950s there would not have been much of an African presence in Kuala Lumpur.

What does all this experience tell us? It tells us that the demographic African presence in the world is expanding. There are more countries with Black people in their populations today than there have ever been in history. The black skin is becoming less and less exotic as a sight in the streets of the major cities of the world.

As we have indicated, Seretse Khama did live to become President of Botswana with Ruth as the First Lady after independence. Africa has had other Heads of State with white first ladies, such as Leopold Senghor of Senegal. What we have never had is the mother of a British king married to an African. Such a symphony has for the time being been interrupted; such a Diana-Dodi scenario has been aborted by accident or design.

The African Diaspora continues to expand with or without conspiracy theories. The globalization of the African peoples is struggling to come home. People of African descent continue to multiply in the most unexpected parts of the world. African Studies has yet to catch up with them. To paraphrase the words of "Global Africa" the final episode of "The Africans: A Triple Heritage" (BBC/PBS:1986).

We are a people of the day before yesterday, and a people of the day after tomorrow. Long before slave days we lived in one huge village called Africa. And then strangers came and took some of us away, scattering us in all directions of the globe. Before the strangers came, our village was the world, we knew no other. But now we are scattered so widely that the sun never sets on the descendants of
Africa. The world is our village, and we plan to make it more human between now and the day after tomorrow.

NOTES
Africa in the Post Cold War Era

By:

Sulayman S. Nyang, Ph.D.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the leaders and the people of Africa found themselves in a new situation. They were not the only ones. All the peoples living in the Third World found themselves living in an unipolar world as opposed to the familiar comforting bipolar worlds of the Cold War. A number of questions about the effects of the end of the Cold War have been raised by many thinking Africans. Among these questions I will address a few for the benefit of my readers. The first question, which is critical for the African continent and abroad, is the future of Africa in a unipolar world. This is say, at the time when the Soviet Union was falling apart in 1989, Africans wondered, “What the future holds for them?” This was most evident when President George Bush of the United States of America told the world that a “New World Order” was in formation and that he and his allies were the principal architects. This message was a sobering one, because it was in the context of the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein that President Bush announced his plan for the world. Indeed, his announcement sent the signal to Africans and others in the Third World it was no longer possible for the smaller and weaker states for the world to play one big power against the other. This unexpected crisis of identity for the Third World and the growing irrelevance of their institutions of Non-alignment, have made it imperative for them to re-examine their situation and to develop new strategies of survival in the emerging global order.

In order to survive the Post Cold War years, Africans must address some of the important challenges facing their countries. In a world without the contending ideological superpowers, Africans must learn to depend more and more on their local resources. Any strategy that does not operate along these lines is doomed to failure. Those
who wish to extricate Africa out of the web of economic underdevelopment must accept the fact that collective endeavor on the path of economic development is the surest way to transform the present African condition and to improve the quality of life of the average African. Owing to these economic realities, it is imperative that Africans begin to cooperate more fully on political matters. The creation of institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADDC) is a significant step forward. By working together politically the African states stand a chance of ironing out their differences and building the necessary structure of peace in their respective regions. The cutting of the monetary umbilical cord, which has until recently linked France to her former colonies, has been received differently in African circles. Those who loved and benefited from the old ties to France lamented the unpegging of the CFA from the French franc; those who saw the old arrangement as a continuation of French imperial hegemony welcomed the new development as a sign of African maturity and independence. To those who embrace such a position, the liberation of the Francophone mind begins with the delinking of the CFA from the French franc. Such an exercise, advocated for this second position argue, is the best thing to happen to Africans in the Francophone world who are determined to free themselves from French economic hegemony.

Another issue, which is closely related to the first, deals with the question of foreign assistance. Assistance is no longer the object of attention in the eyes of the multiple suitors from the developing world, and faced with the prospects of internal political climate was actually drying up the limited number of sources of funding for their economic and social development.

Related to the first two issues is the question of African self-governance and self-development. Born out of the womb of the anti-colonial movement, and determined to maintain both their political independence and national sovereignty, the post colonial African states have worked hard to participate as equal partners within the UN
system. This, however, has remained at the level of idealism and rhetoric, for how can African states press for equality when they depend on foreigners to feed them and to restore law and order in their countries. Why is this the case for Africa and not for the countries of Asia that collaborated with Africa at Bandung, Indonesia in the 1950s? It is to this and other related questions that we now turn.

Thirty-seven years ago, when the new country of Ghana became the first African colonial territory to join the ranks of the members of the United Nations, African leaders were preoccupied with stability and national unity. Rather than deal with the political consequences of the cultural ambiguities of African societies, they preferred to give primacy to politics. As I stated in a West Africa Magazine piece last year, this primacy of politics in African affairs was based on three assumptions about the African realities of the time. First of all it was generally believed by African leaders and intellectuals that the best way to bring the fruits of independence was to create a political system with minimal dissension. Nkrumah and the first generation of leaders told their people that political dissension among Africans would undermine their cause and expose them to the manipulations of the colonial powers. Hence the need for a single party state. Those who proposed this line of thinking were not only censored, but chased out of their countries in the name of the African revolution. Those who were the only interested in the politics of the belly and not of the head found it prudent to keep their silence and to use its fruits of the post colonial state as effective as possible. Hence, the emergence of the political termite in the African bureaucracy. These groups of creatures are bent on silent opposition and sabotage, not necessarily out of any serious commitment to a radical or liberal cause, but because of their preoccupation with self-enrichment. Owing to their activities and due to the political paranoia that the first generation of leaders fostered, in order to keep themselves in power, Africa became the victim of presidential monarchs and political termites. The combined mischief of these two forces, has accounted for the present state of affairs. These are some of the domestic Africa actors responsible for the state of affairs in many African countries.
But while we identified the domestic forces responsible for the state of affairs in African societies, let us train our critical lenses on the external actors that also added to Africa’s woes. Being former colonies, African states were new in the international political system only because they had no direct diplomatic representation at the United Nations prior to the 1960s. The two exceptions were Liberia and Ethiopia. But if these states were denied representation because of their colonial status, members of the international community were using their services and resources since the earliest days of European penetration of the African coastlines. Apart from the utility of the colonies in terms of economic resources for the metropolis, there was also the political prestige they conferred upon colonial powers. No European power know this better than France. For this European source of culture for the French African colonials, the continent of Africa has always served as a magnifying mirror. Whenever France went through a crisis of confidence and self-doubt it was always the African mirror that confirmed her greatness and glories. It is because of this relationship of dependency between European powers and the former colonies that Africa finds itself in the current situation. The departing colonizers wanted to keep the imperial umbilical cords tightly fastened to their colonial offspring. This fostered a climate of dependency and the need to “check with” Europe before doing anything. Hence, the African derisive statement: a blunder for Europe is an innovation in Africa.

It is indeed against this background that one addresses the question of foreign aid. When one looks at the historical record of foreign assistance to Africa over the last thirty-five years, one cannot deny the fact that the hundreds of billions of dollars given to Africa have not changed the condition of the average Africans. It is true that some of the money found its way into hands of the poor and the powerless in the urban and rural areas of the continent. However, much of the money either stayed in the countries of origin through an elaborate network of suppliers, contractors and manufacturers, or wound up in the bank accounts of the political elites and their
collaborators in African countries. A study done some years ago revealed that "68 cents out of every U.S. dollar given out as foreign assistance remain in the United States while only a small portion of the remaining thirty-two cents reach the intended beneficiaries". Why is this the case? Five reasons can be given to explain the poor performance of foreign aid programs in Africa. The first reason why foreign aid failed in Africa lies in the manner in which aid programs have been among the people charged with their execution. Because the political system in most of the African states were either one-party states or military dictatorships, public funds were taken and spent as if they were personal fortunes left behind by one's ancestors. In one-party states and under military rule, checks and balances are rare if present at all. Those who govern are expected to check themselves and the media that is expected to serve as the public watchdog is reduced to a pack of lap dogs with several bones thrown in their direction because of their connivance. Those media men, such as Dele Giwa of Nigeria, who dared to speak out against corruption and political representation, were permanently silenced through the policies of intimidation. The accumulation of millions of dollars and French francs in foreign banks by men and women of responsibility in Africa has made it categorically clear that the politics of self-enrichment has replaced the earlier nationalistic rhetoric of African sacrifice and collective self-development. It is a sad commentary on the African condition to note that, though Africa is the poorest continent on the planet and the majority of the states on the list of least developed countries in the world are from Africa, African leaders and civil servants have yet to embrace fully the ethics of frugality and sacrifice to lead the hungry, diseased and powerless African masses on the path to self-development. One of the lessons Africans living in the Post Cold War period must learn is the fact that foreign aid is no longer coming their way and the politics of self-enrichment is now challenged both by the conscious activities in the African states and by the conscious and concerned members of the international community who wish to Africa's poor and would do everything possible to prevent the rapacious and riotous living of the privileged few. It is indeed the activities of some of these groups now called non-governmental
organization (NGOs) that make human rights, health issues, and environmental matters to be taken into account by developed countries in their formulations of foreign policies and in the implementation of development assistance programs.

In addition to the foreign assistance program as one of the problems of the postcolonial generation of Africans, there is also the problem of governance. The founding fathers of the African states were very concerned about diverse politics. Having inherited colonial constructed states whose designers gave no thought to homogeneity and cultural affinities in Africa, the new leaders of independent Africa felt that the only solution to political fragmentation along ethnic lines was to deny the existence and relevance of the "tribe" or the ethnic/religious groups to political engineering and nation building. Because of this anti-tribal logic, many of the African leaders, whether socialist or not, saw a panacea in the idea of a single party state. This politics of the belly takes precedence over the politics of the head. By feeding oneself, one protects one's society from being too dependent on others. It is true that this is the age of independence, however, it is dangerous and unwise to rely too much on others for one's supply of food.

Again, as I have pointed out in another essay on Africa in the 1990s, the continent of African stands naked before the rest of the world. In this age of rapid and instant communication of the daily life of the Third World pauper is quite accessible to the middle classes of the world who are entertained an served with news around the clock from the satellites of CNN and other commercial news agencies. The second point is that Africa's poverty and the fragility of its states together make her children vulnerable to external manipulations. Unable to hide their weakness from the probing cameras of adventurous reporters, and eager to be at least vicarious travelers on the gradually constructed electric highway, modern day Africans now find their world's exposed to both domestic predators and external disturbers of peace. Who are these foreign sowers of the seeds of discord? They are the fly-by-night investors who find a willing partner.
in the political termite: they are the external powers who supply arms and intelligence about the opposition to presidential monarchs who are neither faithful to the traditional mode of governance left behind by ancestors long gone nor committed to the democratic principles of governance borrowed from the West. The foreign sowers of discord also include and army of émigrés who usually vote with their feet out of their countries and then spend much of their periods of self-exile in painting the African realities darker than they really are back home. Secure in their foreign refuge, and determined to be counted as factors and forces to be reckoned with in the final resolution of their country’s problems, these émigrés often inflame the situation in their country by throwing a monkey wrench into any on-going negotiations between their ethnic brethren and the political rulers of their countries. What is being said here is that the national movement was seen as a microcosm of the society, and a carefully organized and led single party state was believed to answer their prayers for social and political peace in the land.

These political arrangements and structures proved to be inadequate, and therefore not representative enough to capture the majority of their populations. As a result, political decay and political breakdown set in throughout the continent. The first region to witness the failure and collapse of the inherited and created structures was Western Africa. The assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, the overthrow of President Nkrumah and Keita of Ghana and Mali respectively, sent a wave of shock across the continent. For the first time sub-Saharan Africans began to take note of the potential of the military as rulers in place of civilians. The departure of the Ghanian and Malian leaders also gave Africans another lesson to learn about the politics of post colonial times. Surely, the collapse of the Nkrumah regime made it categorically clear that charisma was not enough and that African societies could not be integrated by one man, one party, and one socialist ideology. The process of nation-building or national integration, one could argue, requires a great deal of time and effort, and those who wish to see their diverse populations integrated into a
single nationality must speak the language of tolerance and sensitivity to others.

Our task will remain undone as long as we fail to pay attention to the challenges of poverty in Africa. The state of poverty that now cripples Africa’s masses, deserves our attention immediately. Africans, we must stress, cannot regain their dignity and assert their independence in a shrinking globe unless, and until they tap their human and non-human resources and join the emerging global markets with the kinds of strategies. An African strategy of self-empowerment in the New World Order must include food security through the restoration and mechanization of agriculture. Many countries have almost lost their capacity to feed themselves. Africans in the modern age must therefore know that politics of here, is that, tough dissident émigré intellectuals and politicians have a point in denouncing authoritarian regimes throughout the continent of Africa, those of us who pay close attention to what is happening in Africa, should not accept uncritically everything from these quarters.

A point about Africa as a continent with multiple problems and challenges lies in the pathological xenophobia rampant throughout Africa. The pathology is the result of colonial conditioning and the baptism of many Africans in the New Age Religion of consumerism. Caught in the web of poverty but determined to be registered as part of the emerging global structure, many an African leader fails to see the differences between having a fat bank account in Switzerland and investing that money somewhere in Africa so that modernization will make his country one of many ports of call for the train of economic development. This recklessness of the elite is a sin equally shared by the average man in the street of many African countries. The pathological xenophobia I am describing here is pathetic not only because it misplaces and squanders Africa’s emotional and intellectual resources, but it also exposes her people to problems that are unnecessary and unwarranted. Witness the young Africans in Washington, DC, or Paris who thinks he is acting on traditional values by shipping home to his beloved parents in a remote village with an
electric or battery-operated television set made in China. Is he doing well, or magnifying the woes of his parents' back home? In my view, his action has a demonstration effect, but it is of the worst kind. His good intentions open a Pandora's box by fomenting and fostering an unnecessary competition in a village where the basic needs of his people go unmet daily. In a village where electricity is a luxury known only to the rich and super-rich in the capital city, it is adding insult to injury when one undertakes an action like the one described above. Once such a television set enters the village, it stays for good and life as the villagers knew it change forever. Hence, the vicarious links to the outside world but at a terrible price to each villager. It is the proliferation of such absurdities that now lead some of us to believe that there is really a globalism. I call this the illusion of globalism. Like all illusions it is a constructed out of misperceived images. In the special case of Africa, it feeds on the pathological xenophilia of the African and the self-congratulatory attitude of the peddlers and salespeople of the New Age Consumerism. Lest I be misunderstood, let me restate my third point. What I am arguing here is that Africa's participation in the emerging global structure can only become a reality rather than a chimera, when Africans construct a political order which conflicts are settle without bloodshed and civil society reflects and reinforces the individual and communal needs of every man and woman. Again, Africa's involvement in the new global order cannot be real if Africans do not contribute their requisite share in the pool of human knowledge and culture. Such a contribution will not come about when Africans are culturally dependent and internal and external looters hiding behind the veils of international trade and commerce squander their resources.

The fourth point about the African in the Post Cold War era is that the ethnic complexities of the African continent make it the location of the New Tower of Babel. By governing states where diversity is the rule and homogeneity the exception, African leaders owe it to the people to learn and speak the language of tolerance and compromise. The little democracies of Mauritius, Botswana and Senegal of the seventies have recently been joined by a host of other
democracies. This increase in the number of progressively democratizing states is due to the second wave of democratization in Africa. Like the first wind of change, which led to decolonization of most parts of the continent, this new wind of change has ushered in a new day for Africa. The collapse of Apartheid in South Africa and the slow but promising efforts towards transparency in government in certain African states have not sent the signal that many Africans are interested in a new beginning. In areas of the continent where the democratic movement is stymied, as it is in Somalia, Burundi, Liberia and Togo, to name a few, the only way out of the impasse is for the opposition groups to remain steadfast in their quest for democratic government, and the international community must demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that it too stands by the democratic forces in Africa. There are foreign interests that wish ill for the democracy movement in Africa. There are foreign interests that wish ill for the democracy movement in African. As I stated earlier, there are both domestic and international operators who do not want to see political stability and peaceful development in Africa. In countries where ethnicity is a useful tool of political manipulation, such sowers of discord become purveyors of violence. This is what happened in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the Horn of Africa. It is now taking place in Rwanda and Burundi, two countries with two people whose cultures are almost identical, but whose destinies have been separated by the excesses of a military dictatorship. Bent upon staying in power by all necessary means, the military clique in Kigali sees its survival in the politics of ethnic confrontation. They find their match in the Rwanda Patriotic Front, a Tutsi military force bent on seizing power with the help of their ethnic cousins in Uganda. These two groups must sit down and negotiate if lives are to be saved and bloodshed stopped.

What I am saying is that the politics of ethnic violence, creates deadly opportunities for the foreign merchants of death. It also creates the now familiar historically un-African idea of the child soldier. In this closing decade of the present millennium it would be a sad indictment of our generation if we sit idly by and let the Idi Amins, the Bokassas,
and the Marcias Nguemas of the 1990s to decimate thousands of their fellow countrymen and women and then recruit their children into illegal armies where these children learn the art of warfare before mastering the alphabet.

The fifth point about the African in the Post Cold War era is his susceptibility to the virus of religious fanaticism. Owing to the telegenic nature of religious fanatic, and given the fact that the rise of Islamic and Christian fundamentalism has made resurgent religion a new opportunity for those interested in gaining entrance once in Africa, it is becoming dangerous and unwise for African leaders and their people not to pay attention to local and foreign manipulations of religious differences in the continent. This trend of development has serious consequences, if African leaders and their people do not wake up to the dangers of religious wars. Two issues are crucial at this juncture. The first relates to the separations of church and state, and the second deals with the political fall outs of conflicts in which religion reinforces ethnic differences. In such cases the naked brutality of man is rationalized by an elaborate system of beliefs. As the African saying goes, when two elephants fight, the grass suffers. In the Africa of the 1990s, when the Cold War is a fading memory, the specter of the New Cold War could be disastrous. This is particularly disturbing to many African countries where religion cuts across families, kinship groups, clans, regions and ethnic groups. To put across in another way, one should state categorically that when the two fundamentalist elephants fight, the grass of family unity and of Pan-African solidarity suffers.
Africa, Defining the State
By Dr. Awad al-Sid Al-Karsani

Introduction
At the wake of the independence wave during the early 1960s, many African countries adopted 'parliamentary democracy' systems which were inherited from the colonial masters. The legacy and experience of the colonial period brought different fates to different African countries. The adoption of a parliamentary democratic model in societies which are characterized by widespread poverty and illiteracy are anathema to 'stable democracy' a concept that is supposedly linked with the level of socio-economic development. However, many African countries embarked on a trial and error experimentation to discover how to achieve Africa's new identity. These experiments were a product and the work of local and international forces. Ideology which played an important role in the march to attain independence continued well in the post-independence era, specially during the 1960s. Pan-Africanism, Fabianism, Marxism, Democratic Socialism, Maoism and local African heritage were experimented as means to achieve good governance, but in vain. Ideology became a leisure and the property of the disgruntled opposition groups.

The experience of Africa in general, and many African countries in particular, has posed certain challenges to conventional theories on state formation and raised a number of questions concerning the nature of the African state in independent Africa. To many African scholars and statesmen 'the understanding of state formation in Africa depends on the analysis of attempts by Africans to build political institutions which suit their needs in an era when they have been faced by many constraints.'

This paper tries to argue that the present stage of the development of the African state is an incarnation of (and similar to) that of Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at the eve of the transition from the sultanic, paternal and patrimonial state types to the legal-rational one. During this process of state formation the African state disintegrated because it lacked an organic center of gravity capable of pulling the polythnic and multinational groups
together. The hegemony of the colonial semi-capitalist system with its commodity trade economy in the post-independence era deepened the socio-economic crisis in almost all African countries and retarded the evolution of the processes of national integration and rule legitimation. Thus, it became clear that "most African countries have become an adversarial relationship between state elites interested in rule legitimation and national integration, and a large group of increasingly exploited and impoverished societies." (3) State and nation-building became problematic in Africa. This is why the search for good governance poses certain challenges to African scholars and statesmen. Africa is experiencing great social, economic and political experimentation to the extent that theories of state formation are all revisited.

2. Theories of State Formation in Africa:

In this part of the paper I take as my starting point the fact that African scholarship started by preaching 'leadership theorists.' (4) Many of these theorists were influenced by the rising tides of structural-functionalism in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Many of these theories described African leaders as saviours and embodiment of charisma. The future of African societies was projected as dependent on "the performance of those in position of power." (5) This approach was optimistic (recalling the hence USA dominant foreign policy views towards the new states in the 1950s and 1960s." However, it failed to see the real factors and forces behind the untimely erosion of the democratic institutions, the demise of many of the "charismatic" leaders through coup de tat or the transformation of many African countries into single-party states. Apter described Nkrumah's demise in January 1966 as:

"He understood neither charisma nor his native obligations. Nkrumah lacked the imagination and skill to develop a country. He was a revolutionary without a plan - a visionary but not a builder." (6)

The intensification of the Cold War and the rise of the new scramble for Africa in the early 1970s by the two great world powers was responsible for the move from the idealist, charismatic leadership theories into Marxism. The latter theorists were occupied "with the
notion of class and its relationships to the ‘state apparatus.’ This set of theories emphasized the role of neocolonialism in the consolidation of peripheral capitalism. Concepts such as the ‘overdeveloped state’, ‘social formation’ and ‘class’ dominated a whole generation of African scholars. However, these theories, which came at a time of intense nationalist and international struggle, concentrated on criticizing the external factors such as neocolonialism. This is why they failed to see the real problems of African societies.

Of most importance is the attempt to build a general theory in order to justify why the state is both an economic and a political institution. Such a theory is in fact a mixture of structural-functionalism and Marxism. An important feature of this theory is its recognition of the role of the elite, ideology and the state as the most dynamic institutions in African societies. This theory aimed to explain the failure of the pattern of development followed by African and the Third World countries at large in the post-independence era. Models such as ‘import substitution’ ‘export promotion’ and the ‘autonomous state’ were legitimate off-springs of such a theory. The pragmatism of this theory recognized an economic role for the state. However, the theory failed to account why African states failed to achieve economic development. It also failed to see that the dominance of commodity trade with the metropole is the main reason behind disintegration of the African state because of their inability to fulfill the Africans’ expectations.

The rise of such a theory came at a time when many of the African theorists were optimistic. The source of their optimism lay in the relative prosperity enjoyed by Africa during the early 1970s. International aid, which resulted from universal interest in the development of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) was the source of such optimism. This is why both the leadership and the Marxist theorists advocated that the state had entered its consolidation phase.

It is clear that the different theories of state formation in Africa reviewed above were unable to see the historical legacy and the dynamic potentialities of the African societies. This is why most of these theories, specially the Marxist ones and their off-shoots stopped at the level of criticizing the Western approaches and were unable to discover the real forces behind the political turmoil and instability.
which eventually led to the disintegration of the African state. In some African countries this disintegration is not even a matter of debate; “After a seemingly never-ending war, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia forcing the redrawing of the imperial boundaries. Somalia is defacto of the divided into two states, and the civil war in the Sudan has clearly secessionist overtones.”(9)

**The Disintegration of the State:**

The short honeymoon between Africa and international funding agencies and donors abruptly ended, and the disintegration era started. The post-independence African experience became one betrayed promises. Civil wars, *coup d’states*, corruption, unemployment, shanty towns, epidemics, hunger, and desertification engulfed all parts of the continent. “The national projects that began in the colonial period to a large extent have collapsed, reducing remaining state apparatus to little more than machines used by a succession of politicians, generals and warlords to hold on to power.”(10) T. Balogh summarized the situation as “failure on the whole, due to the historical framework in which liberation has taken place. Despite vociferous Pan-Africanism, it is a tale of fragmentation into unit-apart from the Congo and Nigeria (both of which are menaced by strong centrifugal forces), hardly viable and certainly unable to sustain self-supporting development towards quasi-European standards of life.”(11)

Many internal repulsive forces started to work against the state and caused new threats to political order integrity and regime’s stability. Gadzey described that “of the 45 Sub-Saharan African states, 32 are classified among the world’s poorest 64 (LDCs). After three decades of self-rule, the region is still characterized by low consumption, repeated food crises, large external debts, and basic inability to use needed foreign technology.”(12) These symptoms were to a large extent a result of the paradox that while independence opened wide the gates of change, domestic and international forces worked against the achievement of that change.

Firstly, “commodity trade was not a natural outgrowth of African subsistence economies, but was superimposed for purposes other than the incremental improvement in production levels and efficiency.”(13) The imposition of commodity trade played an important role in the disruption of the economic and social fabric of African societies. The
continuity of this trade in the post-independence period as the major economic activity and source of the state revenue was responsible for social tension and conflict. In many African countries “entire sectors of the society and the state have been forced underground, resulting in the progressive informalization of power, loss of sovereignty and increase of marginalization for Africa.”

Secondly, the dominance of commodity trade shaped the nature of state in independent Africa. This dominance is behind the continuity and consolidation of the defunct colonial administration militarism in the form of neopatrimonialism. This is clear in the extensive state supervision and intervention in the economy and social regulations mechanisms. In the realm of the steady decline of returns from exports and the rising protests against the state’s policies, the state resorted to patrimonial forms in the exercise of power. The infra-state phenomenon (regional, ethnic...) which penetrated the nationalist movement and influenced the development of the post-colonial state, resurfaced, marginalising the modern political management matrix.”

This ‘modern political management matrix’ gave way to a severe struggle over which group is to control the state machinery and exploit it to increase which group share of the declining national wealth. The exclusion of large sectors of the population from the state’s spoils, economic opportunity and political rights is the source of unending protests and conflicts. Clapham was right in giving economic grievances the lion’s share in the rise of such protests and conflicts; “Viewed across the region as a whole, economic marginalisation provides a much clearer guide than either ethnicity or even political exclusion to the incidence of warfare in the Horn.”

Thirdly, the fluctuations in the international market in commodity trade prices defeated all attempts towards reform aiming to stabilize African economies. On the contrary, the more Africa followed donor-mandated economic policy reform programs or international advice and implemented the various IMF/IBRD market-oriented reforms, the more African economies are in disarray. The economic locomotive, which has always been to the benefit of the metropole, deepened the African crisis. Economic security and political freedom, which were thought of as the main targets to be attained by the independent state became a myth. In fact, much of ‘the general enthusiasm over
independence was in anticipation that sovereignty would end colonial
domination and economic exploitation, however vaguely defined.\textsuperscript{(17)}
Instead, neocolonialism and the world powers competition and rivalry
dominated the African scene.

4. The International Rivalry

Since the middle of the 1970s African states' policies and moves
were mainly dictated from abroad. The severe armed struggle among
the nationalist factions in liberated Angola brought Africa more closer
to the politics of the Cold War. USA and USSR transcended their
competition and scramble for world domination into Africa. This is
clear in the number of their involvement in igniting or supporting
domestic conflicts. Since 1975 one can count dozens of super powers
direct involvement in armed conflicts. Super powers, represented by an
increasing number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
cultural and social institutes, became an important base for support
activities for domestic conflicts. As early as 1975 Ali Mazrui noticed
that "small committees or cabals of Western intellectuals within
Uganda, partly inspired by Christian Solidarity and partly animated by
the fear of Communism in Africa, conspired to play their part in the
southern separatist movement. They were joined, especially after the
1967 Six-Day War, by Israel, keen to exploit African-Arab
differences.\textsuperscript{(18)}"

Michael Medley reported that: "A recent aid agency contact list in
Nairobi mentioned 54 (NGOs) working in the rebel areas of Sudan. Of
these, 17 - about one-third would regard themselves as Christian
agencies. By comparison only one is a Muslim NGO.\textsuperscript{(19)} Medley
noted that these NGOs are:
- Indigenous churches and other local Christian organizations,
- Transnational resources channeling organizations, and
- Transnational operational agencies.\textsuperscript{(20)}"
Table (1): Christian Operational Relief and Development NGOs in Rebel-Held Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Christian Background</th>
<th>Staff Christianity</th>
<th>Govt. Funding</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACROSS</td>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Mid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Ecumenical</td>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from: Medley, Michael, op. cit., p. 12.

Table (1) shows that many types of Christian missions run branches in the southern Sudan rebel-held areas. Based on their annual expenditure or programs these NGOs funding varies between ‘very small’ ($100,000) and ‘small’ (for less than $1 m ‘ High’ means that there is a policy to recruit practicing Christians and/or that staff are strongly encouraged to engage in religious devotions in the field. "Mid" means merely that the proportion of staff prepared to identify themselves as Christians is likely to be higher than in most of the secular foreign agencies. The table illustrates that “several Christian agencies directly or indirectly engage in proselytisation and support the general running of churches, alongside their relief and development activities.”(21) It is clear that ‘humanitarian’ activities are utilized to advance and mask other policies and strategies.

In many African countries the NGOs became active participants in local political conflicts and cleavages. There is ample evidence of NGOs becoming beneficiaries of the status quo. They have a vested interest in the continuity of turmoil, ethnic and other, fissures of
instability and disappearance of control in Africa. Thus, in the name of strengthening civil society, combating human right abuses, and building the 'democratic traditions' the NGOs were behind the rise of conflict-generating institutions. A lot of evidence for this bifurcation can be reported. The London Based African Rights Organization is actively engaged in defining and constructing an identity for the Nuba Mountains polyethnic groups in Sudan in order to exercise the right of 'self-determination' in case of any future settlement for the conflict in Sudan. African Rights is constructing such an identity out of cultural traits, which are practiced by the Arab cattle-breeders who share the region with the Nuba polyethnic tribes. In Nigeria the NGOs are behind the rise of polyethnic protest which is endangering the very existence and the unity of the Nigerian state. A leaflet engineered by the NGOs encouraging the Nigerian ethnic minorities to revolt against the Status quo reads:

"The injustice thus exhibited did not only manifest itself at the center but also in the regions. Thus Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region were numerically greater than the various ethnic groups of the Benue Plateau axis. The same social organization occurred in the Western Region with the dominant Yuroba group outnumbering the smaller ethnic groups. In the East the Igbo majority dominated the others in the same region."(23)

Medley described some of the NGOs stand against Khartoum Government as biased in favor of the rebels:

Public literature of Christian Solidarity International and of Frontline Fellowship shows a commitment to attacking the Khartoum government that is hardly at all moderated by any recognition of faults on the side of SPLM/A. But this has parallels among secular organizations. Norwegian People's Aid, for instance, says much the same.(24)

Medley concluded his report by saying that: "The humanitarian ideal of making human need the paramount criterion in the provision of assistance is not one that any aid agency is able to realize very accurately in the rebel-held areas of Sudan. In Africa, where many of the newly "emerging political parties and civic organizations typically lack traditions, experience, and fund, and find it difficult to escape factionalism."(26) in such situations some of the NGOs play an
active role in encouraging and nursing factionalism. One can reach a conclusion that NGOs have completely deviated from their humanitarian mission and become active participants and initiators of conflicts in Africa. In fact they are destabilizing African states, serving the interests of international strategies.

5-Destabilizing Elements

The achievement and building of good governance in Africa needs to be preceded by an analysis of the elements that destabilized the continent in the post-independence era. Thus, at the start it is better to acknowledge that the democratic institutions inherited from the colonial masters do not suit the situation and circumstances of Africa. There are no eternal human rules by which people can fashion their collective living and the institutions necessary for it. Liberal democracy institutions reflect the state of development in Western Europe at a specific period of time. This development is not universal. It only suits the conditions of Western Europe and similar societies facing the same conditions of historic development. Democracy presupposes diversities of interests in societies. 'The polyarchy' and the 'interest-group' theories quite explicitly link and illustrate the existence of diverse interests which compete to the influence the decision making process in a democratic polity. However, in Africa or any developing society we cannot argue for the existence of such articulated interest because of the stage of the society development. In Africa one cannot count more than a handful of mass organizations capable of effectively influencing the people and the rulers.

Western Europe built its democratic values and institutions through centuries of civil wars and conflicts among the various classes and interest-groups. Therefore, it is unfair for Africa to inherit such institutions from its colonial masters. For Africa, the self-rule experience has only lasted for few years before the colonial departure. In many cases political parties were hurriedly formed. Some of these parties were installed as rulers, while others were asked to form the opposition and a 'shadow cabinet.' The constitution came to embody the values and experience of another society.

It is natural for political instability and the resort to extra constitutional means to nourish in Africa. When the Nigerian army first intervened in
politics in 1966, the officers who led the coup de tat said that, "they did so to reinforce national unity and eradicate corruption. Six months after, the Nigerian army had become a beacon of national disintegration as it broke up into ethnic and regional factions."(27) Sudan's history, since independence in 1956, alternated between civilian democratic and military regimes. Like the rest of African countries, the Sudanese crisis is essentially a political one. Since independence the country has been suffering from a chronic state of political instability.

Decades of bad governance in Africa have been a primary cause of endemic conflicts and human suffering. As a result, the gap between cultural values, ideals and social reality has widened tremendously. The rule of law gave way to the rule of might. Corruption became a factor of production and a means of wealth accumulation and capital formation. In Nigeria: "It is to be noted that over 90% of the Constitution Drafting Committee, the Constituent Assembly and the pre-1979 ruling military elite were in business at the dawn of the Second Republic- as Ministers, Commissioners, Chairmen, directors, highly placed political party functionaries and/or recipients of major governmental contracts. The same beneficiaries continued their practices during the First Nigerian Republic, the Civil War and up to the date. Corruption contributed enormously to the debilitating erosion of public funds, the economy, national development and political stability. In the words of Forest;

Pursuing the accumulation of wealth through personal connection with those who held state power, helped to ensure that no clear issues or policies emerged from the process of political competition. Economic management, policy making and implementation were exposed to the political pressures of distributive demands, competition for rents and party patronage.(29)

Ethnicity emerged as a consequence of social strife, economic deprivation and political marginalization. Ethnic conflict is mainly an elite-driven conflict between "elite groups who come from different ethnic backgrounds than it is a people-to-people violence among the masses arising from ethnic animosity, as the term 'ethnic conflict' implies ... has a powerful capability of turning into wider spread conflict among the masses."(30) Most of the African ethnic conflicts are
of this elite type group. Recent events in the Great Lakes, the clan based violence in Somalia, the on-going raging war in the Congo, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, to give only few examples, are of this elite-driven conflict. The inability of the independent state to quell and contain the "ethnic elite" ambitions or to fulfill the ordinary people's expectations led to the emergence of ethnic strife. The disgruntled elite who protested against their exclusion and marginalization from state power and resource sharing questioned the very bases for the existence of the state as a united entity.

Ethnic movements which emerged out of an 'elite-driven conflict' have shared some common characteristics:

They are mainly devoid of any ideological content. Ethnic identity is projected as a defensive mechanism against the encroachment of an external enemy. This is why they easily split into warring factions. The absence of ideological commitment labeled these ethnic movements as readily responsive to act as pawns of international strategies.

This quest to court the international community and international strategies is clear in the resolutions of the 7th Pan-African Congress, held in Kampala in April 1994, supporting the right of self-determination as a basic human right and a democratic principle for resolving conflicts in Africa. This declaration reflects the ambitions of the elite. However, it is against the spirit of the age of creating high united entities.

6- How to reconstruct the State?

7- The collapse and the abrupt withering of the African State since the late 1970s raises questions about how to secure individual and group rights in situations of strife and conflict. This issue is a matter of great controversy and debate in today's Africa. Since the early 1990s many local and international agencies and institutions started to talk about a 'transition to democracy in Africa'. Abacha, the late Nigerian dictator, advertised his transition credentials:

*We are now in the process of putting our political crisis behind us, and we are forcing ahead to create a new democratic culture devoid of pitfalls that characterized our past experience. We are satisfied that*
A faithful implementation of Transition Program will address the deep-rooted factors that gave birth to the political crisis.\(^{(121)}\)

From the past recent history of Africa, and "given the weakness of civic associations and the repression opposition organizations, it is striking how commonly opposition in Africa today is led by former insiders who have fallen out of political favor.\(^{(12)}\) This fact characterized the movement to achieve democracy as a dissident clique inside the ruling class. These rings usually mask their ambitions by claiming revolutionary purity in the name of the masses. Slogans raised by the dissident rings such as "national interest ‘and’ international duty" disclose the truth of the existence of solid relations between these local rings and international NGOs discussed above. However, these "transition to democracy" movements end by installing a new elite into office." Decision making in public affairs in African regimes is typically restricted to elites with a narrow social base. Only rarely is the population at large consulted in policy-making."\(^{(13)}\) This is why such movements usually finish with accepting middle-range solutions and compromises to save their own interests.

Africa has experienced all types of rule. Robert Dahl's typology of regimes illustrates the previous hypothesis. African countries move freely from one type of regime to another (authoritarianism, personal dictatorship, military or democracy) without restraints. This reflects the weakness of the African state. The severe competition to seize the state apparatus is also another indicator of this weakness. It also explains the continuity of political instability in independent Africa as a reflection of the sever struggle to manipulate public resources to satisfy private and fractional interests.

This historic stage is similar to that of Europe during the sixteenth century at the eve of the breakdown of Mediterranean long-distance trade. Warfare ignited among the various European feudal states searching for mastery over the scarce economic resources. This warfare led to the rise of the modern European State, which paved the way gradually for popular sovereignty and political participation.

Therefore, the application of federalism or any form of decentralization is the key to address the problems of the African states. It will break down the impetus of authoritarianism through power sharing arrangements and decentralization of power. On the
other hand, the application of federalism or any form of decentralization brings equity in the distribution and division of resources among the various levels of the federal structure. These measures are important to ensure a degree of participation for the rank and file masses. Federalism "is a means to move the institutions and services of a state closer to the needs and interests of culturally diverse groups living within the state. It is a means to provide self-government for lower-level, less spatially extensive authorities, which, as a rule, are ethnically more homogenous."(34)

The deconcentration of power encourages people to participate in the processes of economic development and nation building. The breakdown of the impetus of community trade production is an important condition for the development of independent social forces in Africa. It will break the bondage of dependency and encourages the liberation of the African masses. This liberation will be strengthened by the deconcentration of power. Deconcentration means that the grass roots are empowered to participate in the decision making, especially at the community level. Besides, economic resources are divided and promoted from the basic community level. The application of this experience will guarantee that no privileged ethnic group can dominate the other groups. In this manner the bondage of the old society inherited from the colonial days will dissolve and on its ruins the society of equal citizens is built.

In order to achieve the new society which is a condition for the reconstruction of the state, Africa needs a cultural revolution based on the glorification of technology. African scholarship has to fulfill the new dream to free Africa from the yoke of servitude.

Footnotes:

5) Stark: op. cit. p. 336
6) Quoted in Ibid. p. 337.
7) Ibid. p.336.
10) Ibid. P. 2
13) Ibid. p. 461.
19) Ibid., p. 2.
20) Ibid., p. 7.
24) Ibid., p. 9.
32) Ibid., p. 465.
Africa and Globalization

By Ambassador Ahmed Eltigani Salih

1-The Continent of Africa:

All economists, ecologists, geologists, geographers, historians and sociologists, agree that Africa is the richest continent in the world, as far as the natural endowments and resources are concerned.

Looking for economic wealths throughout Africa, one finds them scattered sporadically in various locations in the continent. Their distribution may be equally even, but it is revealed that oil is found in north and South Africa. The Savannah belt is abundant in animal wealth, both domestic and wild, and in arable land.

Although imperial powers scrambled for Africa and divided it into spheres of influence and tapped as much of the benefits they could lay hands on, what is left over is still in abundance. It is on the basis of this abundance and plenitude of natural resources that we should plan and forecast for the future of Africa, and should promote and foster that future through the application of modern technology its promising future dawn.

Capital and technology are crucial requirements, and once technology has been acquired and utilized, measures should be taken for its indigenization and for building human capacities through training to overcome development hindrances and achieve actual development, which is a challenging task.

2-Ecology and Development.

As far as the above sub-title is concerned, it is found that the imperial powers exerted a scanty effort, or none at all, to further education or equip the Africans with relevant education and modern production machinery technology to utilize their local resources for the welfare of the African peoples.

Africa has the lowest per-capita income among the continents of the world, and accommodates 24 out of 43 countries in the world that are labeled as the least developed countries, as the United Nations records demonstrate. Illiteracy, poverty, susceptibility of diseases and vulnerability to attacks of mass genocide are rampant in Africa in the highest rates.
Africa enjoys an average rate of economic growth and development of 2.5%, whereas such rate varies between 4.5 to 6% in other countries outside the African continent. This confirms the deplorable conditions throughout Africa, and is very demanding upon the United Nations and its affiliated agencies to do something to help Africa to shake off its poverty, avoid pitfalls and shed off its under-development dilemma.

Looking around, we find that a lot has been done for the development of African societies and communities, but still, modern development and welfare facilities entail a lot of services to be provided in the field of modern high technology, for which Africa is in dire need, as it is for education and social services.

3-Trade and Development:

Like a compass that continuously points to the north, African trade has been focused on one area, viz. the countries of the former colonizing powers. This fact couples African countries to their former imperial masters. The advent of the Soviet Union and China as emerging supreme powers had provided Africans with a new route to diversify their trading activities.

Africa has been, and still is, one of the largest suppliers of raw materials to the Western countries, at the expense of the welfare and development of its nations. It is at the expense of African development and prosperity that the Western European countries managed to develop their industrial revolution, built their states and promoted their civilization. It was not only the result of raw materials derived from Africa, but also the result of cheap African labour, which occasionally included free labour provided by enslaved Africans who were captured in Africa and transported overseas. This enslavement has led some African leaders, whether in the mother continent or in the diaspora, to raise a cry for redress for the compensation of what had been stolen or taken through sheer force. The committee formed for this purpose was based in Lagos in Nigeria, and was presided over by the late Nigerian president Moshood Abiola. This issue constitutes a bitter fact and a black spot in the history of Africa, which shall always surface on the top of the relations between Africa and the West.
As previously mentioned, trade between Africa and her Western partners was one-way-directed, and the heavier of the dual carriages was the one that carried goods from the West to African countries. African exports to the West included raw materials and primary commodities. The Western buyers specified the prices; the suppliers had no say. It was only during the seventies, and owing to the efforts of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), that commodity agreements were concluded to fetch better and more reasonable prices for commodities exported by developing African countries to the other parts of the world.

4-Development:

Owing to the limited revenue tapped from the African export trade, development has been held in check. Funds for development were lacking. The export earnings were barely sufficient to cover imports, and in certain cases there were deficits and shortfalls that called for loans which accumulated as time passed on, and have nowadays formed obstacles in the way of development in Africa. Debts have absorbed all revenues plus any additional loans or aids. African countries have enjoyed the notion of additionality as far as their development finance is concerned. The case of development in Africa was, and still is, an acute and chronic headache for so many African leaders. Only a few African countries in North Africa, besides Nigeria in west Africa and the South African Republic in the southernmost fringe of the continent, were able to overcome part of their development problems. Other African countries are still struggling to procure the necessary finance, technology and technical know-how to bridge the gaps in socio-economic development aspects. Efforts exerted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies are taken into account, but during the latest three or four decades, the UN has been politicized, and consequently aid from its various agencies was directed by remote control. So the issue of development in the African continent has been a parabola, one of poverty - fighting in all aspects of life and in all fronts. This led to the migration of skilled and semi-skilled labour from Africa to the Gulf Arab states, Europe, USA, Canada, and recently to Australia and the South African Republic. Migrant Nigerian labour is now noticeable in South Africa.
Development in Africa cannot be discussed without taking into account the wide and open activities of the multi-national companies. These companies have participated in exporting the raw materials, which are abundant in Africa. They have also tampered a lot with the economies of African countries, and some of them have interfered with the political systems in Africa. Political changes in Sudan and coups in Africa were not natural phenomena. Actually, a lot of them can be retraced to the instigations and influence of these multi-national companies. Accordingly, economic development plans were sometimes jeopardized by those changes in the political systems. Instability deterred those wishing to invest in Africa from doing so. They still hesitate to plunge into Africa.

5-Utilization of Natural Resources:

This was the major task of national governments after independence. Previously, most of the African countries were utilizing their natural resources to the benefit of their former colonizers. One of the ensuing effects of independence was a trend to utilize natural resources along the lines of a country's economic nationalization, which in its turn was an outcome of the political awareness and political nationalism.

It was also a product of certain political leaders in Africa who had their background as trade union leaders like Ahmedu Sekotoury of the Senegal, Modibo Ketta of Mali, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Robert Mugabi of Zimbabwe and others.

6-National Independence:

The struggle of African political leaders has been to some extent influenced by the unfair exploitation of the African labour force in one way or another, and in other cases the exploitation of African wealths and resources. During the 1950s and 1960s, most African nations gained their independence, and had to find their own way to develop their economies and buttress their independence. There were three main important factors in this epoch of African history:

1. The appearance of the one-party system, which played a pivotal role in gathering the different political aspirants into a national body that can lead the country to prosperity and economic development.
2. The support of the Soviet bloc vis-à-vis the western colonizing powers. This was lent to African states in order to bring African countries under the orbit and henceforth strengthen their bloc in the cold war.

3. The initiation of UNCTAD. Since its inception in 1964, UNCTAD was supposed to be in the service of the developing countries, particularly in the field of technical trade and developmental advice. Developing countries of the world succeeded in the second UNTD meeting, held in New Delhi in 1968, in establishing the G77—the group of 77 countries at that time—a working and negotiation forum for developing countries as against West Europe, U.S.A. (group B) and, East Europe socialist countries bloc (group D); and China as a group by itself.

As we mentioned, the struggle for independence in Africa had a long and difficult march. There were problems of tribalism, territorial lands conflicts, foreign intervention and other factors. All these had their reflections and effects on the African economic and social fields. Henceforth, issues of political, economic and social developmental nature interwove and intermixed and started impinging on one another. This threw further gloom on the situation.

7-Explotation of Africa:

In such chaotic situations, most African countries were subject to exploitation of all kinds: political, which involved party leaders, tribal chiefs and even military officers; exploitation of economic potentialities and resources of African countries; and exploitation of socio-cultural relations or border frictions between African countries. Such being the case, African states with strong outcome of African Unity had to reflect the concept of fission and fusion. They united against foreign foes and imminent dangers, but then reversed to their former divisions when the threat was over.

These phenomena coincided with open, and, in other instances latent, foreign intervention in African affairs, which obstructed African development in a way, and paved the way for African exploitation in another. The influx of the multinational corporations into Africa had its little local effects. It also produced considerable
adverse effects. This is where we call for a revision of the activities of these companies, especially at the dawning of globalization.

One of the central issues in which globalization is interested is the functions of the World Trade Organization, the issue of trade relations to investment measures. So far, nothing has crystallized in the form or taken the shape of an agreement or guidelines to direct investment related to trade in the world. The African countries need to develop their strategies in as far as the acceptance of investment is concerned.

One of the wholesome signs in this respect is the awareness of the Africans to the activities of the multinational. That awareness is linked to the prevailing developmental needs of the African countries, and is based on economic national aspirations and cooperation among the developing countries within the continent and sub-continental levels. It has also been adopted by several forums where African issues of trade and development are being tackled and discussed.

8. Self-protection through regional and sub-regional integration:

After independence, and in the era of economic-social development, and after encountering several problems and difficulties, the African countries had to look for some sort of protection, for segmentation of their efforts and fortification of themselves in order to face the massive, and occasionally colossal, difficulties facing them in the course of their development.

In their quest for unity and sub-regional invigoration, one can list several groups that were established to assist in the march for economic integration, cooperation and unity:

1. The Organization of African Unity (OAU).
2. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).
3. Commission of East, Middle and Southern States of Africa (COMESA).
5. South Africa Development Union (SADEC).
6. Maghrib States Union (MSU).

It is premature to evaluate the roles of those groupings of integration in Africa. But, on the face of it, some integration groupings
are all right in as far as their orientation and march are concerned. Others are handicapped by the lack of finance and appropriate technical administration, while others adopted western methodology in their style of work and consideration of matters put across to them. Here, we need to assert that the application of western criteria as a yardstick may actually hinder, or occasionally turn down, some countries' applications and rule eligibility to assistance. It is only in the eighties and nineties that the African awareness has been linked to the highly sophisticated methods of the western countries and their verified approaches to control Africa and its resources.

9-Africa and Globalization:
Globalization is a new world phenomenon, introduced by western thought with the objective of making countries of the world come nearer to one another. It is hoped that through the World Trade, being enhanced by the newly created world trade organizations shall increase and close the gaps between countries of the world. Such a goal looks quite noble and human, but the means is very difficult, and its application to African countries is even more difficult, particularly in the issues of accession to the WTO and application of privileges to African countries, i.e. the least developed among them.

10-Why Globalization:
This question has to be answered. Is it because of real necessity felt by both developed and developing countries that globalization is being so forcibly introduced? Or is it because of the out-molded methods, organizations, and institutions, that western countries wanted to invite something new or to renovate the old ones to circumvent Africa and other developing countries?

11-Historical Reasons:
Africa today has a bitter experience with the Briton Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development (WBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There are lots of complaints all over Africa against the prescriptions of the (IMF) and the structural adjustment programmes that (IMF) enforces on African countries.
So many of the African countries took the pills, but their economies felt no good. It took them no further, and accordingly a convicement has sprung among African thinkers, politicians and economists that these world institutions and organizations have put themselves under the instructions of the western powers, particularly the United States of America. This was clearly felt after the demise of the Soviet Union and the appearance of one world power.

It is here that the western powers should look for a way out of this closed blind alley, as far as their relations with the developing countries are concerned. This may be one of the strongest reasons that led to the creation of the WTO as a trade catering organization and a reshaping of world trade relations that would restore confidence between the North and the South at large.

Another important factor is the issue of investment in relation to trade, and the role of the multi-national companies in a new atmosphere of awareness in which to assess the national resources that can be utilized for the benefit of the Africans, if not entirely in their interest, at least and partially in favour of the proprietors of such resources. This is an important change when treating the issue of storage of the resources, particularly in certain parts of the world where resources are scanty. It imposes a threat to those who had an easy access in the past to the resources of others. A third and an equally important factor is to develop a consumer market for electronic industry and technology in developing countries.

The harnessing and utilization of electronic technology has effected a revolution in communications at a global scale which reduced the size of our planet to that of a village. It has resulted in considerable saving of time and effort. Sound, clear and reliable contact is made in seconds; a wholesome catalyst for development. African and other developing sectors of the international community have to be developed to keep abreast with modern technological development and adapt their conditions to concur with it.

The producers of modern technology, i.e. the United States of America, Europe and Japan, need to cooperate and develop consumption markets for their technical products.

It is in the light of these expected difficulties and hiccups that would encounter the developing world that the WTO came into being in 1995 in Morocco at the end of the Uruguay round. The message or
insinuation is transmitted to those who seem unaware of the significance of globalization to act in conformity with the new conditions and restructure their socio-cultural attitudes. Those who grasp the gist of the message shall act accordingly and effect the necessary modifications of their economic and socio-cultural software.

Globalization is a West-European product. It has its cultural roots and socio-cultural effects. It is a form of cultural invasion that may lead to a cultural dominance. African societies have started to look into their historical origins, historical traditional values, and historical cultural traits that would enable and inspire them to fight or adjust to the new globalization phenomena. They need to stick to their old guns and fight with their thoughts, ideas and features of their culture and civilization.

It stands in clear relief that those who are armed with Islamic thought and anchorage can withstand the winds of change, which would bring about cultural change into their respective societies; whereas those who do not have strong attachment to their African wisdom, which is inherent in their cultural traits, shall be susceptible to changes that may produce cultural shocks as strong as volcanic impacts.

The former and late American President J. F. Kennedy has uttered the quotation “Today it is not (He who finances controls), but also (He who possesses information and knows how to control it as well)”

It is evident that Africa of today, is a power to reckon with, particularly after the independence of the Republic of South Africa. Despite poverty and the many least developed countries (LDCs), African countries are positively responding to the sporadic unity calls. This has featured at the two ministerial meetings of trade in Morocco on September 12-16, and in Algeria on September 20-24, 1999.

The first was a preparatory meeting held by the Group of 77 for the UNCTAD meeting in Bangkok in the year 2000, whereas the second meeting was to decide on African position for the third ministerial meeting by the World Trade Organization scheduled to take place late in November and early December in Seattle, USA. The latter meeting was of a technical nature and addressed a number of topics likely to feature on the agenda of the World Trade
Organization. The Secretary-General of the organization addressed the meeting.

Many observers are of the opinion that the future of the WTO is brighter, and the chances of the Africans and other developing countries are greater. It all depends on the solid unified positions on issues on the agenda and those in the pipeline of the new organization.

Apart from this, the African countries are active in their contacts to enhance their cooperation and development. Summit, consultant and ad hoc meetings are taking place to provide the groundwork of studies and reports for appropriate decision taking. The Africans of today are convinced that nobody shall help them before they help themselves, and that with the human and natural resources they possess they can overcome their difficulties.
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict
1997-1998

By: Professor Hasan Makki

Translated By: Dr. Abdulateef Sa’eed,
And Eltayib Mohamed Osman

On the ninth of October 1998, the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) disclosed a new scheme for the reshaping of the Ethiopian-Eritrean relations in the form of a new bid for mediation between the two countries brought forward by Prince Ermiass Sahle-Selase, which he presented in his capacity as the Ethiopian Throne Council Chairman and the grandson of ex-emperor Haile Selassie.

Nothing prevents a person of the calibre of Prince Ermiass to present his view point about such an issue; but it was interesting that that bid was presented under the umbrella of the International Strategic Forum (ISF) in Washington, in whose chambers the American outlook towards the world is usually formulated. It is worth mentioning that President Esayas Afowrki of Eritrea was introduced to the world from that very forum.

The Prince, therefore, on September 24, 1998, enlightened a selected group of members of the American Congress, some top military Americans, and ministers from 22 countries about the developments taking place in the Horn of Africa, figuring out the following two important points:

* A renowned Islamic thinker and politician, now the Dean of the Centre of Research and African Studies, International University of Africa, Khartoum, Sudan.
1. The failure of all declared mediation bids between Ethiopia and Eritrea, including that of Anthony Lake, the ex-American Security Consultant of President Clinton and that of Suzan Rice, the Assistant to the Foreign Affairs Minister for African Affairs on October 7-8, 1998.

2. That the developments of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflicts may extend to include the Sudan and Somalia; and thereby the whole area would be under that threat, consequently affecting Egyptian stability and the flow of the Blue Nile’s waters, which may affect the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement and the security of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, thus jeopardizing international trade and negatively affecting both Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Gregory Comply, the head of the ISSA, declared that what the Prince has said came in the right time, because the Congress would like to play a more effective role in the American administration now, that Prince Ermias is receiving wide support in his endeavor to give the Ethiopian throne a position that goes beyond that of the day-to-day politics, and that the throne has not given up its responsibility as an emblem of Ethiopian national and cultural unity at the present hard times in Ethiopia. (1)

The fact that the American elites adopt the idea of the return to the throne for both Ethiopia and Eritrea explains to me the extent of perplexity among the American circles pertaining to the totality of the developments taking place in the Horn of Africa. It is very surprising that the issue of the throne should be brought forward after two revolutions in the area, one military and the other popular.

The military revolution, called the coup of junior officers which deposed Hailaselase in 1974, and led to radical reshaping and grassroots changes in the nature of the Ethiopian authority. The Popular Front of Eritrea and the Tigray Popular Front in collaboration led the other revolution between both Zenawi and Afowrki. This union succeeded in overthrowing Mengistu’s government and totally doing away with the role of the ruling military group with its Amhara extensions. That union gave birth to the establishment of a political
regime which acknowledged minority rights and subsequently gave Eritrea the right of self-determination since May 1991.

The revival of the issue of the Ethiopian throne after all that political developments is surprising, for the political contemporary tradition is that whenever a throne falls, it falls for good. What is then exceptional about the Ethiopian throne? Does it refer to some special political vitality or some special legality which allows it to return, unlike what happened in Zeidi Yemen at the time of the family of Hamiduddin, whose chain of leaders ended by Imam Al-Badr, the last of its kings?

Some believe that the Ethiopian throne still has more chances, because the royal family continues to represent the national Ethiopian character, which is centralized around the custody the Orthodox Church and the Amharic language, and because the propagation by the royal family of the myth that it descends from Yahot, i.e. King Solomon, gave it some external emotions and external support from international churches, the West and Israel.

However, the American elite presentation of the issue of the return of the throne implies that Ethiopia, to them, has not enjoyed stability since the fall of the Emperor and the termination of the role of the royal family, and that Ethiopia is therefore suffering from bloodshed, disputes and instability because of the absence of the Kingdom.

The presentation of this issue at this time by the Americans also implies a message to all the area and to the two regimes in Ethiopian, consequently throwing on the table these challenging questions:

1. What was the story of this dispute and how did it develop?
2. Has the Ethiopian revolution failed?
3. Has the scheme of establishing two separate independent entities in Ethiopia and Eritrea failed?
4. What is the future of the Eritrean scheme and the Ethiopian one in the frame of ethnic variety and national dispute in the Ethiopian framework?

5. What are the effects of that dispute on the area as a whole, and on the Sudan, Somalia and the Red Sea Coast?

Since May 1991, some peace was hovering over Ethiopia and Eritrea, not because the terms of peace were fulfilled, but because the peoples of (Greater Ethiopia) have suffered a lot from continuous wars and have been longing for security, stability and life in the frame of acceptable situations that preserve human dignity.

That could also be what the nationalities which refuse the independence of Eritrea think about. Those same nationalities also reject the usurp of authority by the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERDF). The ERDF represents for those nationalities the unwanted strength of the Tigray nationality.

Things, however, remained calm except for Somali struggle movement, which was limited to the Ogaden area. The Islamic Union and the Ogaden Liberation Movement led this but that did not form any security menace to the governing authority.

The new Ethiopian authority found its first golden chance when the Oromo Liberation Movement decided to withdraw from the government in July 1991, and when it refused to participate in the elections of June 1992. The Oromo Liberation Movement committed a mistake by so doing, because accordingly, all the fragments of its army were arrested. They were ten thousand fighters. President Zenawi commented on that sarcastically by saying: “It was rather a police operation than a military one.” Ethiopia continued to preserve good relations with the Sudan, though not happy with Sudan’s Islamic address, until the case of the abortive assassination of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995, which led to the deterioration of the bilateral relations to the extent of waging a silent war.
Eritrea, on the other hand, started since 1992 to feel afraid and unhappy about the Sudanese Islamic address. Those Eritrean fears about the Sudan were temporarily hushed when, in April 1993, the Sudan drove away from Kassala the leaders of the Islamic Jihad, and when the Sudan participated in the success of the referendum which led to Eritrean independence.

But the relations deteriorated again after the abortive assassination of Mubarak. Afowrki immediately exploited the deterioration of relations between his country and Sudan by severing diplomatic relations with Sudan. Hence, making Asmara the Centre for the Sudanese opposition. By so doing, Asmara practically adopted the abortion of the Sudanese Islamic experience.

The general picture of the area was then thought to be as such. There is stability and peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea and that the major menace to the two countries is the Sudan. The Sudan then was pictured as the danger that threatens the whole area, because:

1. The Sudan was the centre of Islamic fundamentalism, keen to export Islamic revolution to Ethiopia and Eritrea.
2. The Sudan was branded guilty of trying to assassinate both Presidents Mubarak and Afowrki.
3. The Sudan accommodated the Ethiopian and Eritrean opposition movements such as Oromo, Bani Shangol and Jihad.

Mass media was projecting the dispute between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda on one side and the Sudan on the other side, while the increasing mistrust and doubts between the two regimes of Ethiopia and Eritrea were kept secret until the war erupted on May 6, 1998 in the border town of Badame.

The reasons of the differences between the two regimes are blamed on their contradicting viewpoints on political, economic and cultural matters, as well as the competitive ambitions of the two regimes.
The Ethiopian regime showed some flexibility. It allowed some press freedom, despite the difficulties which journalists sometimes faced. The regime also acknowledged that minorities had a case. The regime held elections in June 1992 for a parliament to pass the constitution. It also held another election in May-June 1995 for the federal and regional congresses. It separated the Republican Headquarters from the Council of Ministers. A thousand foreign observers representing 17 countries observed the elections. Though their reports showed some negative practices in the electoral operation, they passed it as a first exercise in a country, which are devoid of any freedom traditions.

Ethiopian Constitution spells that Ethiopia is a Federal Democratic Republic, and that the government system is parliamentary. Article No 49 of the Constitution spells that all nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia have the right of self-determination, even if they decided to separate themselves from Ethiopia. Each nationality has the right to speak, write and develop its own language. It also has the right to handle its own affairs and establish governmental institutions within its boundaries. The constitution also states that Amhara language is the lingua franca of Ethiopia.

The case was rather different in Eritrea, where the state was overdominant and freedom was jeopardized. All authorities were accumulated in the hands of the Head of State, who was also the head of the governing party and the Prime Minister.

Although the Eritrean constitution gives the citizens the right of congregation, peaceful demonstration and establishing political organizations, and although it prevents unlawful arrest and allows freedom of press, none of all that is actually practiced, because the press is government-owned and there are no political parties. The intellectual and political environment differs in Ethiopia and Eritrea, which leads to a clear difference in scopes and targets.

There was a prevailing strong feeling in Ethiopia that the Ethiopian government had given the Eritreans more than what they deserved, not only by accepting the independence of Eritrea, but also because they felt that their government was weak towards the Eritreans, and that the Eritrean government was actually represented
secretly in the Ethiopian authority, and that some Eritrean elements related to the Popular Front (PF) practiced smuggling under the cover of transit trade, where goods were imported from Kenya and Rwanda tax-free through the Ethiopian borders, while those goods did not reach the Eritrean markets but were sold in Ethiopia. Also, Eritrean companies re-exported Ethiopian coffee for the benefit of Eritrea, to the extent that Eritrea became a coffee exporting country while it did not produce it.

There was a general Ethiopian feeling of discomfort that the Eritrean community in Ethiopia were enjoying all the rights of Ethiopians, while at the same time enjoying the rights of expatriates in the remitting of profits and getting investment grace, and that the cadres of the Popular Front (PF) were there in so many strategic positions in Ethiopia, such as communications, electricity, water and some security circles.

Assab agreement, signed on January 20, 1992, gave Ethiopia the right to use Assab and pass its goods through without tax or customs duties. The revenue was to be sent to the central bank of Ethiopia, who should then pay to Eritrea the cost of the passage through the port in Ethiopian birr.

Another economic agreement spells that Ethiopia is allowed to refine its imported oil at Assab, provided that Ethiopia sells to Eritrea against Ethiopian Birr enough amounts of oil to meet the latter's need. The port of Assab, which is 70 km away from the Ethiopian coast, was inhabited by 40000, the majority of whom were Amhara, and its economy depended mainly on the Ethiopian import-and-export movement.

Differences between the two countries started with an academic issue. The Eritrean Constitution in its article No.55 decrees that: A national central bank should be established, whose job should be to observe money institutions and the national currency. This article caused the Ethiopian elites to think that Eritrea gave itself the right of establishing its own currency, and was on its way to do that. But from
where would that currency get its power and value? And who would need to use it except the exhausted, destroyed Eritrea who had just come out of a destructive war, and whose exports were less than one hundred million dollars per annum?

The issue of the Eritrean currency was just extra fuel added to the already smouldering relations between the two nations. Ethiopia was never satisfied with the economic relations going on between the two countries. According to the economic agreements signed between the two countries, their economy was to be built on one currency. But there was no economic compatibility pertaining to exchange procedures, currency exchange, interest rate, tax, customs exemption and all development policies. All that, according to the Ethiopians, enabled the Eritrians to exploit the law hitches to pull the dollar and the Ethiopian goods ready for exportation towards the Eritrean markets.

Eritrea used to buy the Ethiopian goods for Ethiopian birr then re-export them to get the dollar free of export tax. The Ethiopian Central Bank was giving unlimited loans to Eritreans and to the Eritrean government, until their debt reached 1.3 billion birrs. All the laws and agreements governing this economic relationship were secret, and they were not published in the national gazette, which meant that all those acts were basically political and were not governed by the law.

Eritrean economic policies were then directed towards the exportation of Ethiopian products and Ethiopian half-manufactured materials, towards the exploitation of the bilateral free-market agreements and towards using the Ethiopian market in the distribution of Eritrean exports, which would not compete elsewhere. This, together with the revenue tax levelled on Ethiopian goods which passed through Eritrean ports, the remittances of Eritrean expatriates - including Eritrean companies and Eritrean elites trading in Ethiopia, and the foreign aid and the Sudanese market grants, were too much for Ethiopia to stomach.
By the advent of the year 1997, the personal relations between President Zenawi and his Eritrean counterpart were not strong enough to stimulate him to defend the new developments in the economic relations between the two countries. That was especially conspicuous after the deterioration of relations between Yemen and Eritrea from one side and the Eritrean invasion of the Island of Hennesh. All that made the foreign policy of Eritrea negative to the interests of its ally Ethiopia.

When Eritrea started, in 1997, its procedures to issue its own currency called Nacfa, Ethiopia issued a new birr (a new Ethiopian currency) at the same time. Ethiopia defended her act by saying that she wanted to cancel the old Ethiopian map as well as the mottos of Mengisto’s time such as “Ethiopia Tigdem”, which meant the preservation of the unity and character of the defunct empire. The printing of the new Ethiopian birr costed nearly one hundred million dollars, for they issued 462 new coins. The Eritrean Nacfa was effective as from November 28, 1997, and the same very day was chosen to be the effective date of the new Ethiopian birr. The Ethiopian citizens were given one month only as a period of grace to get rid of the old birr. By December 27, 1997 the old birr was out of use. There started bilateral negotiations to overcome the difficulties created by the appearance of a new currency parallel to and in the strength of the birr, because Eritrea made one Nacfa to be equal to one birr.

The problem was that Eritrea gave herself the right to print a currency that got its power basically from the Ethiopian birr. Eritrea insisted on the freedom of trade between the two countries and wanted the two new currencies to be used equally in both countries. Eritrea depended on the signed economic agreement between the two countries, the globalization phenomenon, that the size of Ethiopian trade with Eritrea did not exceed 5% of Ethiopian International trade, and that the amount of Nacfa used would be equal to the size of birr drawn from the Eritrean market. Finally they argued that such procedure would give the Eritrean economy a chance to develop. Ethiopia refused all that. Trade between the two countries starting
from November 19, 1997, depended on letters of credit and foreign currency. Ethiopian Press was sarcastic about the Nacfa; it said: “Who wants Nacfa apart from Eritreans?”.

Eritrea, on its side, cancelled the old permission for Ethiopia to buy her needs of oil against Ethiopian birr from Assab refinery. So, Ethiopia had to pay in foreign currency for that, and also for the services of Eritrean ports and for passage. Border trade was allowed between the two countries within the limits of two thousand birrs. Eritrean merchants refused to trade through credit accounts and credit letters, but, despite their opposition, they had to abide by those regulations. They were left with no alternative but to do that when importing essential commodities from Ethiopia such as salt. Eritrean authorities interpreted the Ethiopian economic policies as an attempt to abort the experience of Eritrean currency and kill in the bud Eritrean economic independence.

Traders coming from the Ethiopian Tigrai territory were maltreated; thousands of them were driven away with cruelty. Slowly down of loading and off-loading of Ethiopian ships and fleets in Eritrean ports were planned and practiced. This instigated Ethiopia to reduce its dependence on Eritrean ports and direct its trade towards Djibouti, Somalia and Mombasa.

In this context appeared the issue of Assab refinery, which had become old and was meeting 70% of Ethiopian needs of oil. Eritrea asked Ethiopia to modernize it, but the latter declared that she no longer needed the refinery. Ethiopia started importing refined oil from the free market. This compelled Eritrea to close the refinery and sign an agreement with the Italian Agip Company to transfer the old refinery to Musawa.⁶

On January 3, 1998, the Horn International Bank was closed up. It was an Eritrean bank which was given a special permission to work in Ethiopia, though the Ethiopian law does not allow foreigners to open banks. The bank was closed up when it started to trade in the dollar and secretly smuggle the old birr available in Eritrea to Ethiopia.
Those economic procedures led to an increase in the prices of salt in Ethiopia to three times its normal price, whereas the price of tiny millet, called "teff", which was usually exported from Ethiopia to Eritrea, went down in Ethiopia and surged up in Eritrea, where it is the public diet, to the height of 600 birrs, which made Eritrean authorities start a campaign to change the feeding habits.

Another factor that increased the tension between the two countries was the tough treatment by both border authorities. Differences appeared as regards treatment at observation points, loading and off-loading, export-import permissions, licenses and customs declarations. That led to the collapse of trade movement.

The situation was so serious that Ethiopian trucks going to Eritrea were directed to take enough fuel for their return journey in order to evade Eritrean embezzlement, which led to stagnation in the Eritrean filling stations and an increase in the prices of foodstuff coming from Ethiopia to Eritrea, particularly fruits, vegetables, eggs and millet.

The Eritrean government declined to speak openly to its people about its crises with Ethiopia until February 1998, when its President declared in an open meeting, "It is more beneficial to the citizens to know about the conditions of the local markets and prices of consumer goods than speaking about the closure of Assab oil refinery."

He was trying to criticize the Eritreans seeking the news of their own country from foreign media. In the same meeting, Afowrki disclosed the news of another crisis with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and donor organisations. He said that those organisations gave little while interfering in Eritrean affairs. He declared the closing up of the UN Higher Refugees Commission and expelled its officials.

Bilateral relations deteriorated between the two countries to the extent of armed skirmishing on borders. That was simultaneous with
the disturbances in trade relations. At this time, the case of the Lakes appeared in the political scene, and it was immediately linked to the Horn of Africa issue. Eritrea became part of the Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Congo (Kinshasa) orbit.

While matters were becoming worse in Eritrea, President Afowrtki was speaking about making Eritrea the Singapore of Africa, and about the destruction of the Sudanese regime. By so doing, he was trying to attract attention away from his interior front, and was also trying to come closer to the enemies of the Sudan.

Only two months after his assumption of power, Congolian president Kabila paid a visit to Eritrea, where he stayed through 21-23 of July 1997. A year later, on April 8, 1998, he visited Ethiopia, the other poignant, where in one of his speeches he alluded to the foreign interference in the Lakes area which made the area unstable, in a clear insinuation to Rwanda, the ally of both Eritrea and Uganda. It seems that Kabila's visit to Ethiopia was not connected to that deterioration in the relations which began in May 1998 when Eritrean authorities started giving ports workers long vacations, and then continued its systematic decline.

The authorities also stopped ship-pulling and other services. This gave an impression that the Eritrean authorities wanted to close the port. Sometimes they even off-loaded ships after loading them. This was a clear signal to Ethiopia that war had started, because Eritrea had begun to use its power over sea outlets, and so Ethiopia had to use its power over the economy on which the latter depended.

In an attempt to force Ethiopia to sit down and negotiate economical matters, Eritria, starting with the Nacfa issue, raised a number of hot issues, including the refining of the borders and the recovery of the sector of Badame, Zalibisa and Sharu.

The long-standing differences over this area had been tackled through peace and war for many times between the different Eritrean political organisations and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Tigray. The Tigray Front argued that since none of the political systems was in a position to sign an agreement defining the borders, that issue should be suspended until the establishment of elected governments. Throughout the seventies the Popular Front for the Liberation of Eritrea supported the Tigray Front in its dispute with other Eritrean parties. Accordingly, the other parties pulled out of the area, leaving it to become one of the strongholds of the Tigray Liberation Front. It is quite known that a number of the leaders of that front, such as Siom Mesfin, the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, were born and lived in this area.

When the issue of the ownership of the area was raised after they had been established, the two governments agreed on seeking a peaceful, legal solution through negotiations, provided that the two countries continue to observe the old borders inherited from the government of Mengisto until a suitable solution was agreed upon. Then an agreed solution was struck. But when political tension increased, the border file was reopened and a border committee was named. It met on November 14, 1997 in Asmara, and was helped by some technical committees.

In March 1998, the two sides agreed, through correspondence, that the Borders Committee should sit on May 6, 1998. But then from March 23 to April 1, 1998 President Clinton of the USA made his visit to Africa, in which 400 persons, including his wife, his bodyguards, businessmen and CIA agents, accompanied him. President Afowrki refused to go to Kampala to meet Clinton along with the group of selected African presidents. Before that he apologized for not being able to meet USA Foreign Minister Madline Albright when she made a preparatory visit for Clinton's round. Afowrki immediately made his first visit to Libya, where he met Gaddafi.

Before the scheduled time of the Borders Committee meeting, a big border fight occurred in the area of Badame, when a fully armed Eritrean contingent entered the area. Neglecting the Ethiopian police's orders to hand over their arms before entering the town (according to
the agreement signed between the two countries), the Eritreans opened fire, and many were killed on both sides. The situation was later controlled, the Border Committee meeting was held on May 8, 1998 in Addis Ababa, and it was agreed that another meeting should be held in Asmara within two months when more information had been collected. The Eritrean forces should evacuate the areas, which they occupied in the Badame territory on May 6, 1998.

But that did not solve the problem. The Eritrean forces were seen in increasing numbers at Badame area. This caused the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian armed forces to phone the Defence Minister twice on the 10th and 11th of May 1998 in vain. Then President Zenawi communicated with the Eritrean government through its ambassador in Addis Ababa, and he again telephoned President Afowrki. But nothing came out of all that, because the Eritrean forces, backed by tanks, attacked the Ethiopian land, drove away Ethiopian forces and completely occupied that region.

The Ethiopian government was compelled to put the matter before the Council of Ministers, and before the Parliament on May 13, 1998. A strong denunciation statement was issued, and the Eritrean act was described as illegitimate, against international law and a violation of the agreements signed between the two sides. Eritrea was called upon to withdraw its forces; otherwise Ethiopia preserved for herself the right to defend its unity, safety and dignity. The Ethiopian government prepared her forces to defend its supremacy and its territorial unity, and deployed its troops along the common borders with Eritrea.

The region's political environment was shocked by the events, because attention had totally been directed towards the anticipated conflict between Sudan and what appeared as an alliance against it comprised of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. The American administration never expected that events would develop in that manner; so, an American delegation led by Susan Rice reached the area on May 16, 1998, in an attempt to solve the problem through
American-Rwandan mediation, using shuttle diplomacy. The Vice-President of Rwanda Paul Kajimy participated as a member of the delegation.

The choice of Rwanda by America as a partner in the delegation raised many questions, because Rwanda is a small country and is not part of the political setting of the Horn of Africa. It is also of less weight than Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria. Therefore the mediation was devoid of a weighty partner. Secondly, the mediation was hasty, and lacked the appropriate understanding of the complications of the area. It seems that America had wanted to make use of Rwanda as an ally of Eritrea, but Rwanda disappointed America and withdrew when she discovered that she was not welcome.

The American-Rwandan mediation suggested that the two sides should accept a solution built on the following points:

1. Solving the dispute through peaceful and legal means. Other problems arising should also be solved in the same way.
2. Respect of established principles; logic of power should not be resorted to while solving any of the arising problems.
3. Taking necessary measures to ease the tension.
4. Identification and lining of the borders on the basis of colonial and international agreements and relevant international laws.
5. Appointment of an observational team from Rwanda supported by the USA to stay in Badame to ease the tension and stipulate suitable conditions for solving the dispute.
6. Eritrean forces should pull away from the areas which it had occupied on May 6, 1998 within 24 hours of the arrival of the observational team in Badame.
7. Reinstating the Ethiopian civil administration in the area that was under its administration before May 6, 1998.
8. Investigating the causes of the May 6 events in order to achieve permanent peace.
9. Boarders should be settled as follows:
   a) Borders should be identified according to colonial agreements and international law applicable in these areas in consultation
with the United Nations and the necessary technical committees.
b) The two disputing sides have the right to feed the Committee
with any necessary written or oral information.
c) The two sides should vest in the Committee the necessary
power and authority, and should abide by its resolutions.
d) Rapid disarmament at the borders and stopping military
operations.

Ethiopia accepted the American-Rwandan mediation, whereas
Eritrea refused it through its President Afowrk, who said,
"Withdrawal from Badame is immoral and is practically impossible."

The dispute was then switched to the Ministerial Council of the
OAU, then to the conference of the African leaders in Ogadogo, the
capital of Burkina Faso on June 10, 1998, where it was decided that:

1) The conference expresses its great concern over the dispute.
2) The conference endorses the recommendations of the Ministerial
Council in its sixty eighth session, which are included in the
recommendations of the American-Rwandan mediation committee.
3) Sending a presidential delegation headed by the chairman of the
present session to both Ethiopia and Eritrea.

On June 8, 1998, the presidential delegation, led by President
Blaze Kompari, and including President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe,
the President of Rwanda, the Foreign Minister of Djebouti and the
General-Secretary of the OAU, paid a visit to the disputing countries.

The delegation met Zenawi in Addis and Afowrk in Asmara.
But the mission of the delegation failed, because, as the Secretary
General of the OAU, Salem Ahmed Salem, said, Eritrea rejected the
American-Rwandan plan, which was accepted by Ethiopia and adopted
by the OAU.

However, the OAU delegation decided the establishment of a
peace mechanism for the continuation of the efforts for solving the
problem through peaceful means. Fact-finding should also continue about the authority, which was administering the town of Badame before May 12, 1998.

Rwanda, however, decided to withdraw from the American mediation due to Eritrea’s refusal of that mediation.

The OAU efforts, which were started after its conference at Ogadogo, held on November 7, 1998, continued under the chairmanship of President Blaze and the membership of Mugabe, Hassan Jolette and Mohammed Sahnoon, the representative of the UN Secretary-General. This committee put forward its suggestions before Zenawi and Afowrki separately. But negotiations ended into nothing, because Eritrea refused to withdraw from Badame and Ethiopia refused to enter into any arbitration before Eritrea’s withdrawal. Judging by all that, Ethiopia could be considered a winner on the (diplomatic war front).

When the case was presented at the Security Council’s meeting on June 26, 1998, the Council issued the following resolutions:

1) Denouncing of the use of power, and asking the two sides to stop hostilities immediately and not to use any power any more;
2) The Council welcomes the two sides’ respect of the declared truce. They should stop all threats of war and stop carrying out any air bombardment.
3) Calling upon the two sides to do their best to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute.
5) The United Nations Secretary-General puts the services of his office at the disposal of any efforts that support a peaceful solution and the establishment of a fund for that purpose, and calls upon all governments to participate in its establishment.

The Ethiopian diplomacy was able to gain to its side the OAU, the Security Council, the Union of African Parliaments, the European
community and the Congress of Non-Alignment. But what about the actual nature of the dispute after May 12, 1998?

Since the beginning of the hostilities on the borders on May 13, 1998, the Eritrean citizens living in Ethiopia became subject to basic human rights transgressions such as deportation without crime, which led to the dissipation of families, and the increase of human suffering, such as leaving children without guardians, confiscation of property, maltreatment of innocent Eritrean citizens and Eritrean pregnant ladies. Even students on scholarships as part of programmes of educational exchange between Ethiopia and Eritrea were not left alone.

The Eritrean reaction against Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea was not better. All that taken into consideration, the two countries started military offensive to create ‘facts on the ground’. The armed forces of the two countries faced at Lambsa, Illinna and Ija, starting from Wednesday May 30, 1998. As it is usual in such wars, casualties were great among civilians, who left everything and escaped for dear life. At Zalmisa, Eritreans seemed to have victored, but the town was destroyed completely and evacuated of its inhabitants.

Then the war of air bombardment started on June 5 and 6, 1998, when the Ethiopians made two air raids, attacking the airforces in Asmara. But the Eritrean airforce hit an Ethiopian fighter and captivated the Captain. That captive was Butrus Bzania, the brother of the exiled politician Bini Butrus, the Chief of the Alternative Power for Democracy and Peace in Ethiopia (APDP).

Then the Eritrean planes attacked Meckli, the capital of the Tigrai territory and the source of their passion and pride. The planes also hit a primary school and killed many civilians. The war continued on the road to Assab. There, Ethiopia said that she had killed 2,000 of the Eritrean Special Forces elements. Eritrea responded by displaying the Ethiopian war captives in a procession in Asmara.

On June 12, 1998, Ethiopia hit at the Eritrean elites who lived in Ethiopia when it declared precautionary measures against the
Eritreans who might endanger the national security of Ethiopia. That was reflected in the following actions:

1- Arresting Eritrean Popular Front cadres who lived in Ethiopia and those who were responsible for administering the Front’s centers and quarters, as well as its veteran fighters and recruits - about 1000 - who, the Ethiopians doubted, had some relations with the Front’s security system.

2- The driving away of thousands.

3- Confiscation of properties, companies and accounts continued. That was a heavy blow against Eritrean community and its extensions inside and outside Ethiopia.

On June 15, 1998, President Clinton succeeded in convincing the two leaderships to stop air assaults until foreigners had been evacuated, and another peaceful solution was given chance. Airways stopped their journeys to Asmara and all Northern Ethiopia starting from May 12, 1998. Clear and decisive orders were given to Ethiopians not to use the ports of Assab and Musawa. The Ethiopian armed forces were 45 miles away from Assab. It is worth mentioning that Assab is 400 miles from Addis Ababa.

After air raids had been stopped, foreigners started quitting Asmara. The first to leave were the Israelis. Simultaneously, the last batch of Falashas was sent to Israel from Addis Abba (they were sixty.) Embassies of Israel, Holland and Germany in Asmara closed up completely, whereas the Russian Embassy switched to Djebouti. Britain withdrew 62 of its citizens from Asmara after the declaration of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The behaviour of the two governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea showed that the war was not only waged for the sake of gaining the 400 sq. km over which the dispute erupted, but was also meant for revenge.

Eritrea is planning for military and economic superiority by establishing security nets ready to move in Addis Abba at the zero hour to cause chaos, destruction and political assassinations; this is because Eritrea believes that the greatest threat to its independence is Ethiopia.
That was why it made herself ready for a long war against the (old empery), in order that it disintegrates it through civil wars between its different nationalities.

On the other hand, many groups of Ethiopian political powers look at the independence of Eritrea as an unforgivable folly and consider Eritrea a cancer gland in the body of the Ethiopian State, which must be eradicated. War was a good occasion for expressing such emotions. Ethiopian demonstrations used to carry portraits of the emblems of the Ethiopian Empire such as Theodore, Yohannes and Menilik. That happened for the first time since the advent of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF) to power in Ethiopia. The empery emblems had been looked at in the few previous years as emblems of dictatorship and injustice against different Ethiopian communities. Ethiopia understood the border operation as an Eritrean message based on the right of might, as if saying while hitting “Have this!” The war led to the reshaping and resetting of alliances on both interior and exterior fronts in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Ethiopian opposition is not happy about the way the Revolutionary Democratic Front is governing the country. They feel that the Front’s political practices reflect its negations of the others; yet, because Ethiopia is subjected to invasion and bombardment, the opposition is ready to put its political differences aside and defend the country. Ethiopia must not be in danger; its supremacy must be preserved, and the security of its peoples must be taken care of.

The only exception in this Ethiopian unity against Eritrea was the Oromo Liberation Front, who took sides with Eritrea, saying that the disputes were exaggerated. This position of the Oromo Front led to differences among its files and a reshuffle in its political bureaus in which eight of its officials lost their posts.

As a result, the Council of Ethiopian Opposition Parties (a group of eight parties) met in Paris on Sep. 13, 1998. The meeting chose Dr. Negede Gobeze as Chairman to the Council of Ethiopian Democratic Powers Alliance. Then Arijawi Berhin, representing the Tigrai Democratic Movement, was selected as deputy to Dr. Negede,
whereas Mammu Yahun was appointed Secretary-General. Progress of Mankind Foundation (PMF) paid the expenses of the meeting, which resulted in the following resolutions:

1) Eritrean invasion is denounced, and a quick solution for the dispute is required.
2) The Council rejects armed violence in dealing with the Ethiopian authority and adopts peaceful political action.
3) The Council has decided to participate in the year 2000 elections in Ethiopia for a new parliament.

As a reaction to this meeting, the Oromo Liberation Front made demonstrations in America, declaring that the Oromos are not concerned with this war, that the Oromos have their own dispute with the government, and that the blood of the Oromos must not be shed in this war.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean community in North America was subject to another division and a new complication. There live between 300–500 thousand Ethiopians, some of whom are skillful and educated and are proud of their culture and traditions, though most of them are Amhara. There are also many Oromos and Eritreans there, while there are 70,000 Jewish Ethiopian Flashas in Israel.

On the other hand, war unified the elements of the interior front in Eritrea, which were not happy about the fact that Eritrea was fighting the Sudan. But the Eritrean fronts abroad (mainly Islamic Jihad, Islamic Khalas and the groups of Eritrean Liberation Front) looked at the matter as a dispute between oppressors and dictatorial systems. Though they believe that the area of dispute is an Eritrean land, they still hope that the war will weaken the two systems and get them rid of the Popular Front regime, which they hope will be replaced by a democratic, national system pardonable to nationalists and allowing freedom. The Revolutionary Council differs from other fronts by its refusal of war and calling for dialogue, peaceful solution, interior reconciliation and democracy.
War led to limitless suffering amongst both Ethiopians and Eritreans, who fled in hundreds of thousands from border areas. Sixty thousand were victims of expulsion on both sides in the period of May-December 1998. Some committed suicide, some died under torture, and the stories narrated by those driven away have it that:

1) Some were taken by force and pulled off their jobs and families.
2) They were not allowed to contact their families nor make any preparations.
3) At times whole families were driven away, in some cases fathers without their children, and in other cases mothers without children.
4) Some died as a result of shock when their children were kidnapped.
5) Some were shot dead, some burnt, and some tortured to death.

Some stories said that:
1) Refugees' main needs were housing, water, clothing and cooking utensils.
2) Water was poisoned
3) Bombs were planted
4) Spies were everywhere
5) Sabotage prevailed

Amnesty International (AI) expressed its concern over the violation of human rights in the two countries due to arbitrary driving away of people, imprisonment and ethnic hatred. Such organizations became arenas for confrontations between Ethiopia and Eritrea in cases of human rights violation. The dispute enhanced the culture of hatred and maximum warlike activities. The stories told by both sides about the violations of human rights can hardly be believed. According to the story told by an escaping Ethiopian from Eritrea, the Eritrean authorities closed up the Ethiopians who refused to work in the salt pits in a container after lashing them severely, where forty of them died due to suffocation, high temperature and lack of ventilation.

According to a German team who were working among the tribe of Tigray in eastern Tigray, Eritreans, after their occupation of the area, destroyed the church and violated ladies. Equally bad deeds are
also credited to Ethiopians, to the extent that James Folly said on August 6, 1998 that the American government was observing closely what was happening to Eritreans in Ethiopia. Ethiopia retaliated by saying that America was concerned about Eritreans because they were rich and elites, but not concerned about Ethiopians who were maltreated in Eritrea because they were poor workers whom nobody bothers about.

There were stories that some people were burnt alive. The effect of human rights violations was clear on the stance of the Europeans who supported the American-Rwandan mediation. But the Europeans insisted that both sides should observe human rights, adding that failure to observe human rights would affect peace negotiations and would affect the European position towards them.

AMERICAN-ISRAELI POSITION IN THE DISPUTE

After the bombing of the two American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, America became less interested in the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute.

The eruption of war in the Lakes also reshuffled the loyalties. Ethiopia required that all foreign forces should pull out of the Congo, which meant a clear support for President Kabila. In another connected move, the Rwandan Foreign Minister withdrew from the mediation committee, when Eritrea refused the American-Rwandan mediation, saying, “Since the OAU will adopt a similar proposal, and since one of the two major sides refused the mediation, we think it is necessary for us to withdraw and continue working in an independent manner as President Musevini is doing.” So America found herself in confrontation with her major allies in the area, i.e. Rwanda and Uganda, who supported Eritrea.

When the USA stopped selling arms to Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Ethiopian newspaper the Monitor compared that American act to that of Carter’s administration when it refused to sell arms to Ethiopia and Somalia during their 1977-78 dispute, which caused Ethiopia to join the Soviet Camp. Ethiopia, however, expected that there would
be an international denouncing of Eritrea and that an international embargo would be ruled on it as was the case with Iraq.

When OAU denounced the American hit of the Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory in Khartoum on August 21, 1998, Ethiopia supported that stance, while Eritrea contradicted it. Yet the Americans continued to support Ethiopia; David Shini, the American Ambassador, said, "The American policy stands with the fact that Eritrea has openly invaded an Ethiopian land."

David Shini added in an other interview, "Any sort of instability, political, economical, social or religious, has its disastrous effect on foreigners. This includes American investments. There is very limited foreign capital which chases many attractive areas around the world; and if the countries of the horn of Africa need more of that money, they should prove that they are politically stable and devoid of disputes".12

In an interview on the Eritrean television on Sep. 17, 1998, President Afowerki accused America of complicating the problem, adding that the Americans are looking for a quick solution, and that they failed to denounce the bombing of Eritrea which was meant to force her to surrender. Americans, according to Afowerki, wanted to pour medicine into the patient's throat in one gulp. He also accused Israel's Primier of sending ten Meig 21 Ethiopian fighters back to Ethiopia after repairing them in Israel. Four of them arrived at mid September. According to the Jerusalem Post of June 7, 1998, "Eritrea has plunged herself into irrational border difficulties, even with Sudan and Djeobouti. Pertaining to the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Clinton has previously praised Ethiopia and Eritrea, saying that they represent a new trend of African awakening."

Notwithstanding the siding of Israel with Ethiopia, some Israeli experts continued their training of Eritrean troops, and when Ethiopia asked for Russian trainers for her airforce, six, all of Jewish origins, arrived.
USA did not close the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute file when Eritrea rejected America's mediation, but announced that she was sending off a high American delegation led by Antony Lake, the ex-National Security Consultant of President Clinton and the mastermind behind the strategy of exhausting the Sudan through its neighbours (the alliance comprises: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and the other pro-American countries in the Lakes area). That was preluded by a telephone call between Sandy Berger the National Security Consultant to the President and Esayas Afowrki on Monday September 16, 1998, concerning the mission of Antony Lake. The fruits of the Eritrean declarations on 8/9/98 pertaining to Antony Lake's mission were as follows: "Endeavours to reach a peaceful solution to the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea are no more effective due to the unwelcome intrusion of the American team, which is responsible for liaising between the two sides. Those unpermitted continuous intrusions by the American team and the Secretary General of the OAU added to the negative effect of the OAU mediation and have dwindled its outcome."

Antony Lake arrived on October 7, 1998, at the head of an American delegation representing Foreign Affairs Department, the Defence Minister, the National Security Council and the CIA. He said that he had come with new ideas that he refused to disclose. He met President Afowrki, then President Zenawi and he was supposed to return to Asmara carrying Addis Ababa's point of view but he did not, which meant the failure of the American mediation that consequently brought the two countries on the verge of war.

America has thrown herself into a dilemma when it adopted the idea of mediation and convinced others to support it without the Eritrean concert. Ethiopia on the other hand went to extremes when it abided by the literal conditions of the American mediation, which were based on the withdrawal of Eritrea. Eritrea narrowed her own chances for a solution together with those of the international community when it dealt with the American mediation in a selective manner.
America, therefore, was the biggest loser after Ethiopia and Eritrea in this dispute, because its strategy failed in the whole area. And its allies all over the area entered into a state of war against each other (Ethiopia against Eritrea, and the Congo against both Rwanda and Uganda).

Not only that, but the war had also pushed Eritrea towards the Arabian region and the other enemies of America in the area, specially Libya whom Afowrki visited five times during the year, violating the air embargo. The last of these visits was in October 1998, when a high Libyan decoration of honour was bestowed on him. Afowrki has also refreshed his relations with Sudan, Yemen, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The tearing of the Ethiopian/Eritrean American alliance gave birth to a new alliance between Ethiopia, Djeoboute and France. The French Minister of Defence visited Ethiopia in April 1998, and the Ethiopian-French bilateral relations developed. On the other hand, Ismail Omer Jelly, Minister of Defence and Security and the head of President Jolied’s office and his expected successor, issued a declaration that he did not oppose the issuing of a common currency with Ethiopia nor the establishment of a confederation with her; that he rather believed in the necessity of the integration of the Ethiopian-Djeobuti market and rejected the military bases and the French guardianship on his country.

This means that the Ethiopian leadership has started to collaborate with the Djeobuti leadership. It is known that the latter is a Muslim leadership, and that Ethiopian imports and exports have started to pass through a Muslim area in east Ethiopia (Derdawa sector), which means that the majority of the Ethiopian trade has switched from the plateau area to the Muslim area. This is of course totally rejected by America and Israel despite their support to Ethiopia.
CONCLUSION

Ethiopia and Eritrea have reached the stage of no return in their dispute. The dispute is no more a 450-km border dispute. It has become a struggle for power and domination in the Horn of Africa. Academicians and geographers may say that these disputed areas according to the Italian Colonial maps belong to this or to that of the disputing sides, others may disregard Italian maps, arguing that Mosellini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was illegitimate. Nonetheless, all that would not make any change in the situation. Unfortunately, the peaceful coexistence and integration between the two countries has collapsed for good.

Whether war erupts or not, things have complicated. An era has ended, a new one is emerging; and the two countries are destined to go into opposite directions and tracts. The collapse of Afowrkī’s regime or the reform of Zenawī’s would not change that fate. Alas, the era of dreams and longing for integration has elapsed forever.

The new era will be the era of loss and gain, calculated economic relations and balances of power.

Freedom shall shine in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djeoboute, Somalia and the Sudan. A new spirit of political and popular revision shall emerge. Nationalities, regional politics and and a new rôle played by elites shall be emphasized, because that alone is able to absorb tensions and acrimony.

Tension is not restricted to the borders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also found deep there inside all the countries of the region. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. There is no way out of these tensions but the way of freedom and the establishing of states on institutional bases; otherwise things shall remain unresolved in this AIDS and malaria infested area. The results of a recent statistical study show that 2.5 million Ethiopians are affected by the AIDS virus and that half of the Ethiopian male youngsters may die of this disease within the coming decade. Two thirds of the inhabitants of this area are hit by malaria and are subject to malnutrition and famine.
Eritrea still suffers the results of war and destruction of life and properties, reflected in the generation of the orphans, the deprived, the crippled and the deformed. The last thing that this area needs is war, if it ever needs any. War means extra human sufferings, reopening of old wounds, involuntary immigration, dislocation, homelessness and death. If - God forbid! Another war broke; death would be in hundreds of thousands.*

Border confrontations are expressions of internal and external suffocations. It is imperative that these suffocations must be eased by the exercise of more freedom, more recognition of the rights of others, more recognition of different nationalities and the solution of the crisis of identity and recognition of the rights of Muslims. 60% of the inhabitants of this area are Muslims. This area must go back to the geography of the Islamic world. Ethiopian Muslims are twice the number of Sudanese Muslims, equal to the number of Muslims in both the Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula. The Ethiopian Muslims are many in quantity, will in quality.

A new formula must be sought for the recovery of their identity, presence and value. However, should that be done through peace or war, they must recover their usurped position. Then they would represent the cornerstone of stability and peaceful co-existence in this area.

* The translator: Unfortunately this prophecy came true. The war erupted and hundreds of thousands are actually losing their lives now (February 1999).
Endnotes

1 Addis Tribune 14 August 1998.
2 Nača was named after Nacfa, an Eritrean village at lowland area, from which the popular front of the seventies started its operations.
3 Addis Tribune, over 300 million birrs - The cost of changing Ethiopia’s note, 10/10/97.
5 Modern Eritrea newspaper 28 February, 1998 No 88 Ministry of Information Asmara Eritrea, an open meeting between the President and the people.
6 Modern Eritrea newspaper 26 February 1998.
7 I depended on building up of the dispute story on the Ethiopian point of view, because I did not find a complete Eritrean story. Eritrean, even, says that Badame was never under the Ethiopia’s view point at the press release of the Ethiopian Embassy, Washington 13/8/98 http://www.africanews.org/africa/ethiopia stories 1998/08/13 feat/html.
8 Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Khartoum, background and story of the Eritrean aggression.
9 Opte Ethiopian Embassy Washington, 13/8/98.
12 Ethiopian Embassy, Washington, a declaration on 18/8/98.
THE ATTITUDE AND REACTION
OF THE ISLAMIC GROUPS TO US/UN INTERVENTION IN
SOMALIA 1991 - 1995

Dr. Mahasin Hag al-Safi

Since the early 1980s, Somalia became one of the main areas of American military presence. Siyad Barre agreed to give America access for its forces in an agreement which facilitated USA intervention by offering a foothold for its Rapid Deployment Force, in anticipation of developments in the Gulf, Afghanistan and Iran. In return, Somalia got military aid equivalent to fifty million dollars (1) a sum which Siyad badly needed at the time, though other sources tended to minimize American efforts of assistance to Barre. David Rawson argues that development funding outweighed military assistance (2) Hirsch and Oakley maintain that military aid fell from $33 million in the fiscal year 1984 to $14 million in 1985 and $7 million in 1986. Economic aid fell from a peak of $100 million to $70 million in the same year (3)

After the collapse of the Siyad Regime the USA in December 1992 championed a peace-keeping effort with the approval of the United Nations to restore peace and protect the humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The Islamic groups were skeptical of American motives behind that effort. Al-Ithad al-Islami fought against the SSDF in the Mijertein accusing them of collaboration with American intelligence units in an effort to invite international intervention in Somalia (4) Leaders of the Islamic Movement in Somalia firmly believe that the main purpose behind American intervention was to hinder the possibility of the formation of an Islamic state in Somalia. They feel that the USA was trying to stop Muslim elements from taking advantage of the absence of political power and the vacuum thus created to spread Islamic revivalist doctrines which would threaten American interests in the area (5)

The Islamists argued consistently that American intervention in Somalia was directed against Islam. It is against this background that
the Islamists both in Somalia and outside made a direct appeal to the Islamic World to voice their opposition to it. Ali al-Sheikh Abu Bakr a Somali intellectual, states, "The responsibility to save Somalia is purely an Islamic one. The situation is very serious and entails an urgent response from the Arab and Islamic countries to move quickly to aid their fellow Muslims - the Somalis." (6)

Speaking at the inaugural session of the Second Conference of the Arab and Islamic Association held in Khartoum in December 1993, Hassan al-Turabi, the well-known Sudanese Muslim scholar and the Head of the Association, blamed the Arab and Islamic countries for the lack of interest in what was happening in Somalia. He also expressed his disappointment with regard to the insufficient aid the Somalis were getting from these countries. This factor paved the way for the West return to Somalia in a crusade to revive colonialism exploiting United Nations wealth and power. This allowed them to impose their ascendancy on the future of the Somalis, end their independence and stop Islamic Fundamentalism. Turabi was even more critical of the fact that some Arab and Islamic countries gave their support to foreign intervention in Somalia military, financial and moral. He hailed the firm resistance shown by the Somalis against the Invading Western forces. He renewed his appeal to the Arab and Islamic World to provide urgent assistance to Somalis in the form of medicine, food, etc (7)

Nabeel Shabib attributed the intervention of the USA to the complete absence of Arab and Islamic effort in Somalia since Siyad Barre's era. (8) Shariff Bashir also blame the Arab and Islamic countries individually and collectively for not being able to help the Somalis. Both the Association of the Islamic Conference and The Arab League played a very poor role because of the limited means at their disposal, and also because the actions and attitudes of their members were largely affected by that of the United Nations. (9)

Dr. Ibrahim Sheikh Muhammad al-Dosougi, the spokesman of the Islamic Movement in Somalia, criticized the United States intervention in Somalia, describing it as a natural outcome of the New
World Order which has one of the main items on its agenda the destruction of Islam and the Islamic movement. He was however equally critical of the delayed response from the international Islamic community. Aid organizations from the Muslim World came only too late, after American intervention. With the exception of the Islamic Aid Organization (Hayat al-Igatha al-Islamiyya), which has contributed positively to the humanitarian effort, others did not. Dr. Dousogi was shocked at the fact that none of the Arab and Islamic leaders bothered to visit Somalia at the time of the crisis, while nine European ministers had done so within one month. This was equally true of the leading figures of the Islamic revivalist movement.

The fighting groups and the factions who were also anxious to enhance the role of Islam in Somalia viewed American intervention as a campaign against Islam. The Somali National Alliance (SNA) in one of its press releases explained the US intervention as an "extermination of the colored Muslim Somalis and Nigerians setting one against the other by US and UNOSOM forces."(11) They repeatedly questioned the motives that prompted "the disillusioned Pakistani troops to get themselves involved in this criminal and unholy war of annihilation waged by the Americans on the Muslim Somali Nation".(12)

In another press release in July 1993 addressed to the Islamic states, the SNA drew their attention to the reasons behind the American intervention in Somalia which was directed against the Islamic faith and its places of worship; troops have pulled down mosques and violated them in a manner insulting and harmful to Muslim feelings.(13)

The attempt made by SNA and its chairman, warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid, to raise Muslim slogans, was however, understood by the leaders of the Islamic Movement in Somalia as a pretext to attract the Muslim Somalis because they realize that Islam plays an important historical role in Somalia in uniting an essentially fragmented society. In Somalia, the leaders of the Islamic criticized Aidid for trying to give his opposition to American troops an Islamic flavor. The Islamists were moreover convinced that the Americans
were anxious to establish the fact that Aidid was aided by the Fundamentalists in order to drag the Muslims prematurely into a war that they were totally unprepared for. The Islamic Movement of Somalia preferred to practice caution so as to avoid sacrificing the Muslim Somalis. (14)

Despite these assertions by the Islamists, the American and Western Media were very anxious to connect Aidid to Fundamentalism not only in Somalia but also in Sudan and Iran. In addition to this the Media was trying to connect events in Kenya where the Islamic Party was in conflict with the government, to that happening in Somalia. The decision to pursue Col. Aidid in July 1993 was partly connected with this.

In order to build up the case against Aidid, a memo was circulated in Mogadishu on 25/6/1993 stating that the Muslim Brothers, supported by Aidid, were preparing to wage Jihad with one thousand five hundred fighters against the United Nations Forces. Naturally, the Islamists dismissed this as false propaganda circulated by American intelligence units in order to connect Aidid with Islamists. The Islamists were also of the opinion that this gesture was meant to convince the Somalis that Aidid, being part of the Islamic trend, was responsible for the destruction of Somalia. In this way Somalis would wish to get rid of both Aidid and the Islamic groups.

In November 1993, UNOSOM II announced that Muslim activists had arrived in Mogadishu from Iran and Lebanon and were prepared to organize terrorist activities against American and other United Nations Forces. Major David Stockwell, the military spokesman of UNOSOM II, mentioned that the UN received information that a number of people from Hizbullah Fundamentalists who were experienced in terrorist techniques had arrived in the town. American staff warned Col. Muhammad Farah Aidid that he would be held responsible if anything happened. (15)

SNA strongly denied these allegations and accused the United Nations of waging a campaign of false fabrications and misinformation.
designed to primarily justify the continued presence of a large foreign occupation force in Somalia. *Hizbullah* also denied sending any men to Somalia, asserting that resistance to foreign intervention rested on the Somalis themselves. This accusation, they maintained, was meant as a pretext for fresh intervention in Somalia. On the other hand, *Hizbullah* confirmed its open support to the Jihad waged by the Somalis against the forces planned to subject Somalia to new modes of colonialism.(16)

Indeed, the influence of Iran in regional politics of the Horn did not escape the notice of observers and concerned scholars of the region. Peter Woodward observes: "...The continuing existence of the regime that has been in power in Sudan since 1989 means that opportunities may be taken for the promotion of political Islam internally. Iran has not only become Sudan's closest ally since the Gulf War, but has been connected to some Islamist activities in parts of Somalia...."(17)

Iran's support to Somali factions or Islamic groups in the current crisis either morally or militarily is yet to be established. At the moment, available literature only leads to unconfirmed conclusions.

**THE ROLE AND ATTITUDE OF THE ISLAMIC GROUPS TOWARDS THE EFFORTS FOR PEACE**

Since the civil war broke out in Somalia, efforts have been made to put an end to the conflict. Djibouti, long concerned with the situation in Somalia, hosted two conferences of the fronts that had opposed Siyyad in June and July 1991. The USC, SDM, DFSS, SPM, USF and SDA signed a five-point manifesto, but it proved insufficient to prevent the subsequent outbreak of hostilities between Aidid and Ali Mahdi's factions.(18)

The Islamic Movement of Somalia played a significant role in the Djibouti meeting. Abdel Aziz Haj Ahmad, one of the leaders of the Movement, warned the meeting against the presence of the international forces in Somalia. But he was also very critical of the
local factions whom he described as unable and unqualified to lead the country towards peace. He was emphatic that they could not be useful and it is therefore not reasonable to involve them in the process of rebuilding Somalia. (18) The Islamists further attributed the failure of the Djibouti meeting to the contradictory nature of its recommendations. The meeting, while recommending the adoption of the secular constitution of 1960, requested the Somali government to prepare an Islamic constitution.

Efforts for peace were then entrusted to Ethiopia, who played a key role in supporting opposition parties in Somalia who eventually managed to oust Siyad Barre. She was then given the task of finding a solution to the Somali crisis after the civil war. The Islamists think that Ethiopia made a big effort to marginalise the role of Arab and Islamic countries in the process of finding a solution to the problem. (20)

On January, 4 1993, a preparatory conference for National Reconciliation was convened in Addis Ababa. It was inaugurated by the President of Ethiopia, and attended by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Members from fourteen different Fronts in Somalia participated including the Somali National Movement (SNM) which declared the independence of the territory of Northern Somalis previously under British administration prior to 1960. Present at the Conference were both Aidid and Ali Mahdi. The Islamists were not allowed to participate. A delegation from the Islamic Movement arrived from Somalia, but the United Nations refused to allow them to participate. They understood this as anti-Islamic, and felt that the USA and the UN were manoeuvring to undermine the Islamic identity of Somalia and prevent it from playing its natural role in spreading Islam in East Africa. (21)

In March 1993, the conference on National Reconciliation was held in Addis Ababa, and was attended by almost all Somali factions in order to find ways of solving the problem by peaceful means. The
conference was chaired by Ambassador Laurance Keyani Representative of the United Nations. The Americans suggested the formation of a transitional council of seventy four members to represent the 18 regions of Somalia, three members from each region, plus 15 members from all the Fronts plus five members to represent Mogadishu. It was further suggested that, the council should continue for two years and that the United Nations should enforce its recommendations.

A delegation from the Somali Islamic Movement was present at the Conference led by the spokesman of the Movement, Dr Ibrahim al-Dosogi. Al-Dosogi believes that previous efforts for peace did not succeed because the Islamic Movement was not allowed to take part. (22) The delegations of the Islamic Movements circulated their views on reconciliation and peace to the members of the Conference in a memorandum which could be summed up in the following points. (23)

1) To form a national government with a broad representation to include all parties.
2) To renounce violence, tribalism and lust for power.
3) To admit responsibility for the agony of the Somalis, and to solve the problem through local efforts.
4) To stop violence and resort to negotiation by peaceful means.
5) It is necessary for all parties to adhere to previous agreements.
6) To exert all efforts towards the rebuilding of Somalia through accepted norms, by the rule of Shari’a and through a united Somalia.
7) To see that no chance to participate in the process of reconstruction is given to those who are responsible for the destruction of Somalia.

Dr. Dosogi believes that the traditional armed groups have failed to present a reasonable solution to the Somali crisis and that it will only be possible to solve it within the Islamic framework. He admits that the Islamic movement failed to play an effective role during Siyyad Barre’s Regime because it was suppressed. During the current events, it is equally unable to exert reasonable influence due to the lack of cooperation within his party and the in fighting between the different
factions. Other Islamic groups are committed to their tribal and regional affiliations. In short, these actions presented serious limitations on the contemporary role of the Islamic Movement and the development of political Islam in the region. Dosogi pointed to the efforts of the Islamic Movement in Somalia to correct this by revitalizing the Islamic approach and the rebuilding of confidence within the Islamic movement.(24)

Efforts of peace and reconciliation moved from Ethiopia to Egypt, the then chairman of the OAU. Fifteen factions were invited to Cairo. Twelve attended the Cairo meeting and proposed the formation of a transitional government of seventeen members including Aidid and Ali Mahdi. Aidid refused to attend on the grounds that a solution to the Somali problem should not come from outside. In addition, Aidid was critical of Egypt for its support to Siyyad Barre; by sending fresh troops to Somalia within the ensuing crisis to enhance the UN effort and for harboring meetings of opposing factions.(25) Naturally, the Cairo effort was not productive.

On March 21st 1994, Aidid and Ali Mahdi met in Nairobi. They both signed a reconciliation agreement on March 24th. The next day Colonel Thomas Montgomery and the last group of American troops left Somalia.

Neither the Djibouti, the Ethiopian, the Egyptian nor the Kenyan meeting were successful in bringing peace to Somalia. All reconciliation efforts have so far failed. According to Col. Muhammad Farah Aidid: “The original good intentions of those who wished to assist us, when translated into, far from helping our nation restore its damaged institutions, and actions to reconstitute our democratic cultural tradition over time came to confront our dignity, and sovereignty and endanger our very lives”.(26)

Indeed, as it is obvious from the above and other utterances it is clear that Aidid was skeptical of foreign assistance. In several of his statements, he considered UNOSOM as an obstacle to national reconciliation in Somalia.
Losing faith in efforts towards peace the main factions resorted to the traditional methods of resolving conflict in Somali society. Representatives of major factions met to talk about peace under the chairmanship of a prominent Muslim leader, the Imam of the biggest mosque in Mogadishu (Hirab). Sheikh Muhammad Omar met these groups on 13-16 January 1994 at the Kaah Hotel in Mogadishu, in a meeting which Italian sources described as the most important since the start of the civil war in 1991. The meeting adopted an eight-point peace accord by the religious men of both the Habar Gidir and the Abgal clans. The meeting, moreover, decided to implement Shari'a law as the only way to restore peace and order. (27)

In order to carry out the matter further, Shari'a courts were established in Northern Mogadishu and started to function under the guidance of Shariff (Sheikh) Muheidin, a few months after the Kaah meeting. This effort was warmly welcomed by the various Islamic groups in Somalia. Al-Itihad Al-Islami openly declared support and appealed to the Somalis to reject the secular government formed by the clan leaders and warlords and only to support a government based on Islamic Law. (29)

The Islamic Movement of Somalia also very warmly welcomed the formation of the Shari'a courts. Dosogi once more dismissed the international effort to solve Somalia's problem as manifested in USA, UN, and OAU as a failure being foreign, and stressed the success of local efforts in the form of the Islamic courts as a positive contribution to the peace process. Islamic courts proved very successful in the course of mediation and reconciliation. In fact, the success of these courts was not only appreciated by the Somalis, but also the BBC correspondent in Somalia, Jean Stanley, praised their effort in preserving peace and order. The Egyptian Media also commented positively in their favor. (30)

The leaders of the Islamic Movement in Somalia praised the formation of these courts and considered them crucial to the process of peace because they have changed the process from the secular to
religious path. On March, 13 1995, the implementation of Shari’a and the opening of Shari’a courts was announced in Baidawa. This was done in the presence of members of the Somali Council for Reconciliation, formed under the tutelage of the Islamic Movement. This Council supported the Shari’a courts financially and morally. Shariah courts were also started in Central Shibelle Province (in Johar), in Jiddu Province in February 1995 and others were planned to be opened in Bakal and Jalijadod Provinces. The Somali Council for Reconciliation was the connecting effort of these courts.

Dr. Abdel Rahman Malalim Badir, the chairman of the Somali council for Reconciliation distributed a memorandum of eleven pages describing the necessity of the formation of the Council as the natural outcome of the departure of the UN forces in March 1995. The Council was therefore meant to fill the gap created by the departure of the UN forces. The memo contained a thorough description of the status quo in Somalia, the attitude of the Somalis to the current events, the methodology and approach to reconciliation in Somalia, the position so far of the reconciliation effort and the efforts of this council towards peace. At the end of the memo, Dr. Abdelrahman enumerated the achievements of the Somali Council to be; the opening of eleven centers, dealing with a number of cases of reconciliation, meeting with clan heads and introducing them to the Islamic project. In short, the Council felt that it was successful in introducing Islamic courts and explaining the Islamic project as the two issues are quite complementary.

These efforts of the Islamic Movement to solve the problem through the medium of Shari’a courts and the Council of Reconciliation could be seen as the necessary outcome of the philosophy of the Movement, which is mainly political in its outlook. Politics to them, is the manifestation of Shari’a in government. It is not therefore possible to solve any problem in the Islamic way without the foundation of an Islamic state.

Besides the Somali Movement, other Islamic groups had their views on peace and reconciliation. In March 1995, the media directed attention to a meeting held by an Islamic group in Mogadishu; the
Somali (ahl al-sunnah wal jama'ah) the People of the Prophet's Tradition and Muslim Group. The meeting was held at Adam Dheere Center in Mogadishu. Sheikh Abdel Razzaq Yusuf Adam was elected as the new Imam of the group by the 500 religious men who attended.

Another Islamic group, the jihad al-Islam, described as "Fundamentalist", was very concerned about the continuation of the fighting after the departure of the UN Forces. Upon learning that nine civilians were killed and another twenty three wounded, the group leader, Sheikh Abbas bin Omar, threatened to take up arms against the faction chiefs if they did not find within two months, a solution to the political impasse that the country was in.(31) He condemned them as heads of factions founded on tribalism and ignorance. Sheikh Abbas further called on the country's numerous Islamic organisations to hold a meeting to discuss the issues of peace and rebuilding of Somalia.(32)

The factions themselves, desperate for restoration of peace became gradually converted to the thesis systematically adopted by the Islamists. They realized that it was only through the implementation of Shariah that peaceful efforts could succeed in Somalia.

The Horn of Africa Bulletin reported in June 1995 that supporters of Somali faction leader Osan Ali Atto have agreed to introduce Islamic Shari'a Law in some of the southern parts of Mogadishu in a bid to quell legal vacuum there. They agreed to introduce Shari'a courts in all areas where USC/SNA supporters and other supporters of Shari'a Law were in the majority. An appeal was launched to Muslim businessmen in Mogadishu and other towns to generously support the implementation of Sharia Law.(33)

Indeed, the conviction that Islam has historically played a constructive role in Somali society was not new. The role of Islam in mediation, peace, learning and inter-clan cooperation has been regularly confirmed by the scholars of Somali affairs. But, as Husein Adam has legitimately observed,(34) if Islamic ideology can functionally unite the highly fragmented Somali elites and allow them
to work to the twin priorities of maximizing democracy and economic development, then, it would have played a historically successful role.

Unfortunately, as Ibrahim al-Dosogi has himself stated on various occasions, the lack of unity among the Islamist groups makes the chances of resolving conflict through the medium of religion rather remote at this juncture. This is because the Islamists failed to exploit the chances which could help to project their efforts of leadership. Following upon this, they were unable to help the Somalis to get rid of the forces of destruction and hence come together into a reconciled and unified nation. The Islamic movement in Somalia is thus suffering from serious handicaps, which at the moment make it difficult for them to fill the gap created by the departure of the international forces which they have continuously opposed.
Endnotes
4- Hassan makki, Al-Qadha ya Al-Somalia: Al Magza wa al-madmoun, Risalat Ifriqiyya (in Arabic), Khartoum, issue No. 6, August 1995. p. 6
5- Interview with Mohammed Hersi Mohammed (Ridwan). Khartoum International Arabic Institute, Khartoum, 1993.
7- Al-Alam. Issue No. 513. 11/12/1993. p. 34.
12- Ibid.,
13- Somali National alliance. Press release, Mogadishu. 13/9/1993
16- Ibid.,
18- Ibid., p. 188.
23- Ibid., p. 14
24- Ibid., P. 14
32- Ibid.
Westernization and Cultural Alienation in Africa

By Prof. Zakaria Bashier
Vice Chancellor, University of Juba

Prologue

Cultural alienation is a relative concept. If we ask: alienation from what? It immediately becomes clear that maybe we are taking as a cultural reference the traditional African animistic religions and customs. To speak of cultural alienation within this cultural framework, we perhaps mean that Africans, through Westernization, have been robbed of their traditional cultural heritage. Even if we accept this at its face value, we must also attribute this alienation in some measure to the incursion of Islam into the traditional African societies. It is of course true that Islam is more congenial to traditional African values than Protestant ethics, been derived to some extent from western capitalism. Islamic ethics by contrast, shares with traditional African ethics such cardinal values as family and social solidarity, collective values, and the rejection of the extreme individualism. It also shares with it the concepts of collective ownership of land, water resources and forestry (wood). In addition, to this, both Islam and traditional African values share a common respect, veneration of elders chief and parents and the values of extended family. Thus, although we can also speak of cultural alienation in Africa, due to the incursion of Islam, yet, this must be viewed as comparatively much lighter than alienation caused by Westernization.

When we speak of westernization in an African context, we mean Westernization being induced by all means which were mostly imposed by the colonial masters. Even, when the Christian church was a major factor, yet it was viewed as Western, phenomenon and manifestation. The church was viewed as a tool of the colonial masters. The native African used two words (master) and (father) interchangeably at least in the initial days. But of course
later on, and with the inception of independent African churches, the question changed dramatically. But, on the whole, there is no question that the American and European Christian missions, played the major role in the Westernization of the African man. For one thing, the priests and clergymen worked and lived amongst the masses, forming very elaborate networks, of churches, schools, hospitals, and charity organization, even in the most remote villages and camps in the most wild terrain and forests. The Africans looked upon the church and its institutions with awe and appreciation. They saw compassion, beauty, order and cleanliness and we are magically attracted to them. They saw articles and artifacts of western civilization, like automobiles, radios, televisions, guns and crafts. They saw fine clothes, fine ornaments and beautiful fair western women and men. They were attracted by all of this and they liked to be a part of it. Thus, Westernization was induced among them. It was their dreams to be a part of it and to enjoy the high, good living like that enjoyed by Westerners (fathers) and (masters) alike.

A beautiful dream of a myth Westernization.

However, except for the very limited minority of the Western educated elite, the promise of the sophisticated and good live posed by Westernized style of living was but myth and a false dream for the majority of the Africans both north and south of the desert.

These masses continued to live in shanty towns and rural areas in deplorable and very extreme deprivation, with no amenities whatsoever. They lived in slums with no roads or no sanitation and no services whatsoever, with very little to eat. When they are ventured outside, they go bare footed and in rags. But that is not all, they are at times subjected to oppression by gang chiefs and state police. Moreover, they are also plaque by civil wars and strife, what a miserable life!

Be that as it may, not all Westernization was negative phenomena, in the African continent. It is of course very true that Westernization process have uprooted the Africans from their traditional way of life, without giving a real substitute. They lost their serene traditional way
of living, without affording the European standard of life. Their expectations and aspirations were raised, without having any chance to fulfill them.

Worst of all, Westernization distorted their view of themselves and of their identity. They are no longer sure whether they are Africans or Europeans. This is the worst part of it, and this is where cultural alienation is most accurately felt.

With Islam, the matter is somewhat different. Muslim Africans still maintain many aspects of their traditional life.

Most of all, the family values are still there. Respect and the veneration of parents, and love and solidarity among the members of the extended family are values common to Muslims and traditional African way of life. African women never contest the authority of their husbands, and female members of the family duly respect their male relatives and maintain a low profile in their presence. In some African tribes, the male members enjoy authority over female members even though they may be of younger age.

On the other hand, collective living, sharing food, and lodging are prominent features of the African societies. Even today, polygamy is a shared feature of Muslim and African societies.

Most importantly, Africans like Muslims, are profoundly religious and God-oriented. Religion occupies a very central place in African society. Similarly, Muslims are God-conscious, and religion lies at the very foundation of the Muslim society.

Positive and negative Aspects of African Traditional way of life
Despite our protestations against Westernization and against cultural alienation of the African social scene, not all aspects of traditional African way of life are of positive value, and as such they do not deserve to be retained or cherished. Black music, sorcery, ancestral worship and disregard of women rights are bad and regressive practices, and as such they do not deserve to be maintained and preserved. If anything, and for the sake of the welfare of the Africans
themselves, they ought to be combated and eliminated. Who would want Africa to remain for ever suckled by ignorance, black magic and sorcery?

Westernization is bad when it does not allow the Africans to choose freely the modes and categories of their own way of life. It is bad when it reinforces dependency on the west and mere imitation of its values and ways of living. Last, but not least, Westernization is bad when imposed by force, against the will of the people. But when Westernization actually leads to economic and social development, why should any one condemn it as bad and unwanted? If Westernization, moreover, leads to scientific and technological progress and advancement, why should it be rejected by any one? Positive interaction between different cultures and civilizations can lead to mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual assistance between nations. In this respect, we should not view any Christian or Islamic influence of the African cultural scene as necessarily bad. By the same token, we should not view any African custom or practice, as necessarily good, simply because it is an African. When we insist on preserving the African cultural legacy, this should not be understood on its face value. We should only keep and preserve that part of the African legacy which is deemed useful and beneficial to the cultural and social advancement of the African peoples, and is consistent with rationality and science. In this respect, the African should be advised not to insist on any sacred cows, because if these cows are to hamper progress and social advancement, they ought to vanished from the scene.

**Tolerance and Values of Multi Culturism in Africa**

Africa today is torn by conflict, wars and civil strife. This is largely due to the widespread illiteracy, poverty and lack of tolerance among other things. Moreover, Africa is a continent of many races and cultures and thousands of languages and dialects. This diversity must be taken into consideration by the politician, the educationists and by all those involved in social change and planning. Failure to acknowledge this fact or to give due allowance and consideration for it will spell disaster and causes havoc. This is where enlightened religious education,
whether Islamic or Christian, could be of valuable help. I emphasized enlightened religious education, because religious fanaticism and extremism could be fatal! Also liberal education and humanities, like philosophy and literature, are very essential. Democracy must be adopted, not only as a means of good governance, but a way of life, permitting all layers of the society. Educational system in particular must be embossed by democratic philosophy, and a great deal of liberties must be allowed. Of course, liberties within educational context must never be divorced from discipline and responsibility, in the sense of self restrain. Liberty could never mean reverting to anarchy or ill-behavior. It is meant to enable the students to develop to the maximum in every respect, spiritual, intellectual, psychological and physical. In the absence of an adequate measure of freedom, no such development is possible. A lively democratic state need not to be totally secular, in the sense of rejecting all religious guidance. But of course, it must have as its foundational stone the principle that citizenship is the basis of all rights and privileges, and that all citizens, respective of their creed, color or race are equal before the law, and enjoy equal rights and duties (lahum ma izzina wa alayhim ma alay'na) i.e. Non Muslims have the same rights as Muslims, and have the same obligations).

The Limitation of the Appeal of African Legacy
As we said before, in our endeavor to put Africa in a firm and unambiguous road towards development and progress, we do not pay any attention to sacred cows. Thus, there is a limit to the extent we are prepared to go in our veneration and cherishing of the African legacy. Whenever that legacy may pose as handicap towards the scientific and technological advancement, or to the well being and prosperity of the peoples of Africa, we must not hesitate to disregard it. This is not a mere statement of a philosophical position, because there are situations when African legacy really endanger the advancement and well-being of Africa. In fact, black magic sorcery idol-worship or ancestor worship do pose a real hindrance to development and welfare of the Africans. Especially, dead ancestors still wield influence in the lives of the descendants. The traditional believes that charms and amulets can cause healing could endanger the lives of many, especially young-
children, who are too venerable to epidemics. Also these believes in the human divinities could prove to be hindrance to democratic development, because these human divinities could easily develop into terrible doctrines. They use religion to consolidate hold on their followers and in due time practice total domination over them. Such domination could at times lead to a very extreme cases of exploitation of the people in the name of religion. When this happens, it will give credence to Karl Marx’s proposition. “Religion is the opium of the people.” In the traditions of some African tribes, the chief have divine powers and, in the practice of some African tribes, the traditional doctor (Kujour) is of a permanent authority in medical and religious sphere. Typically, these Kujour are ignorant and without any medical knowledge, and without any healing powers. There are a lot of other problems, regarding the African legacy;

■ The good and bad spirits
■ The witches doctors and Kujours
■ The dances and religious rites, which could be violent and bloody, at times.
■ The belief in the efficiency of charms and amulets

One could very well ask; what is the rationale of defending these practices? that they simply form part and parcel of the traditional religion is not enough defense. If it is proven beyond doubt that they exert a bad and repressive influences on the lives of the Africans, then so much the worst for them. Why should any tears be shed for their demise and disappearance? Thus, to liberate the Africans from these irrational practices must be one of the cardinal objectives of modern education in Africa.

The Rejection of Isolationism
To combat cultural alienation dose not mean that Africans should recede beyond the thick veils of cultural isolationism. There is nothing wrong in Africans interacting positively with the currents of the international culture and ideology, nothing wrong if the Africans should decide to become Christians or Muslims or socialist or Democrats. This is their choice, and they are entitled to it. After all, they are no less than one rational and mature human beings, and as
such they are free to shape their lives the way they see it. They are free to retain some of their traditional values or, to scrap it at all, if they so wish! For any one to claim otherwise is paramount patronism.

Positive Influences of Islam and Christianity
No doubt the advent of Islam and Christianity on the African scene had many positive influences. For one thing, both religions are strongly pro-civilization. They work for clean, nice sophisticated life, and they both encourage learning and spirituality. Both of them are monotheist religions, in the sense that they worship God, the Almighty. It is of course very true that Islam is much more monotheistic than Christianity, because Christians also take Christ as God, while Muslims recognized only one true God—Allah, subhanhu wa t‘a‘ala, and Mohammed and Christ are both humans and prophets, according to the Islamic faith. Muslim recognize no God beside the One true God, Allah. Thus, pure monotheism exist to day only in Islam. True Judaism was also monotheistic in the beginning, but then the Jews were given to the worship of Uzair besides God. They consider Uzair as the son of God, much as Christian consider Jesus as the son of God.

To conclude, both Islam and Christianity had a positive and a civilizing influence in the African scene. To ban the spread of these two great religions in the pretext of preserving the African animistic religions would not be wise, nor would it be of benefit for the Africans. Moreover, Africans conversion to Islam or Christianity does not necessarily lead to the phenomenon of cultural alienation. But Westernization could lead to cultural alienation, when it means the adoption of the European ways of living. Adoption of the Europeans ways of living could lead to cultural alienation, in so far as they carry with them the values of individualism, capitalism, and sexual permissiveness far beyond what the Africans might be prepared to accept, though, some of African tribes are permissive in their own culture. But Westernization in the sense of adopting science and technology which leads to the good life, does not necessarily lead to cultural alienation. Cultural alienation is to be decried if it is the practice of imposing some modes of living which are of harmful influence, or if they are contradictory with what is best in African
legacy, namely: peacefulness, collective living, family values and social solidarity.

Currents of Westernization and cultural alienation are not confined to Africa south of the desert. In countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan, the tide of Westernization is keenly felt. Western civilization is a global civilization and its appeal of liberty, individuality, and its promise of a good life are of tremendous appeal everywhere. Western values appeal is even greater in places where liberties and human rights are infringed upon. Thus where totalitarian regimes thrive, Westernization thrives too. Thus one effective way of combating Westernization is to allow ample degrees of democratic liberties. After all, Westernization is not opposed because these liberties are rejected, but because it also carries with it, the negative values, of extreme individualism, secularism, and permisiveness, to name only a few of the western vices.

Epilogue:
In conclusion we have decried Westernization and cultural alienation in Africa in so far as they represent impediments to progress and advancement of the African continent. We have adopted the view that even our appreciation of the African legacy shall not be allowed to stand in the way of Africans derive towards progress and scientific and technical advancement. In our quest towards a liberated and progressive Africa, we try every avenue, no holds barred. Should the conversion of Africans to Christianity, Islam, or even Secularism proves itself to be of instrumental value towards a progressive, civilized and enlightened Africa the clinking of African legacy must not be allowed to present itself as a hindrance.

Selected References
2- Abdel Rahim, M.: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan
4- Jackson: Introduction to African Civilization. Secaucus. N.Y., Ciradel Press
AFRICAN WATER RESOURCES:
CONFRONTATION AND COOPERATION

By: Samson S. Wassara

INTRODUCTION
Water is vital for life because it sustains good health, food security, economic growth and other forms of development. But the real problem is that its scarcity is being felt everywhere around the globe. The future of agriculture in Africa depends on the rational use of water resources. Available data show that 80% of water resources is devoted to agriculture. The other 20% is shared among other competitive uses of water. These figures do not indicate how much water quantities are actually exploited. Developing river basin resources is an expensive business that hampers reasonable exploitation of these resources.

It is obvious that water renews itself through climatic mechanisms. This characteristic of water tends to make people believe that it is abundantly available for all. However, water distribution is unequal because of several factors. The most conspicuous ones consist of climate, demography and pollution. Pollution may be a major issue concerning African rivers, but climatic changes and demographic growth make water a strategic natural resource in Africa. This situation is particularly visible in arid and semi-arid regions of the continent. Rapid population growth is also becoming a serious concern when water supply remains rather static.

The international character of African rivers calls for either conflict or cooperation between riparian countries. Some of these rivers include the Nile, Congo, Niger, Senegal, Orange, Limpopo and Zambezi. Managing cross-border rivers implies positive social and political interactions and domestic stability. These factors determine the degree of cooperation which could enhance the exploitation of water resources. Events in Africa do not, nevertheless, show that political and social stability prevails in most riparian states. The use of water
resources does not necessarily depend on agreements of cooperation, but mainly on the degree of political stability in a hydrographic region.

This assumption could only be justified if we could explore the role of some states in Africa’s river systems. The examination of the recent developments in the concept of integrated water management and institutionalization is of great importance for the assessment of conflict and cooperation. Given the fact that there are several shared river basins in African, it would be logical to select some of them according to their sizes and sub-regions for the purpose of comparisons and analysis. This approach will enable our study to be manageable.

For the purpose of assessing situations of conflict and cooperation, it is necessary to distinguish between surface water and underground water resources. The latter must be seen in the context of impacts that influence public policy in inter-resource integration. Underground water constitutes an essential component of comprehensive plans of water supply. Boreholes are increasingly becoming inevitable sources of drinking water and small-scale irrigation. It is fortunate that exploitation of subterranean water barely leads to interstate conflicts. Hence, this paper treats surface water resources, because they are at the center of conflict in some parts of Africa.

Examining the issues of conflict and cooperation over water resources in Africa raises the following fundamental questions: What are the determinants of water scarcity in Africa? Are there serious confrontations between African countries over water utilization or not? Is it not the effect of other conflicts which adversely affect the exploitation of water resources? Could African countries develop water resources without partnership with non-African entities? Finding answers to these questions and others will require emphasis on forward-looking strategies rather than dwelling on theoretical ideals. However, there is a need to provide brief observations about the basic concepts underlying theories of shared water resources.

**Theoretical Framework of Analysis**

Our framework of analysis depends on a number of theories concerning water utilization. Specialists in water studies are aware of
the water-related theories that explain state behavior over the use of shared water resources. There is a need to provide an overview of such theories with respect to African river systems. In addition, other theories are equally useful in explaining why certain states behave in a particular way over the use of water. It follows that some economic and social concepts will be useful in our study. Also, international legal instruments regulating the use of water resources emphasize cooperation. Hence, examining the nature of cooperation is necessary for locating issues of confrontation and cooperation in an appropriate context.

**Water-Related Theories of Conflict and Cooperation**

The utilization of Africa's water resources must take into consideration the theories that determine the degree of conflict and cooperation in a drainage basin. Until recently there have been a few problems between African countries concerning water resources. Symptoms of conflict appear in countries that are affected by climatic uncertainties and demographic pressure. This situation is visible in the relationships between the Nile riparian states. In this respect, several theories have been developed to explain interactions between states in relation to the utilization of water resources. These theories are classified into two major categories.

The first category consists of theories of conflict. One of these theories is the absolute territorial sovereignty. This theory states that a riparian state is free to use the water flowing on its territory because it falls under the sovereignty of that state. The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is in favor of upstream states. In Africa, Ethiopia has made several declarations in its dispute with Egypt and the Sudan over the distribution of water quantities stipulated in the 1959 Nile water agreement.(2)

Another theory under this category is the theory of absolute territorial integrity. It advocates the doctrine of water rights that downstream riparian states claim. They claim uninterrupted natural flow of the river from upstream states. The theory of absolute territorial integrity restricts the utilization of water flow, which involves harnessing of an international river for agricultural or hydropower purposes. Egypt has always argued for her natural or
historic rights over the Nile waters in the upper reaches of the river.\(^3\) Thus, the claim of Egypt nurtures conflicts with some upper riparian states such as Ethiopia and Tanzania.\(^4\)

The second category of theories furthers cooperation. Two theories under this category express the same logic: the theory of limited territorial sovereignty, and the theory of limited territorial integrity. These two theories emphasize positive attitudes of riparian states in processes of water utilization. They assert that every state is free to use the water flowing on its territory provided that such use should not affect the rights of the other states sharing the river basin. Many international water agreements derive their principles from these theories \textit{inter alia}: 

- the equitable and reasonable use of international rivers.
- opposition to all restrictive attitudes which undermine the rights of other basin states.
- The relative freedom of each state to exploit water resources while respecting interests and needs of the other riparian states, and the necessity for cooperation in the development of the shared river basins.

The Helsinki Rules, 1966, provide more details of what constitute equitable and reasonable use of water. The rules have much influence on the use of resources based on formal agreement. Our analysis will focus, at a later stage, on how African countries treat the relevant factors contained in the Helsinki Rules.

The most liberal theory of cooperation is the theory of community interests in the use of shared water resources. The degree of cooperation that may result from this theory has far-reaching effects on relationships among riparian states. The theory goes beyond the considerations emanating from the theories of limited territorial sovereignty and limited territorial integrity. Proponents of this theory maintain the ideas that international rivers should be treated as a common economic and geographic space for development. All basin states should have a common right of action over water resources. The theory advocates joint planning, development and management of river basins. In other words, the theory of community interest implies integrated development programs for the exploitation of water resources. Many countries are reluctant to forgo sovereignty over the
water flowing on their territories. Thus, the idea of community interests enjoys limited support among riparian states, especially in Africa.

**Economic Principles and Water utilization:**

Economic development comprises all human activities intended to improve qualities of life by exploiting available resources. Water, as a renewable natural resource, is central to economic policies. States consider water resources as an economic good. They demonstrate subjective behavior towards others when the uses of water are competitive before a formal agreement is concluded. For this reason, the use of water for economic development leads to two important principles in economic theory.

One of the principles is rationalization. It consists of taking stock of economic needs of riparian states in a given drainage system. Based on the inventory of needs, interested states distribute the water quantities between themselves. The principle of rationalization calls for objective criteria of distribution of water which would be acceptable to the concerned parties. The distribution of water quantities between Egypt and Sudan within the framework of the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 is an example of rationalization in the use of water resources. Egypt appropriates 55.5 milliards of cubic meters while the share of the Sudan stands at 18.5 milliards of cubic meters.(5)

None of the co-riparian countries has gone that far in rationalizing water resources in other African hydrographic regions. The reason is that they are not interested in water quantities per se, but in what water can develop to the advantage of the majority of partners. The real problem posed by the application of the principle of rationalization is that the multiplicity of water utilization and the diverse interests at stake militate against rational distribution of water between competing states. Many states give priority to the water uses that respond to their urgent economic needs.

The other economic principle is optimization. It emphasizes the balance between the use of water for agricultural development and the other sectors of hydroeconomic activities. Under this principle, water per se is not the only issue of concern. Riparian states address integrated development prospects in their respective drainage systems.

117
The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) is a typical example for large African river systems. The institution coordinates and harmonizes the policies, projects and programs of member states. It elaborates the plans of integrated development that are compatible with the international character of the Niger.

Also the theory of regional integration applies to the use of water resources in Africa. Those African rivers, which are governed by international agreement, do experience varying degrees of integration. Irrespective of political conflicts, member states of basin management institutions continue to uphold certain aspects of integration as stipulated in the constituent acts signed by parties to an agreement. For example, the Sudan and Egypt are still active partners in the Permanent Joint Technical Commission of the Nile Waters agreement. Similarly, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda remain theoretically partners in the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin.

**The Concept of Cooperation:**

Cooperation is the human behavior that entails positive integration and collaboration between parties on resources and interests. This phenomenon is transposed from human behavior into state behavior. A river system comprising more than one riparian state represents a shared natural resource. Relations between co-riparian states depend on the rationality of their respective behavior or intentions as regards the utilization of the water resources available in the river basin they share. Certain factors, such as aridity, demographic explosion, pollution and many others, engender conflicts.

The utilization of water resources in a situation or competition of disagreement tends to call for acrimonious exchange between basin states. International water conventions stress cooperation among riparian states. The Declaration of the Inter-American Bar Association in Buenos Aires (1957) the Resolution of the International Law Association concluded in Madrid (1976) and the United Nations International Law Commission, recommend cooperation between states in the management of water resources. International cooperation exists in different forms, depending on interests of riparian states and on national needs for development.
Invoking cooperation in the use of water resources presupposes conflicts between co-riparian states. The concept of cooperation will be useful in examining the inter-state relations that develop around the utilization of water resources in Africa. It may provide a clue to understanding the nature and place of conventional interactions between riparian states in different sub-regions of Africa. In general, the treatment of relevant theoretical concepts helps non-specialist readers in understanding such a complex subject like hydropolitics.

WATER RESOURCES AND FACTORS OF SCARCITY

Africa is endowed with considerable surface water resources. There are several river and lake basins which differ in area. While a few of them may be national, many others are international. Studies show that fifty-one river systems and lakes are shared between states. According to World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the smallest river basin is that of Umkeluzi with an area of 5,600 km2. Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland share the river basin. Giant river basins with areas greater than one million square kilometers consist of the Congo, the Nile, the Niger and the Zambezi. Other important river basins whose areas are greater than 100,000 km2 include among others Limpopo, Okavango, Orange, Senegal and Vota(8).

The sheer number of river basins conceals problems of water in Africa. With exception of the Congo, most of the principal river basins shave poor natural yields. This assumption is justified by the data in table 1 below. This study centers on the principal river basins, and African international drainage systems with areas greater than one million square kilometers.

Table 1: Basic data on Africa’s Principal River System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>River</th>
<th>Length (Km)</th>
<th>Drainage Area KM2</th>
<th>Annual Drainage (Billion M2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>4,104,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile</td>
<td>6,825</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezi</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1,419,960</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The discharge of a river system is determined by a number of factors that may be artificial or natural. Artificial factors affecting the hydrology of African rivers tend to influence patterns and trends of conflicts between states over water resources. They consist of those human activities that produce changes in hydrological regimes. This part of the study treats specific natural factors of hydrology and their influences on the availability of water resources. The demand, allocation and management of the resources depend partly on the climate and the demographic situation of a given river basin.

Another distinctive feature of African water resources is the lakes. The importance of African lakes lies in the space they occupy and the quantity of fresh water they hold. Table 2 presents their salient characteristics. Spatially, Lake Victoria is the third largest lake by volume and the second deepest lake in the world after Lake Baikal in Russia.

Table 2: Characteristics of Large Natural Lakes in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lake</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Max. Depth (m²)</th>
<th>Volume (Billion M²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>66,400</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>32,890</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>18940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>30,800</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>153,590</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The deeper the lake, the more quantity of water it carries. The respective volumes of Lake Tanganyika and Lake Malawi justify this hypothesis. Although the respective areas of the two lakes are less than half of the area of Lake Victoria, their volumes are impressive. Bowen
argues that Lake Tanganyika alone represents 1% of the total volume of freshwater in the world. (9) Excluding other less important lakes, the five major lakes in table 2 have the total volume of 28667 billion cubic meters of freshwater. These lakes contain considerable quantities of surface water resources in Africa.

Besides natural lakes, artificial lakes contain water quantities that are stored in reservoirs for development purposes. The water quantities in artificial lakes are part of the river discharges that are readily quantified at specific points. Such is the case of Aswan High Dam. Table 3 shows the significance of planned water storage in Africa. There are also other dams that are not mentioned here. (10)

Table 3 Characteristics of Large Artificial lakes in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lake</th>
<th>Area (Km²)</th>
<th>Max Height (km)</th>
<th>Volume (billion m³)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volta</td>
<td>8480</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariba</td>
<td>5250</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan (Nasser)</td>
<td>5120</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabora Bassa</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21550</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from table 7.1 in William M. Adams et al., p. 123.

Despite the fact that the data do not indicate the actual capacity of each dam, the table demonstrates the efforts that have been deployed in Africa to harness international rivers to ensure the generation of hydropower, flood controls and the development of irrigated perimeters. These lakes continue to sustain development. But they are not always free from controversies. Artificial lakes give rise to conflicts of different dimensions and intensity. This aspect will be treated later in the appropriate section in this paper.

Climate as a Factor of Hydrology

Variability and reliability of rainfall in Africa make differences in average annual discharges of river systems. Studies reveal that there is a great range in the distribution of rainfall from about 2 millimeters in extremely arid zones to 1000 millimeters in tropical humid or highland
climatic zones. Further, Mike Hulme reinforces this finding when he argues that spatial and temporal patterns of changing rainfall is more noticeable in the Sahel zone in Mali and over parts of Botswana and Zimbabwe in the southern hemisphere. These climatic factors affect the hydrology of river systems located, in a greater part, in arid regions. River systems such as the Nile, the Niger and the Senegal north of the equator, as well as the Okavango, the Orange and the Upper Zambezi in the southern hemisphere, are particularly vulnerable to rainfall variability because of their geographical setting.

Rainfall pattern, relief and vegetation are linked to the discharge of river systems in Africa. Variations in average discharges of principal rivers are closely associated with the climatic regions in which the rivers are located. Research has established the differences between annual discharges as shown in table 1. It shows that the discharge of a river system is not proportionate to the length and/or the area of a drainage basin. Thus, drainage basins which are located in regions of high rainfall have higher discharges than those lying mostly in semi-arid and arid climatic regions.

For instance, the Congo has the highest water yield in Africa. The drainage basin of this river receives the highest rainfall in Africa throughout the year. Water specialists acknowledge that, of the major source basins of the continent, only the Congo has water quantities which exceed demands of riparian countries. Both the Zambezi and the Niger have high water yields despite their respective moderate drainage areas. These two rivers lie mostly in humid climatic areas.

The unique case is the one of the Nile basin. In spite of its length and drainage area, the water yield is very poor. The Nile receives sufficient rainfall in the Great Lakes region and in the Ethiopian highlands. Precipitation declines progressively as the river descends through various climatic regions ranging from the equatorial to the desert climate. The river crosses more than 3000 kms without receiving any reasonable precipitation. Rains decline as the river flows northwards, and they disappear entirely as from 19°N. Recurrent drought the Sahel zone during the last two decades have accentuated decline in the Nile hydrology.

Shifts in rainfall patterns and their impact on natural resources prompted Sub-Saharan countries to reorganize. It is the climatic hazard
which brought into existence regional organizations such as the Comite' Permanent Inter-etat pour la Lutte contre la Sechresse au Sahel (CILSS) and the Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in the 1990s. The same situation facilitated the establishment of the Sub-Saharan African Hydrology Assessment (1987-1992) by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). One of the important functions of the project was to evaluate the status of existing hydrological data.

**The Impact of Wetland on Hydrology:**

Marshes and their ecosystems contribute to water scarcity in Africa. Geographers refer to them as wetlands. The total area of drylands in Africa is estimated to be 21 million square kilometers, but the wetlands occupy 350,000 square kilometers. Definitions of wetland vary according to research goals. In our treatment of this subject, wetland means marshes, floodplains and their ecosystems. This focuses on the patterns of evaporation that lead to water losses. The geographical locations to wetlands are in the Sub-Saharan Africa. (13) Table 4 shows the major characteristics of a few wetlands that relate to water losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wetland Name</th>
<th>Wet season Area(km²)</th>
<th>Mean annual Inflow (million m³)</th>
<th>Mean annual outflow (million m³)</th>
<th>Evaporation (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudd</td>
<td>29800</td>
<td>50300</td>
<td>21400</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger Inland Delta</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>70000</td>
<td>35000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Congo</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okavango Delta</td>
<td>18000</td>
<td>11000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafue Flats</td>
<td>5666</td>
<td>10716</td>
<td>8876</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Extracted from M.R. Hughes, "Wetlands" in Physical Geography, p. 277*

The data in the table show that less than half of the inflows of swampy zones is lost through evaporation. Wetland systems differ in
nature. This study is interested in freshwater marshes that are popularly known as swamps. The vegetation of this type of swamps consists mainly of papyrus, which dominates the Sudd system in the Sudan. This particular vegetation contributes to huge water losses through evapotranspiration. Water losses also occur through seepage. It is difficult, however, to establish the quantity or percentage of losses linked with this phenomenon. Paul Howell and his associates found out that black clay soils are dominant in many swampy areas of Africa. Their finding suggests that the percentage of water losses through seepage may be negligible compared to those through evaporation, evapotranspiration, and runoff. In short, wetlands and their ecosystems are another source of water scarcity in Africa. Attempts to drain them for development purposes culminate into conflicts as it happened in the Sudd region of the Sudan concerning the Jonglei Canal.

Demography as a Factor of Hydrology

Africa has the fastest population growth rate in the developing world. Its annual growth rate is estimated to be 2.8% during the period 1960-1993. Projections indicate that growth rate will rise to 2.9% by the end of the twentieth century. Hence demography is one of the main factors that determine the nature of competition or conflict over the utilization of water resources. The population growth of riparian states exerts considerable pressure on the scarce surface water yields of Africa's shared river and lake basins. The satisfaction of developmental needs is becoming associated with water resources. Policy-makers consider water as the renewable natural resource that must be exploited for the benefit and welfare of people. The annual fresh water withdrawals are no longer the issue of traditional consumption, but a means of accelerating economic development. The question that arises is to know whether or not the available water supply could satisfy the needs of the present growing population. Table 5 presents the relationships between water resources and the dynamics of African population in selected international river basins.
Table 5. Relationships between Demography and Water Resources in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>River</th>
<th>Annual</th>
<th>Estimated Population(million)</th>
<th>Average Growth rate 1993-2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>120.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>267.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>203.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezi</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The hydrological and demographic characteristics indicated in table 5 reveal important facts about the correlation between the population and the supply of water in the selected river basins. Data confirm that demand for water is in constant increase. Population grows rapidly while water supply is static or decreases as in the case of the Nile. The average growth rate of 2.8% is well above the annual world population growth rate, which is 1.8% and that of all developing countries standing at 2.2%. The scarcity of water resources related to demographic explosion affects policies of water allocation between states and between national users. Also it influences the attitude of governments towards the ideas of water regulation among the actual or potential users. When the annual water-population ratio is less than 1000 cubic meters per person, water scarcity is said to be acute. This consumption level affects activities and economic strategies of the countries concerned. Several African countries consume water below the normal average ratio. This situation nurtures tensions between and within riparian states sharing poor water yields.

Demand for water is much greater in the Nile basin because the annual discharge of 84 billion cubic meters is the lowest among the four largest river systems in Africa. The population has doubled during the last thirty years, yet projections indicate that it many triple by the year 2000. The limited supply of water in the Nile basin and the growing
population imply that the economic value of water is of great significance to riparian states. This scarcity affects interactions between riparian states resulting in suspicion and tension.

Conversely, international rivers with abundant water yields and a well-distributed rainfall do rarely experience tensions over water per se. When the annual per capita consumption of water is greater than 1500 cubic meters, tension over water resources becomes irrelevant if the distribution is based on equity. Riparian states, under this condition, may not contemplate the distribution of water quantities.

This is the case of the Congo basin. Evans argues that of the major surface water basins on the (African) continent, only Zaire (now the Congo) has resources which exceed the expected demands of the riparian states. Table 4 confirms his observation. The Congo has the greatest annual discharge, but has less population growth of 2.5% is relatively manageable. What remains doubtful to assess is the capability of the riparian states to avail the abundant water resources for the purpose of consumption.

In general, there are other factors offering water resources which have not been treated here. As the theme of this paper suggests, the author is interested in examining the principal factors that are responsible for scarcity and conflict. Droughts, rainfall attains and marshes leave their marks on hydroeconomic activities. They are the natural factors of water scarcity. Equally important, population has an impact on water resources. Over-population puts strains on reasonable and equitable utilization of water resources. Excessive numbers of water users aggravates the water distribution mechanisms. It also calls for anarchy and violence. These four factors are useful for the analysis of confrontation and cooperation related to issues of water management in Africa.

**ASPECTS OF CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES WATER**

The greatest challenge concerning the use of water resources in Africa consists of the decline in traditional water uses and the rise in the value of water as an agent of economic development. Customary law regulated drinking water for humans, livestock and fishing. However, modern agricultural techniques, industrialization and hydropower are accompanied by new water rights. These rights give
rise to various inter-state conflicts, as well as communal conflicts within state boundaries. Modern approaches to the exploitation of water resources are becoming so complex that special attention should be paid to political, organizational and technical problems in the development of shared river basins.

Researchers and policy-makers acknowledge the critical importance of freshwater supply for the future survival of mankind. They are seeking credible methods of containing tensions over water at international and national levels. Water problems are not identical because uses of the resource depend on economic needs and on the geographical setting of a river system. Other factors complicate the use of water resources, thereby exacerbating water conflicts. Thus an interdisciplinary approach to problems of water resources must be the logical approach to the analysis of conflict over water in regions where they are visible.

Water-related conflicts are few in Africa but their potential is great. Conflicts are well demarcated and differ in intensity where they exist. Most of them concern water distribution and territorial sovereignty over waterways. Conflicts of interest occur within the framework of political and economic philosophies of water ownership. As shown earlier in table 2, river systems with poor yields are subject to conflict when other factors such as aridity and accelerated population growth lead to acute competition over ownership or utilization.

Conflicts over Water Rights and Boundaries:

One aspect of conflict, which leads to confrontation between riparian states, is the allocation of water quantities. It is closely linked with political decisions. The Nile river system is best known for tension over water rights in Africa. Highlights of water scarcity in the Nile basin have been made earlier in the context of water yields of some African river systems. Also, it has been argued that climatic conditions and the population growth contribute to disputes over the utilization of water resources in the basin. The riparian states have not been able to rationalize the distribution of water resources. There is a persistent conflict dating back to the colonial era when Great Britain restricted construction works in the Nile basin by other riparian powers. The
revision of the colonial agreements by Egypt and Sudan in 1959 did not lay a credible foundation of harmony between them and the other upstream countries. The postwar superpower competition for zones of influence reinforced suspicion between Egypt and Ethiopia until the end of the 1980s.

Egypt's total dependence on the Nile waters affects its relations between the upper riparian states. This country visualizes the Nile as a factor of national security. The philosophy of historical rights that Egypt has conceived remains the basis of conflict in the Nile basin. Ethiopia tends to regard existing agreements or projects in which Egypt is involved as an extension of the philosophy of historical rights. Also, several upstream countries remain outsiders as far as Nile basin agreements are concerned. The countries concerned are Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritrea. Among these countries, Ethiopia alone continues to challenge Egypt and the Sudan. She threatens to exploit Nile water resources on her territory without reference to any agreement.

The end of the cold war has apparently eased conflict between riparian states in the Nile basin. However, confrontation still lurks in the background. Relations between Egypt and upstream countries remain tense. The Egyptian attempt to dominate the Nile basin is actively being contested by the Sudan and Ethiopia under different circumstances. Egypt considers any rapprochement between these two countries as a threat to her historical and natural rights over the flow of the Nile. There are several examples to support this statement.

First, Egypt does not hide her worry about any form of understanding between the Sudan and Ethiopia. This situation developed when these countries signed agreements in December 1991 and April 1994 to cooperate over the use of the Nile waters. Although a similar agreement was concluded between Ethiopia and Egypt in June 1993, suspicion continued to haunt Egypt. Egypt confronted the Sudan after the events surrounding the unsuccessful attempt on the life of President Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995. The Ethiopian Minister of Public Works and Water Resources challenged the Sudan that she was unable to carry her threats of blocking the Nile River, and even if she had the capability, she would feel the consequences before Egypt. Although Egypt and the Sudan are parties to the 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement, mutual tensions do occur. Egypt is conscious that many Sudanese are unhappy about their share of the Nile waters as stipulated in that agreement. She is dismissive of the capability of the upper Is it Sudan to carry out threats about using the Nile as a weapon.

Second, a diplomatic row had erupted between Ethiopia and Egypt in June/July 1998. The question of water surfaced more forcefully again. The Ambassador of Egypt to Ethiopia Marawan Badr, reminded the Ethiopians that the Nile water is not just a national security issue, but rather a national survival obsession. The Ambassador invoked the historical and natural rights of Egypt when referring to the share of 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile waters, Egyptians are so sensitive to water issues that when they are in conflict with any other riparian state, their arguments irritates some countries which are not involved in that conflict. Badr’s argument depicted the Sudan as the better beneficiary of the 1959 agreement when he stated that:

"As compared to the 1929 agreement between the two countries, Sudan’s share rose by 450% and that of Egypt by only 17%, the additional waters resulting from the High Dam, estimated at 22 Billion Cub. mts(sic) were shared at the ration of 1:2 in Sudan’s fervor."

The issue of claiming attitudes of riparian states to adopt rational use of water resources in the Nile basin becomes problematic when responses to political conflicts surpass its scope. It is difficult to accept the idea that “the individual’s water share in 1990 was about 920 cubic meters for Egypt compared to 3970, 3500, 3000 for Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia respectively." This calculation may be crude. Statistics show that the per capita annual freshwater consumption of Egypt, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia during the period 1980-89 is estimated to be 7,564, 1,092, 20 and 49 cubic meters respectively. One feature of confrontation over water resources in that Egypt minimizes or attempts to conceal its real use of water resources while exaggerating quantities of water available to upstream countries. It remains problematic to imagine how Egypt would continue to use threats when the water demand of the other riparian states is growing.
The examples from the Nile basin represent the dimension of conflict over water resources in river systems experiencing severe water scarcity.

Territorial sovereignty is another source of conflict that affects the utilization of water resources in international river systems. Natural lakes and water control works are the integral part of drainage systems. Africa's river which separate territories of two or more states constitute international boundaries. This type of boundaries differs in length. Water blunders whose length is greater than 500 kilometers are the Senegal River, the Zambezi River and the Congo River. Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika also fall into this category. Besides territorial sovereignty, drainage systems experience a variety of confrontations over state jurisdiction, fishing rights and techniques, and other benefits or effects of water control projects. Such confrontations may be internal or external.

The case of Congo River relating to confrontations over state jurisdiction is typical of boundary problems in Africa's freshwater systems. This river separates the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville and the Central African Republic over the distance of about 2000 kilometers. Border incidents are frequent between the riparian states concerning state jurisdiction over boundaries and ownership of the islands in the Congo-Oubangi region. The real cause of confrontation is the absence of a common legal instrument binding together the three central African countries. In the past, the common boundaries regions were regulated by the Franco-Belgian Vivendi (FBMV) of 1932 and the revised version of 1934. This arrangement established a condominium to administer the islands in the Stanley Pools and the Congo-Oubangi marshes. Repeated crises in the region result in arrests of canoe fishermen by the authorities of the riparian states. Harassment is one form of conflict in this part of the Congo River system. (25)

Similar conflicts are on record in natural lakes shared between two or more states. Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria are the African lakes separating states by more than 500 kilometers of international boundaries. These lakes are endowed with enormous fish resources. Fishing is the most important economic activity in the region of Great Lakes. Maximum fish production levels in Lake Tanganyika
and Lake Victoria are estimated to be 460,000 tons and 500,000 tons respectively. Confrontations develop between different classes of the people involved in fishing: the fishermen using traditional equipment, and the ones making use of modern equipment such as steel boats and sophisticated nets. Authorities of Lake Tanganyika addressed this type of conflict by restricting industrial fishing to areas surrounding major ports.

Water control projects result in confrontation during and after the period execution. It is on record that the development of river systems creates unrest opposing the victims and state authorities. The construction of dams is usually preceded by detailed plans. But plans are subject to shortcomings. The most conspicuous aspect of confrontation relates to the process of evacuation of the population affected by the filling of reservoirs. Table 6 shows that control works are source of human displacement.

Table 6 Displacement due to Dam Construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reservoir</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Evacuees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koussou Dam</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akosombo Dam</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariba Dam</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>57000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainji Dam</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>50000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagdo Dam</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>35000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan High Dam</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>120000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>431000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: W. M. Adams. Lakes in Physical Geography. p. 131

The figures in the table concerning evacuation are only the tip of an iceberg. Several other dams, not mentioned here have resulted in population displacement. This situation provokes confrontations, and their effect remains the basis of conflict between states and within states. People are inadequately compensated for the loss of property. Also they suffer psychological and socio-cultural stress. Poorly planned construction works result in prolonged confrontation. This case is characteristic of the Kariba Dam and Aswan High Dam concerning the Gwembe Tonga people in Zambia and the Nubian in Sudan.
Access to economic benefits after construction works becomes thorn in the flesh of state authorities. Again fishing could be taken as an example. It is a critical sector in water related economic activities in man-made lakes. Conflicts arise between evacuees from areas of reservoirs and the other people who take advantage of the change. For example, the 20000 fishermen on the Akosombo reservoir are not from the village evacuated when the dam was closed for filling. The same problem applies to 5000 fisherman at the Kainji reservoir in Nigeria. The other problem is that fish population dwindles to insignificant quantities below dams. Reduction in fish population has been recorded in Sokoto River downstream of the Bachelor Dam in Nigeria. (27)

Lastly, institutional conflicts arise between lower organs of the state and the central governments over authority and ownership of water control installations. The intensity of such conflicts can be detrimental to useful exploitation of water resources. There is bound to be conflict if water authorities fail to conceive policies that give rights to local authorities to participate in water management. These rights are sometimes in force. But attempts to disown an institution result in confrontation. The case of Idere Gorge Dam in Nigeria illustrates this point. (28) Conflict developed between the Ogun Oshun River Basin Authority and the Oyo State government. The Authority wanted to take over Idere Gorge Dam from the state government on the ground that it should come under its jurisdiction. The state government resisted the attempts and won the case.

Nevertheless, other conflicts do not relate directly to the use of water resources, but have devastating effects on implementing water-related projects or attitudes of riparian states towards cooperation. Such conflicts need to be given a separate treatment. The nature of this study is interdisciplinary. Consequently, the integration of other conflicts into water studies illuminates their roles in obstructing integrated management of water resources and in hardening attitudes of states in the search for cooperation.

Contextual Conflicts and Armed Violence:

Greed of power, the misuse of ethnicity as a source of power and racism pose a threat to cooperation and the development of water resources in Africa. Political conflicts and desperation result in armed
violence. They are a common phenomenon in the main sub-regions of Africa. Conflicts and armed violence are manipulated to disrupt cooperative management of water resources. In other cases, they contribute to the paralysis of the existing institutions of cooperation in drainage basins. We refer to this class of conflicts as ‘contextual conflicts’. They are not directly linked with water resources, but undermine efforts to cooperate and to develop shared water resources.

First the civil war in the Sudan had stopped the ambitious project of the Jonglei Canal in the 1980s. The position of the protagonists in the conflict of Sudan was to some extent embedded in rival cold war camps. The Sudan under President Nimeiri, was considered to be a pro-West state. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) showed by its manifesto that it was in the socialist camp. Behind these protagonists were Egypt and Ethiopia. These two countries realigned themselves in the Western and the socialist camps respectively. The SPLA attack on the Jonglei Canal is considered sometimes as an Ethiopian inspired action to stop the project. Nevertheless the Jonglei Canal was already subject to controversy in 1974 before President Mengistu assumed power in Ethiopia. The politics of liberation of the Sudan cannot be divorced from water interests.

Second, the search for conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa rekindles old animosities between Ethiopia and Egypt concerning the Nile waters. Ethiopia became a credible peace broker between the different Somali warlords. When the Sodere negotiations stalled, Ethiopia attributed the failure to Egyptian intervention. The response of the Egyptian Ambassador in Addis Ababa to an article in Addis Tribune included problems of Nile waters. Political differences between the two countries harden their attitude towards cooperation over the allocation of water quantities. Such exchanges compromise the warm relations that resulted in the agreement of cooperation in July 1993.

Third, the ethnic tribally in Great Lakes regions erodes the effectiveness of the functional organization of water management. The Organization concerned are the organization for the management of Kajera river Basin and the Lake Tanjanega, Kivu Basin Commission. Members of the former are Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania.
Concerning the latter, the members are Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. With exception of Tanzania and Zambia, the other member states have become embroiled in armed conflicts. Countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda are obsessed with the logic of civil war. Water-related organizations are currently paralyzed. Thus they cannot fulfill their obligations in good faith. Exploiting ethnicity in the quest for power or as the basis of power perpetuation is destructive to coordinated and concerted development of water resources.

Fourth, West Africa is also bedeviled by the misfortune of armed violence. The post cold war West Africa has witnessed devastating civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Both countries are members of the Mano River Union (MRU) established in October 1973. Guinea is the third member. This organization operates in the field of water cooperation. Forces of the West African Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) ended the civil strife in Liberia. The Civil War In Sierra Leone flared up just as the one in Liberia was subsiding. Although ECOMOG reinstated the elected government of Sierra Leone under President Tijan Kabbah in early 1998, activities of the deposed military government and their allies are blamed on the Liberian government. The mutual confidence required for a union remains uncertain. This development can hardly uphold cooperation or encourage the water-resource development envisaged by the agreement of 1973.

Finally, the struggle against the apartheid South Africa resulted in the absence of conventional cooperation. Most of the countries in Southern Africa involved themselves in the struggle to dismantle racial discrimination. They formed the organization of Front-line States comprising Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. This organization was reincarnated as a development agent under the name of Southern African Development Community (SADC) after the system of apartheid collapsed. The SADC is already paying attention to the development of water resources. Liebhart warns that most of the region’s surface water resources are from international rivers. Hence potential conflicts of interest exist, at national and regional levels, due to the construction of reservoirs for irrigation, water supply and
hydropower. These water uses reduce river flow in downstream countries. It remains to be seen how Southern African countries would face the challenge of conventional and institutional cooperation over water resources.

In summary, conflict is an interesting aspect of the study of water resource. African river systems are different from others in that the potential for conflict and confrontation is great. Referring to our first two research questions, we can assert with certainty that states have not been parties to violent conflicts related to water resources per se. It is the contextual conflicts that disrupt the exploitation of water resources. Political and social conflicts are responsible for the underdevelopment of drainage basins. Despite the scarcity of financial resources, African countries strive for cooperation, as it will be seen in the next section. Cooperation is the only practical behavior that is likely to reduce tensions and confrontation between African countries and within their territorial boundaries.

COOPERATION AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

The state of cooperation between riparian countries looks gloomy given the number of international rivers in African Studies show that there are 51 international drainage basins, but the World Meteorological Organization has recorded only 12 conventional institutions of cooperation. This figure represents 23.5 per cent of the entire international river and lake basins. In addition, 7 of the 12 institutions are found in West Africa, and three are in the Great Lakes region. In Northeastern Africa, the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 governs the distribution of water between Egypt and the Sudan. Central and West African countries had centered into an agreement for the development of Lake Chad basin on 22nd May 1984. The Horn of Africa and Southern Africa are devoid of conventional cooperation.

Organizational arrangements for the use of water resources differ in nature depending on the peculiar characteristics of the river systems concerned. It is difficult to establish cases where two rivers are alike. There are variations in social, economic, political and physical environments of African river basins. These variations lead to different demands and structures of water-related institutions of cooperation.
Interstate water resources institutions play different role ranging from consultation to autonomous authority. The variety of problems connected with the use of water resources shapes the administrative and management objectives of water resources institutions. Hence, examining the state behavior concerning cooperation and strategies for improved water management constitute the main aim of this part of the study.

**Institutionalized Cooperation**

Riparian states commit themselves to water agreements when there are compelling reasons necessitating a from of joint exploitation of water resources. The role of governments is critical in creating water-related organizations. Technical experts may prepare comprehensive programs drawing on experience in many fields, but the decision to undertake such programs depends on the political will of the governments concerned. As mentioned earlier, a few African rivers are managed through institutions established by international agreements. Activities of the established institutions range from evaluation of water resources to integrated water resources development. One should stress here that the nature of cooperation between riparian states varies from one river system to another. It is determined by the participation of basin states in the existing institutional arrangements. Thus the institutional regimes of African river basins can be classified into two categories.

The first category comprises those institutions whose jurisdiction extends to the whole river basin. Most of the West African water institutions are open to riparian states. Niger and Senegal are typical of the river systems in that region. The Niger Basin Authority includes all the member states, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. Similarly, the Organization for the Development of Senegal River (OMVS) conforms to the principle of open membership to all basin states. Although Guinea is not a member, the agreement of March 11, 1972 contains a provision for the accession of that country into the organization.

One of the common characteristics of the Niger Basin Authority and the OMVS is that they are hierarchical structures. The former is composed of the Summit of Heads of State and Government,
the Council of Ministers, the Technical Committee of experts and the Executive Secretariat. The OMVS is more structured than the Niger Basin Authority. It has four organs: The Assembly of Heads of state and Government, the Council of Ministers, the High Commissioner assisted by the General Secretariat, and the Permanent Commission on Water. The major differences between the two institutions lie in power. The riparian states of the Senegal River endow the OMVS with the power of creating obligations binding member states. Finally, these two organizations perform integrative functions. They bring together member states in the structures vested with the power to coordinate and implement water-related projects.

By contrast, the institutional regime of the Nile basin is a patchwork of agreements creating different institutional mechanisms. Fragmented cooperation is the reality that has been an obstacle to integrated development of the Nile water resources. The organizational culture and attitudes of riparian states have tended to discourage incentives for integration and coordination. Political and cultural factors are at the center of hesitation in process of basin-wide cooperation. The Nile basin experiences the clash between cultures, especially when the League of Arab States treats the Nile River as an Arab river. In emotional reactions about water allocation. Ethiopia emphasizes the Africaness of the Nile River. Whatever behavioral problems affecting cooperation, the truth is that the Nile is a river of the two worlds: Africa and the Middle East.

Consequently, two agreements create different institutions. They are the 1959 Agreement concerning the full utilization of Nile waters and the Rusumo Agreement of 1977. The first agreement established the Permanent Joint Technical Committee comprising Egypt and the Sudan. At the southern extreme of the Nile River, the Rusumo Agreement established the Kagera River Basin Organization. The organization is composed of two organs: The commission and the Secretariats. Membership of the basin organization is drawn from the four upstream riparian states: Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. These two institutions are exclusive in terms of membership and areas of Jurisdiction.

For example, the membership of the Permanent Joint Technical Committee of Nile River has no provision for adhesion of any other
riparian state. Instead article V stipulates a common position to consider demands of upstream countries for a share of the Nile waters. This provision implies exclusion in that Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania or any other upper riparian should not contemplate joining the organization as a full member. Similarly, the Rusumo Agreement imposes a spatial restriction in membership. Only the four countries sharing the Kagera River basin are eligible to participate in the Commission and the Secretariat. Thus, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and parties to the 1959 agreement have no role to play in the Kagera River Basin Organization. The founding members anticipated only the adhesion of Uganda in the text of the agreement.

Tension has been building up over the allocation of water resources since the signature of the 1959 Agreement. Ethiopia feels that she was deliberately excluded despite her independent status at the time of signature. The independence of the East and Central African Nile riparian states brought pressure to bear on the allocation of water resources. It resulted in the Hydromet Survey Project of 1967. The goal of the project was to provide updated hydrological data and to enhance cooperation. As a result, the project brought together, besides relevant United Nations bodies, all the basin states to participate in different capacities. The Project complicated its task and submitted the final report. The dissolution of the Hydromet Project in 1992 and its replacement by the Technical Committee for the Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) have created an incentive for a form of basin-wide cooperation.

Prospects for Cooperation in the 1990s

Economic conditions and the reduction in superpower tension have encouraged Africa states to cooperate over water resources. Developing institutional cooperation is gaining momentum in hydrographic spaces that were subject to acute rivalry between local powers with the backing of great powers. A number of basin states are moving away from parochial structures of cooperation and are in search of comprehensive cooperative arrangements. Also, the regional approach to the management of water resources seeks to incorporate a diversity of interests into a solid economic program. With exception of
the Congo and the Juba-Shibeli basins, prospects are great for cooperation in regions that were known for conflicts. This development is clearly noticed in the Nile basin and in Southern Africa.

The creation of TECCONILE in December 1992, with its secretariat at Entebbe, marks a turning point in the history of cooperation in the Nile basin. This organization has been able to hold meetings in the different countries of the Nile basin during the period 1993-1995. These meetings culminated the Nile River Basin Action Plan adopted on May 1995 at Entebbe. The Action Plan envisages several projects including the establishment of a regional organization comprising all the riparian states. The goal of the proposed organization is to promote integrated development of water resources and the consideration of water allocation. However, Ethiopia still participates in the meetings as an observer. This was the case during the Ministerial Meeting held in Arusha in February 1998.

Morse interesting is the improvement in the attitudes of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan concerning the problems of the Nile waters since the Mengistu regime collapsed in Ethiopia. Hence, Ethiopia has concluded agreements to cooperate over the use of Nile waters in December 1991 with Sudan, in June 1993 with Egypt and in April 1994 with the Sudan again. The annual conferences of technical experts known as the Nile 2002 foster cooperation between the Nile riparian states. The session of February 1997 took place in Addis Ababa. All these developments demonstrate the softening of attitudes, even though the participation of Ethiopia as an observer is hard to explain.

The most significant impediment of cooperation in Southern Africa was the policy of apartheid. Wars of Liberation, superpower involvement in Southern Africa and the international isolation of South Africa contributed to the absence of cooperation over natural resources including water. The end of the cold war brought a radical change when South Africa threw off apartheid. The need to exploit water resources in the SADC gives rise to regional cooperation. Most countries of the region lie either in arid or semi arid climatic conditions and have limited water resources. Although the SADC is endowed with important shared river systems, the potential for conflicts is
considerable. The population growth in the regions is already increasing pressure on water resources.

Consequently, cooperative management of water resources is becoming a conventional practice through the establishment of river basin authorities. They consist of the Cunene River Commission, the Zambezi River Authority and the Okavango Authority. The riparian states have created the Zambezi River Action Plan intended to draw up regional strategies for integrated management of the river basin. Member state of the SADC signed a protocol in August 1995 concerning shared watercourse systems. The Protocol envisages the creation of a Monitoring Unit for regional water resources management and a River Commission. The SADC Council of Ministers went further to wet up a water unit in August 1996. It is coordinated by Lesotho. All these endeavors are an intensification of cooperation over water resources in addition to the general cooperation represented by the existence of SADC. This is a considerable progress in the process of cooperation in Africa.

Finally, the assessment of cooperation must be seen in the context the relationships between African water organizations and the other international factors. There are other partners whose participation aims at transforming plans into concrete realities. None of the African countries exploiting river resources on a large scale have succeeded without having resorted to external resources. So, cooperation at the international level is a critical factor in integrated water development. International institutions and no governmental organizations have a role to play in developing water resources at different stages of national or regional plans. In this respect tribute should be paid to bodies in the United Nations systems such as the UNDP, WMO, UNESCO, FAO and the Like.

International organizations with interest in water resources participate in technical cooperation in Africa. UNESCO is one of the UN specialized bodies which is actively engaged in Africa since the mid 1990s. It enhances cooperation through the FRIEND Program. Such a program was launched several years ago. Two networks have been operating: The FRIEND group for West and Central Africa (FRIEND/AWC) and the FRIEND group for Southern Africa.
(FRIEND/SA). Another third group FRIEND/Nile Group, was launched on 13 March 1996. These groups bring together states of the regions concerned. For example, the FRiEND/Nile Group involves water specialists from six Nile basin countries (Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) and two regional organizations (IGAD and TECCONLE) The FRIEND Program incorporates other specialized groups such as the "Office de Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer (ORSTOM) in water resource development."

Building up cooperation and sharing experience is the partnership that must involve governments, NGOs, professional associations and academic institutions. The Stockholm-bas of Global Water Partnership (GWP) is one of the NGOs participating in Africa's efforts to develop water resources. The organization focused in its meeting of November 1996, on the state of sustainable water resources management in Southern Africa. However, the cooperation of organizations with riparian states of the continent must be built on the creative imagination of African countries that should be compatible with national and regional needs. The cooperation of NGOs with state institutions and private initiatives could ensure the implementation of small-scale projects. African countries have learnt from the past experience of ambitious water-related projects. Thus emphasis is turning fast in favor of manageable projects. The cooperation of the NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and national organizations has the propensity to open new investment opportunities in water resources development.

In short, cooperation and external assistance should focus on the needs of riparian states, Africa needs the kind of cooperation which must be in harmony with the policies of water-related institutions established by basin countries. External cooperation is needed in building technical know-how and the transfer of technology. These two elements should be based on credible methodologies, coordinated goals of water development and land use as well as on information network.
Integrated Water Management and Strategies

The treatment of this subject requires the exploration of the meaning before relating it to the African context of source water management. Integrated water management can be understood in several ways. Bruce Mitchell advances three meanings of the concept. First, it implies an ecological system that is formed by the number of interdependent components. The second meaning is that water is a system that interacts with other systems. This definition applies to the interaction between water, land and the environment. Last, integrated water management refers to the interrelationships between water, social and economic development. The last two definitions are more acceptable than the first definition, because water, land environment and society are interrelated to development efforts in Africa.

Integrated water management is a concept that has received considerable attention in recent years. The concept is applicable to normative, strategic and operational functions in the development of water resources. The question that arises is to understand the extent of its application in Africa or the possibility of its application wherever it is apparently absent. Specialists in water studies delineate thin boundaries in the field of integrated water management. But they differ over approaches to the levels in managing land and water resources. The issue of examining integrated water management in Africa must take into consideration the scope of application.

Most of the studies on Africa’s international rivers show that issues of integrated water development are treated at normative and strategic levels. At the normative level, the agreements establishing institutions of cooperation emphasize the integrated approach as the goal of water-related organizations. The OMVS and the NBA are typical of African normative actions of integrated water management. The organization for the Development of the Kagera River Basin falls within this level though with a slight difference. Its operational area is limited to a small portion of the Nile basin. Concerning the strategic level, states of African shared river systems devote themselves to elaborating policies of cooperation. The process is always the demonstration of interests and their harmonization in a comprehensive plan. Thus integrated water management show what the states can do
but not what has been done, what has been done is an operational action depending on the availability of financial and human resources.

Adopting an integrated approach to the development of water resources requires a number of options. One option is to identify the goals and the activities needed to achieve such goals. In the process of water diplomacy, states harmonize common activities and negotiate contradictory interests. This is true for the Africa riparian countries that have succeeded to establish a basin-wide organization. The other option is related to fragmented water management. Each state of a river basin identifies its own goals and directions. Member states of the Nile Basin organizations have chosen this form of water management. As mentioned elsewhere above, the riparian states of the Nile River system are actively engaged in the search for a basin-wide organization to accommodate and harmonize their divergent interests. There is the possibility that in the potential agreement the Nile basin countries may maintain the old fragmented structure of management under a new set of normative rules.

What the African river basin countries seeking an integrated water management should do is to create institutions with legal personality and regulatory powers over allocation of water, enforcement of anti-pollution laws and settling disputes between member states. Water policies should establish a link between water, land and the environment. Africa may be facing lesser effects of pollution, but water management should integrate social and ecological interests. This set of values constitutes the first strategy for integrated water management.

The second strategy consists of capacity building for integrated management of river basins. The development of institutionalized cooperation will require the training of personnel and users of water resources. Coordination, planning, and evaluation are the activities which must be undertaken in order to avoid resource wasting. Training and enlightenment should be extended to politicians, policy makers and tenants in the various river basin schemes. This form of capacity building should incorporate environmental problems, water conservation and responses to water scarcity.

The third strategy that must be given a special attention is conflict reduction. Water development has been the source of conflict
between and within states. It can hurt communities while benefits go to others. Externally defined systems of water rights result in the infringement of traditional rights. There is the need for research on effects of water-related projects. Conflicts over water resources should be based on objective policies, consultation and sharing of information. Also, basin states should organize to control social and political conflicts that have a bearing on the development of shared river basin. Regional organization, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) SADC and IGAD, are expected to play this role.

Finally, access to external assistance for the development of water resources should be promoted by river basin states. The success in attracting external assistance depends on the common understanding between riparian states to maintain political stability in a river basin, Conflict resolution is the strategy that can attract donors to the hydrographic areas prone to armed violence. Related to this strategy is the method of combating corruption. External donors are less inclined to invest in countries where corruption is rampant. It follows that states should monitor the river basin institutions they create to develop water resources on their behalf. These few strategies and the others that we have not mentioned here are to be given special attention if African countries expect to reduce confrontations and enhance cooperation in the development of water resources.

CONCLUSION

Analyzing Africa’s shared water resources in a holistic perspective is not an easy task. Each river basin has its peculiar characteristics and environment. More again does it become complex when one adds issues of confrontation and cooperation. Water-related theories have their shortcomings in that they only explain the relationships between basin countries according to their geographical locations in hydrographic regions. Theories barely explain the underlying causes of conflict or cooperation.

Consequently, this paper has addressed the general assessment of water resources, discharges of principal river systems, lakes and marches. The study reveals that river systems including lakes demonstrate variable discharges and capacities. It also indicates that
the geographical locations and the climates of the African rivers, taken as a sample, influence the availability or scarcity of water. Thus, the differences between the Nile River and the Congo River regarding the annual average discharges are directly linked with predominance of the desert dry climate and the Equatorial humid tropical type of climate in their respective basins. It has been noted with concern that Africa experiences water scarcity a situation which is aggravated by accelerated population growth in most of the basin countries. There is the potential for conflict over water resources if demographic growth becomes uncontrollable.

Water quantity and quality are central to conflicts. It has been found out that some conflicts emerge when water control projects are in operation. Such conflicts are resolved through appropriate institution. People tend to exaggerate the issues of conflict between riparian states in Africa. The fact is that a few direct confrontations over water resources have been recorded so far. They are limited to political exchanges between Egypt and Ethiopia or between different users of water. The bulk of conflicts opposing African countries are not directly related to water resources. Their occurrence disrupts plans for water use and the environment. Civil wars and power struggle between groups constitute the type of confrontation which impact on the development of water resources in Africa.

The state of water-related cooperation and the management of water resources is still inadequate. However, prospects for cooperation are bright in regions formerly riddled with a variety of conflicts. The Nile basin and Southern Africa begin to open for regional water arrangements. The search for cooperation has intensified in the post-cold war era. If Southern Africa completes the cooperative arrangements being promoted by the SAC, the scope of cooperation will be enlarged considerably. This area had been deprived from cooperation because of the generalized conflict that resulted from the policy of apartheid as well as the resistance against it.

Finally, water resource development processes take place as part of general economic cooperation. Activities of water-related organizations in Africa are geared towards integrated water development, but the practice falls short of integrating water, land and the environment. Functional organizations have paid more attention to
construction of dams and integrating irrigation into the process of
development. Besides irrigation, fisheries tend to be integrated into
water development due to the reservoirs created in the process of dam
construction. In general, the practice of integrated water management
needs a wider cooperation because it is a very expensive programs.
Africa’s riparian states should look beyond their organizations for
access to external assistance, and that access depends on social
stability. Activities of conflict reduction should be given special
attention in order to attract investment.

Notes:
   161, January-February. ACP/EU. Brussels. p.51
   Pinter, London. pp. 35-36
4. Tanganyika (now Tanzania) reacted to the distribution of water quantities of the
   owards a Nile Valley Treaty, M.O Beshir (ed) The Nile Valley Countries:
5. Article II section 4 of The Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the
   Sudan.
6. Article 6 section 3 of the Convention of Faranah (21 November 1980) creating
   the Niger Basin Authority.
   Third, the ethnic tribally in Great Lakes regions erode the effectiveness of the
   functional organization of water management. the Organization concerned are the
   organization for the management of Kajera river Basin and the Lake Tanganyka.
   1.
2. 7. For details see Dante A. Caponera (1978) Le Regime juridique des eaux
   internationales. FAO / Roome pp. 21-22 and pp. 50-53 Also see Edumudian
   Agreements Taylor and Francis. p. 549.
   Geneva. table 2.1. pp. 11 3-11.8
5. Twenty-eight dams were completed in 1960s. See Adams. The Physical
   Geography, p. 38
15. The Egyptian insistence on the philosophy of historical and natural rights contradicts the principal of cooperation. For the analysis of political and economic philosophies and their influence on the use of water resources see Adrian McDonald and David Kay (1988) Water Resources: Issues and Strategies, Longman. Essex pp. 41-42
18. See the Addis Ababa Tribune of the same date.
25. WMO (1987) Infohydro. table 1.6 pp.1 13-1.14
27. Article 19 of the Rusumo Agreement of 1977
31. Al Sudan al - Hadith 8th April 1994
32. Liebart (1997) the Courier, p. 64
33. 38. Emanuel Naah (1996) "News From FRIEND Groups in Africa UNESCO"
Bulletin Vol. 31 No 1 January June
Gender and Islam:
The African Perspective

By: Bilkisu Yusuf

Introduction:

That Muslim woman in Africa, like their counterparts of other religions and other continents, experience varying levels of subordination is not contestable. What is arguable is how Islam as a religion and a way of life connects with the multiple levels of subordination and oppression of women. Is Islam used as a liberating force for the promotion of gender equity or as a legitimizing ideology for women’s subordination and oppression?

This paper examines the inter-relationships between Islam and gender inequalities in Africa, focusing mainly on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. One out of every five Africans is a Nigerian. In discussing gender, the expectation is that this discourse will illuminate our understanding of the power relations between Muslim women and men in societies that profess Islam. What are the roles Islam assigns to women? How do Muslim women perceive their status? What roles do they play in decision-making, in taking control of their lives? How do they affect or are affected by social change, the legitimizing ideologies of their societies? What has been their pattern of interaction with the state and custodians of religion and global women’s movements? How have these impacted on their lives?

From the outset, the issue of identity is most palpable. Is there a common identity for Muslim women in Africa? One might even expand the question beyond the African continent and ask

A political scientist and editor, Citizen Communications, Ltd., Caduna, Nigeria.
whether Muslim women worldwide have a common "Muslim identity" that Islam as a religion bestows on them. It is obvious that the only ground for a common identity is the profession of faith in Islam. Where that similarity ends, the diversity in the interpretation and implementation of "Islamic Law" and "Muslim way of life" begins. Recognition and acceptance of what is "Muslim" or "Islam" is then determined by the various cultural factors such as kinship structures, patriarchy, class, socio-economic factors such as the relations of production, patterns of relation, power and political structure, etc.

Given the myriad of differences that exist even within Africa and in various societies worldwide, a common Islamic identity becomes an illusion, eroded by these factors earlier enumerated. The paper posits that the diversity of African Muslim societies has ensured that the level of women's subordination, empowerment and self reliance vary according to the original socio-cultural milieu into which Islam is introduced. Other historical factors such as experience with colonialism, national and international policies, which shape development, have generated varying responses. The discourse addresses some of these responses from Muslim women in Northern Nigeria, which is predominantly Muslim. It recognizes the differences, even in Nigeria, between the responses in the North in comparison with those from the South-West of Nigeria, which has had a longer history of exposure to European missionary activity, Western education, different patterns of colonial rule and a mixed population of half Christian and half Muslim.

Shaheed (1993) makes a clear distinction between societies or communities that are Islamic, i.e. that which is ordained, and those that are Muslim (i.e. of those who adhere to Islam). The latter are in fact not Islamic but are merely Muslim because adherence to Islam also reflects the assimilation of Islam into prevailing structures, systems and practices. It is however, imperative to
discuss the key concepts that should feature in any discourse on Gender and Islam.

Defining Gender

Development vocabulary has been reflecting gender for several decades, and gender-focused development has been recognized as an organizing principle of society. However, gender is yet to be understood by various segments of society, and it is often confused with sex.

Sex refers to the biological characteristics of women and men, which are God given, universal, biologically determined before birth and permanent. Gender, however, refers to the roles and relationships in a specific society or culture that are ascribed to women and men. The people therefore socially determine gender, and it varies from one society and culture to another. Gender is said to be a “social construct” because it is created, supported and reinforced by societal structures and institutions. It envites inequality and it also legitimizes it. Gender is not permanent, nor is it universal. It is based on mutable stereotypes of male and female behaviour and capability that are often associated with sex. Age, social class, ethnicity, education and technology also affect gender. Crises such as wars and natural disasters such as famine, floods, earthquakes, etc. cause gender roles to change as men and women are forced to adopt new roles to ensure survival. Gender roles often constitute a constraint to both men and women by limiting opportunities available to them for self advancement, but it often has a more repressive impact on women, restricting their participation in societal development, (CEDPA 1996:3), to the general detriment of human kind at large.

Gender and Development (GAD)

The new focus in analyzing gender and promoting development is recognized as Gender And Development, GAD. It is "an
approach to development which shifts the focus from women as a group to the socially determined relations between women and men. GAD focuses on social, economic, political and cultural forces that determine how men and women can participate in, benefit from, and control project resources and activities. The concept is based on the recognition that "the problems of women were perceived in terms of sex - the fact of their being female - rather than in terms of gender - social roles and relationships of men and women and the forces that perpetuate and change these relations." (CEDPA 1996:12). GAD emphasizes the fact that girl children and women have been assigned secondary and inferior roles to boy children and men, although both sexes are equally intellectually endowed. In addition, the needs of the girl child and women are considered in isolation from the larger society. The GAD approach, therefore, seeks to make the girl child and women an integral part of every development strategy, and has developed the following concepts:

i. Both men and women create and maintain society and shape the division of labour. However, they benefit and suffer unequally. Therefore, greater focus must be placed on women because they have been more disadvantaged.

ii. Women and men are socialized differently and often function in different spheres of the community, though there is interdependence. As a result, they have different priorities and perspectives. Because of gender roles, men can constrain or expand women’s options.

iii. Development affects men and women differently, and women and men will have a different impact on projects. Both must be involved in identifying problems and solutions if the interests and well-being of the community as a whole are to be furthered (CEDPA 1996:13).

The GAD approach has developed strategies, which open the path to gender equity, which is the quality of being fair and right in
allocating roles and defining relationships between women and men. (See appendix 1). An African gender-focused convention was also outlined in the Kampala Document, which called for the full involvement of women in decision making processes at all levels and appropriate policies and implementation of strategies at the national, institutional and regional levels and specifically called for the early implementation of the African Declaration on the Advancement of African Women, notably the Abuja Declaration, and the Arusha and Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies. It also urged all governments to enunciate policies on these.

**Gender In Islam**

Kabira and Masinjila (1993) underscore the fact that gender relations can and do change when influenced by various factors. However, gender relations can be resistant to change, which is precisely why society constructs gender roles and how these over the years perpetuate inequality through unequal relationship between women and men. In such a milieu, when questions are raised about unequal, socially constructed gender relations and the need to change them, the resisting party, usually men and sometimes women, respond that "it has always been like that, it is our culture, you cannot interfere with people’s culture", etc. (Kabira and Masinjila 1993).

Gender relations are interactive and inseparable, and recognition of this underscores the need to gender analyze policies and projects to ensure that they prove beneficial to those for whom they are meant. Indeed it is through recognition of this reality that GAD can claim superiority and comprehensiveness over other methods of analysis. Women and men, according to GAD, have different decision-making powers, different access to and control over resources and different needs. Women are often subordinate in gender relations (ABANTU: 1997).
The Holy Qur'an is a gender sensitive document which specifically addresses women and men, outlines their responsibilities to individually seek their own salvation and gives women and men free will, freedom of conscience to follow its guidance or reject it. Women and men who follow the guidance will be equally rewarded, while those who reject it will be equally punished. “There is no compulsion in religion” Quran (2:256) since truth is clear from falsehood. With freedom comes justice and duties, people should have the freedom of conscience, provided that this does not encroach on the human rights of others. Being just, according to the Qur’an, “is closest to being God fearing”. With justice and freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Qur’an, what does it have to say about responsibilities, and the roles assigned to women and men? It is pertinent to begin with the most obvious: the sex roles.

The Qur’an recognizes the biological differences between women and men, but makes it clear that it is not a basis for either sex to claim superiority over the other. “O mankind we have created you male and female, the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the best in conduct”. (Q; 49:13). The Qur’an glorifies motherhood because it entails genuine sacrifice and unstinted love. It underscores this by narrating the stories of women who bore children and became celebrated personalities who attained higher status through devotion and motherhood. Among them are Virgin Mary the mother of Isa (Jesus), Hajar (Hagar) the mother of Prophet Isma'il, the mother of Prophet Moses, and Sarah, mother of Isaac and the mother of Prophet Yahaya (John). The Qur’an makes it clear that mothers are the best nurturers of their children: “Mothers should give suck for two years if they wish to complete the term” (Q; 2:233). It is a sex role which men cannot perform. It also demands obedience and kindness to mothers. “Mothers shall breastfeed their babies for two complete years, if they desire that the term be completed. The father of the baby shall provide them food
and clothes in the established manner. None shall be charged more than his capacity. No mother shall be made to suffer with respect to her child, nor father with respect to it. The responsibility is the same for both of them. If both spouses decide, by mutual consent and consultation, on weaning, there is no blame on either. Nor shall it be any offense for you if you prefer to have a nurse for your children, provided that you pay her what you promise, according to usage. Fear God and know that God is aware of what you do". (Q: 2:233).

It is obvious from this verse that giving birth to the baby and breastfeeding are sex roles which women perform because they are biologically endowed for them. It is the only biological role assigned to women because the Shariah also makes parenting a joint responsibility of both parents and no parent should be made to suffer more because of the child.

On the gender roles, the Qur'an makes the man the provider for the family. Based on this distinct sex role for women and the gender role for men has developed culture-specific gender relations in Muslim societies all over the world. In most Muslim societies, Nigeria included, the tendency is to acknowledge only this biological role of women and devalue their other endowments and roles that are equally relevant, such as their intellectual and spiritual endowments. The priority given to the biological role also provides a convenient excuse for societies to keep women tied up within cultural constituencies that are not even Islamic. For example, they argue that, because women have to give birth to babies and rear them, they must remain within their homes and forgo intellectual and spiritual activities and this model of the narrow minded, home bound, often illiterate and spiritually deprived women is passed from one generation to the next as the ideal Muslim woman. The acceptable biological roles aside, other gender based contraptions of roles are also loaded on women who are often the cooks and
laundry women. These are clearly gender roles that Islam does not assign to women. Adverse laws and customs are also mingled with what is then passed off as “Islamic laws”, where women are “closeted, isolated and kept” voiceless within four walls, and sometimes forcibly given in marriage”. (Shaheed 1993). Sulaiman (1997) notes that “societies bent on perpetuating their age old customs and cultures have seized upon this loophole to impose particular norms and standards, specific mode of conduct, a particular style of dressing, and a severely restive pattern of life that are otherwise not wholly acceptable to Islam; all in an attempt to enforce uniformity regardless of time and environment”.

Typical examples of such Islamically unacceptable regime imposed on women in Muslim societies are confining women to seclusion, preventing them from driving a car and going to school and even widows from going out to obtain food for their children as was witnessed lately in Afghanistan when the Taliban came to power. Even where the “biological woman” reigns supreme as the only acceptable model of a Muslim woman, as the Afghan case seems to confirm, is the woman not entitled to acquire knowledge and skills that would make the performance of her child bearing and rearing role better and more beneficial to the society? For the mother, humanity’s first teacher, to efficiently perform her sex role as the nurturer of humanity, she needs knowledge. Thus the Qur’an, taking due cognizance of the multiple roles of both sexes, makes acquisition of knowledge compulsory for Muslim women and men. Yet how many Muslim societies put a premium on educating their women? The Qur’an also assigns to women and men the paramount duty of being Allah’s vicegerents on earth, and enjoined both to do good works and forbid evil. How can women perform this role if they remain ignorant?

“The believers men and women are protecting friends of one another, they enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong” (Q.
9:71). As representatives charged with this great assignment, Islam enjoins complementarily, and women and men would earn equal rewards from Allah. "I will not suffer to be lost the work of any of you whether male or female. You proceed one from another" (Q: 3:195) and "Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has faith, verily to them we give a new life that is good and pure, and we will bestow on such their reward according to the best of their actions" (Q: 16:97).

To be able to "enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong", women and men must acquire education, impart it, contribute to society activities, and ensure its balanced development. Inherent in this is the recognition of both the intellectual and biological roles women and men have to play in addition to socially constructed gender roles. Does Islam provide the prerequisite for the empowerment to women?

**The Islamic Empowerment Framework**

There are various empowerment, gender sensitization and analyses frameworks: the Harvard model, Caroline Mosers framework, and Sara Longwe's "From welfare to empowerment", used for planning and programming, which are also relevant for analyzing individual and societal levels of development. One of these is the model (CEDPA 1997) adopted from the "Women on the Move" project. This framework views empowerment as a dynamic process with four major stages: Access, Conscientization, Action and Equity. The attraction in using this model is its applicability and relevance to the individual woman who can use it to determine her level of empowerment. It is also a cumulative model with each stage marking the progress made towards the ultimate goal, which is empowerment. The model will be used to analyze the rights of women in Islam. Can the Muslim woman use these rights as her path to empowerment? The first phase is Access.
1. Access

Access is a stage at which women are able to gain access to all types of resources on an equitable basis with men. The basic resources required to facilitate Access that will lead to empowerment are knowledge, skills, funds and land. Islam enjoins compulsory education for women and men without limitations on how much knowledge they can acquire or a ceiling on how far they can go in the search for knowledge. They also have the right to acquire skills and pursue a livelihood (MSO 1997, Minawi, 1993:47.51), “It is Islamically permissible for the Muslim woman to undergo training for any decent profession, provide it is suitable for her natural capacities. (Shaheed: 1997). Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the Islamic reformer’s insistence on women’s education is well known, and a scholar “as a restatement of the principle that education in Islam is not only a right, but also a duty” views it. (Sulaiman 1986:87). As for economic resources, Islam gives the Muslim woman the right to acquire wealth, own land and property, to inherit wealth from her relations and others also inherit from her. She has the right to undertake legally binding economic transactions and to acquire and dispose of her wealth, as she deems fit. As a widow, she gets a share in her husband’s property. Muslim jurists consider this a significant development at the time the Qur’an was revealed considering that in as “civilized” a country as England, a married woman was not entitled to own property until 1922!! (Brohi 1979:15). It is, however, one thing for Islam to grant women all these rights to Access, and quite another for them to be aware of these rights and, even where they are aware, to be able to claim them. The obstacles to accessing these rights will be discussed later.

2- Conscientization:

The second phase is Conscientization which “is a stage at which women have become aware of their rights and recognize
gender inequities. This understanding enhances women’s ability to take control over and take advantage of development programs targeted at women”. The Shariah, apart from making education compulsory, also demands that such education when acquired must be reflected in the improved quality of life in that society in which the learned live. Conscientization in Islam provides women and men with the opportunity to question gender inequities and seek redress, to take control of their lives by challenging all forms of injustice in the public and private sphere. All persons, according to the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights UIDHR (1981:7), have the right to equality and prohibition against impermissible discrimination. The Shariah provides for an equitable and fair role for women in economic life if Muslim society. Just as much as they share in the management of family affairs, they can contribute to the support of the family, though they are not legally bound to provide maintenance (Turabi, 1993:18).

Taking control over their own lives also extends to reproductive rights. Foremost is the right of the Muslim wife to decide with her husband the spacing of their children and whether or not she wants to breastfeed the baby or even demand payment for doing so or have the baby sent to a wet nurse (Qur’an 2:233). According to the Shariah, parents of the baby would have to decide by consultation and mutual consent whether the mother should breastfeed it, when to wean it and whether it should go to a wet nurse who will be paid by the father. What this rule points to is the right to be consulted, while translated into the right of women to have a say in the well-being of the family, the right to be consulted, and the right to make her views known in public and private spheres and to demand and protect her rights. An extension of the woman’s reproductive right is the right to sexual satisfaction in a marriage without which a woman can seek divorce.
3. Action

The third phase in the empowerment model is action, "a stage at which women increase their participation in decisions and activities that directly affect their well-being". It is marked by actions taken individually and collectively to make visible, practical and strategic changes to their environment. From all the rights listed above, it is obvious that the Shariah allows women to initiate and sustain any project that will raise their standard of living, from practical needs projects which range from organizing communities for provision of basic amenities such as water, loans, health care, food etc, to other strategic needs such as education, representation, and participation in decision making and public life. Since the Shariah gives women the right to vote for, they have the responsibility individually or collectively to ensure that only those who are knowledgeable, competent and the best people in conduct and comportment emerge as leaders. "Is Islam, public life is no stage where men alone can play. There is no segregation of sexes in the public domain which call for joint efforts." (Turabi, 93:20, Siddique 88:78).

Action, according to the Shariah, is the most important expression of faith, and it urges Muslim women and men to rid society of its flaws by changing things with their hands, if they are unable to do so, they should speak out against it, and if this is not possible, they should hate it in their hearts. This, however, is the weakest expression of faith.

4. Equity:

The fourth phase is "the stage at which women have fair and appropriate access to and control of resources and their distribution. Equity also implies that women have gained the ability to participate fully in decision-making and to set an agenda that responds to their specific needs". Clearly, this is the stage of equity that should prevail if the compendium of rights the Shariah provides are
accessible to Muslim women. Islam is not obsessed with granting equal rights to women and men and ignoring the fact that equity is vital in ensuring that these rights are accessible. The Shariah therefore provides for complementarily between men and women and equity in role allocation. Each sex, according to its physical strength and endowments, should be allocated roles for which it is best suited. The Shariah does not demand that Muslim women must develop and acquire masculine traits in order to earn equality in rights with their male counterpart or equity in role allocation in the society. That Muslim societies have not been the pace setters in empowering their women to be active partners in development nor global role models inspite of these rights is one of the greatest tragedies for Islam and the root cause of the degeneration of Muslim societies. This state of retrogression will remain until Muslim women scholars begin to define for themselves their own identity, resist the imposition of flawed male conception of what is the correct religious culture and identity. The progress of any society is mirrored in the status of its women, their freedom to fully participate in decision-making and setting the agenda for sustainable advancement of the society. The Shariah generally provides for an equitable and fair role for women in the social, political and economic sector. They are also entitled to full freedom to express their proper views; Umar Ibrahim (1986:29), Turabi (1993:17,18), Sulaiman (1986:88). The right and obligation to participate in the conduct and management of public affairs is also amplified in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR 1981:10).

Obstacles to Empowerment of Muslim Women

Conscious of the gap between Islamic prescriptions on women's rights and what actually obtains in practice, and anxious that these discrepancies are corrected to ensure that Muslim women know what these rights are and that they have an acceptable, important, and necessary role to play in determining the course and goals of the development process, scholars have been engaged in
age long and seemingly unending debate on the role of women in
the public realm and striving to remove the obstacles that hinder
them from realizing their full potentials (Coles and Mark: 1991:12).
Then, as now, those obstacles to progress, when clearly identified,
rage from patriarchy, weak commitment to religion (which often
leads to distortion and manipulation of doctrinal and normative
teachings of Islam on women's rights, foremost among them her
right, indeed duty to acquire education), segregation and isolation of
women from the general society, male jealousy and arbitrariness.

The earliest recorded attempts by Muslim men in Nigeria to
purposely keep women ignorant and weak could be traced to the
year 1786, when a scholar, Mustapha Goni, criticized Shehu Usman
Danfodio, the Islamic reformer and founder of the Sokoto Caliphate
for allowing women to attend his public lectures where they mixed
with men. The Shehu in response noted that "the evil of leaving
women in ignorance, not knowing what is incumbent upon them,
not knowing Islam at all is greater than the evil of mixing with
men". (Sulaiman 1986:84). In several of his writings, the Shehu
postulated that these men." Who oppose the education of women
were mere hypocrites and in Nurl al-Albab he said: "Oh Muslim
women! Do not listen to those who are themselves misguided and
who misguide others; who seek to deceive you by asking you to
obey your husbands without asking you (first) to obey Allah and His
messenger. They say that a woman’s happiness lies in her
obedience to her husband: they say so only to fulfil their selfish ends
and fulfil their wishes through you. They compel you to do thing
which neither Allah nor His messenger has originally imposed on
you, like cooking, washing of clothes and similar things which are
among their numerous wishes, while they do not in the least demand
of you to perform the real duties imposed on you by Allah and His
messenger".
The Shehu’s admonition fell on deaf ears of later generation, as the majority of women among the Hausa/Fulani where he lived and worked remained in ignorance long after the reformer’s admonition, though the Shehu and those who followed him educated their wives and daughters to the highest level. One of the Shehu’s daughters, Nana Asmau, was a teacher and scholar who had fifty five works to her credit. She was also an administrator and diplomat who was corresponding with the Shehu of Borno, the head of another Islamic State on issues of administration and jurisprudence. Patriarchy and the tendency to attach Islamic values to prejudices in Muslim society have entrenched the pervasive notion that Muslim women are subjected to control by the whims and caprices of men. The seclusion of women has also given rise to a view of Muslim women as largely powerless, relative to men and entirely lacking in authority in the public realm (Coles and Mark 1991:12, Turabi 1991:37 Ibrahim 1986:29 and Siddique 1988:14). Hundreds of years after the Shehu, progressive politicians like Aminu Kano in the 1950s, who started his life using the Shehu as a model, demanded that women should have freedom of movement, they should vote and be voted for and he condemned the seclusion of women, restricting one’s wives to the confines of their quarters, as a pagan practice (Feintein: 1987:28). Yet, male hypocrisy, arbitrariness and jealousy is still manifested in Muslim societies, and as recently as 1992 attempts were made by male legislators in predominantly Muslim Katsina State to deprive single women from paid employment in the civil service as one method of fighting prostitution and immorality. A proposed law recommended by its committee on Judiciary in the Katsina State House of Assembly required all women to be married by a stipulated period or lose their jobs, a move that clearly violated the country’s constitution. Public outcry forced the legislators to drop the law. But that typifies the reaction of men in degenerate Muslim societies where juristic rules and stratagems are usually adopted to distort the Shariah and
oppress women who are made the scapegoats of any misdirected anger. The legislators were silent about the fate of bachelors.

Turabi (1991:38) observes that discriminatory attitude of interpretation and manipulation of law is widespread, yet another side of this same coin of “tendentious jurisprudence is to generalise the provisions of the Qur’an and the Sunnah that were meant to apply exclusively to the Prophets or his wives due to their unique position.” Another obstacle to empowerment of Muslim women in Nigeria, as indeed elsewhere, is the prevalence of male views on status of women and gender roles constructed by men for women by virtue of their domination of scholarship and the interpretation of law. This has ensured that the societies’ views of Muslim women rarely reflect women’s views of themselves, their aspirations and the Islamic provisions that give legitimacy to these. The emergence of articulate Muslim women scholars presenting coherent perspectives on women is the imperative alternative to correcting this. Such a development would also check another factor that hinders the advancement of women, namely the promotion of the views of some scholars or commentators to a sacred, divinely ordained command. The Qur’an as the ultimate law, with the Sunnah complementing, makes it clear that the views of a scholar, no matter how knowledgeable, not to mention the scores of ill informed ones that are peddled, should not be cast with such immutable and unalterable finality to the extent that other views are castigated as unislamic. The diversity of views all drawing their strength from the texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah is a hallmark of Islam as reflected in its four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali, none of which claims superiority over the other. Yet this lesson in intellectual accommodation and tolerance is jettisoned among Muslims in Nigeria who tenaciously cling to their particular Sheikh’s views without opening a window to others, particularly where women’s rights, status and role in society and public life are concerned. As Siddique (1988:141) postulates, “some scholars,
anxious to check the emergence of Muslim women as partners, have emphasized certain aspects of Islam and de-emphasized others. Such scholars cite Qur'an (Chapter 4:34) and one or two hadiths, to give the impression that in Islam a woman is only “half a man”, whereas “there is no Islamic obstacle in the way of women serving at the highest position”.

The solution clearly lies in educating and broadening the perspective of conservative scholars to move from fossilized interpretation of Islam and explore the dynamism of the Shariah by locating it in our specific milieu and time. Unless this is done, progressive scholars believe that “a revolution against the condition of women in the traditional Muslim societies is inevitable”. (Turabi, 1991:43).

The *ulama*, Muslim scholars, in traditional societies do not see the danger of their failure to design an Islamically acceptable path for women’s empowerment. They seem oblivious of the fact that their inability to do so will force Muslim women to look elsewhere for guidance. Some *ulama* have always revealed their profound uneasiness with the strategies of women’s emancipation in non-Muslim societies, particularly in the West. They tell Muslim women cautionary tales about the adverse impact of women’s liberation movements in the West. By doing this, the *ulama* strive to diminish the appeal of Western style feminism. Yet they do no offer an Islamic alternative. It is pertinent to examine some of these theories, what they mean and why the *ulama* are adverse to them.

**Western Feminist Theories**

Defined simply, feminism is “advocacy of women’s rights on the basis of equality of sexes”. (Oxford Dictionary1985). Feminist theory offers “perspectives to a central series of questions and dilemma about sex and gender” (Acker 1994:43). Three of these theories will be briefly examined.
Radical Feminist Theory

This approach stresses "the subjugation of women as a result of male group dominance over female group based on sex or patriarchy. Patriarchy establishes male dominance in its basic accounts of the world, its standards of knowledge and judgment, as well as in its institutions and practices (Ferguson 1991:2687). Azikiwe (1997) notes that this theory believes that the root cause of women's oppression and colonialism is patriarchy, and the way to eliminate this class exploitation and oppression is to erase the domination of women by men on which capitalism is founded. The liberation of women from inequality and invisibility in all aspects of life should begin with the elimination of male domination not social class system.

Socialist Feminist Theory

This theory view women's subjugation as an outcome of class inequality and conflict caused by capitalism and division of labor within the family. Men who also determine the value of what women produce direct the division of labor in society. The result is undervaluation of women's work and their worth. Women's unpaid and underpaid labor are seen as an extension and complimentary to their husbands' even where, as in many African societies, women undertake about 70% of agricultural activities and grow most of the continent's food. This theory underscores the fact that "class relations and in particular capitalism, its construction of women's position in the home and division of labour-a are major causes of subjugation of women in the society" (Sokoloff 1991).

For the purpose of this discourse, which focuses on Muslim women in third world countries of Africa and Nigeria in particular, the expansion of the socialist feminist theory to the broad range of Third World countries is useful. Belen and Bose (1990) believe that in order to understand the history of Third World societies, their
incorporation into and survival in a global capitalist system must be recognized and explored. Within this capitalist system of material and social relations, "the subordination of women has always been ideologically conceived as an integral part of the natural order and perpetuated by cultural praxis, religion, education and other social institutions". This reinforces Sokoloff's (1991) stand, which states that an analysis of women's problems must be based on examining and understanding the complex effects of production and patriarchy. The socialist feminist theory therefore believes that the subordination and exploitation of women would only cease if the social class system and the entire sexual division of labour both at home and outside the home are transformed, reviewed, modified, if they could not be totally eliminated. (Azikiwe, 1997).

C- Liberal Feminist Theory

This theory links women's subordination to private property accumulation under capitalism. It states that in the primitive setting, women's labour was vital and valued because production was basically for family use. The surplus in this system of production was exchanged by barter to obtain items the family required. However, as capitalism consolidated its hold, paid labour was introduced and bourgeoisie began to control and exploit the people by paying for their labour. As this occurred, the significance of women's work began to decline into a necessary but socially subordinate part of production." (Imam 1985:20). The undervaluing of women's production led to a decline in their status. Thus the development of capitalist production and accumulation of property has diminished women's status. In order to address the subordination of women, the productive forces, institution of private property and development of social class relations must be recognized as the casual factors and transformed or eliminated, if the subjugation is to end.
All these theories originated from the West, and were the basis on which Women Liberation Movements (WLM) were established in the 50s and 60s. It was an angry movement demanding equal pay for equal work, it assaulted domesticity and made motherhood a choice, often a burden rather than a binding responsibility and unavoidable obligation if humanity is to be replenished. In her critique of U.S. feminists, Sylvia Hewlett (1986:179) notes that “The feminists of the modern women’s movement made one gigantic mistake: they assumed that modern women wanted nothing to do with children. As a result they have consistently failed to incorporate the bearing and rearing of children into their vision of a liberated life.”

Western style feminism in that era embarked on a scathing critique of dependent wives and mothers, and glorified masculinity, and such traits as hairy legs and bra-burning, which according to Rosenfelt and Stacey (1987:87) had some negative consequences. It cast feminism’s over-reaction to the fifties as “an anti-natalist, anti-maternalist” movement. It also made feminism take the major blame for the disastrous effects on women, such as the rising rates of divorce and female employment which is equated with abandoning the home, though these were trends that were well under way before the women’s movement. Feminists rage and virulent criticism of marriage was also reflected in the fact that it promoted and glamourised unnatural traits such as hostility to marriage and encouragement or tolerance of lesbianism. Many women and potential allies who were sympathetic to feminism have found this distasteful and distanced themselves from a Western feminist identity. They do not want to be identified with the anti-marriage and pro-lesbian, bra-burning label of women’s liberation movements because these go against the natural orders, the basis of all religions. (Yusuf 1991:102).
Feminism: The African Perspective

As the feminist struggle was being waged in the West, Africans identified with and designed their own response to the vital issues raised by feminists - exploitation, subordination and powerlessness of women. Working within secular and religious organisations, they articulated their demands for a gender balanced and equitable society. Although some of them found the feminist theories useful for analytical purposes, many of them shunned the Western style liberation movements’ strategies and were rather propelled by concrete on-the-ground issues within their own societies.

Women In Nigeria (WIN)

Prominent among the secular women’s organisations that emerged to fill this need is Women In Nigeria (WIN). It is a national, non-governmental organisation, established in Zaria, Northern Nigeria, in 1982 by men and women academics, professionals and social activists who shared a common perspective on gender issues. WIN believes that “the majority of women, like the majority of men, suffer from the exploitative and oppressive character of Nigerian society. And that women suffer additional forms of exploitation as members of subordinate classes and as women.” WIN therefore came into being to provide a forum for women and men to struggle against exploitation and gender oppression.

WIN undertakes research and dissemination of information and actions aimed at improving the conditions of women. It challenges gender inequities and makes input into policy. Concretely, WIN acts to promote the study of the conditions of women in Nigeria with the aim of combating discriminatory and sexist practices in the family, in the work place and the wider society; to defend women’s rights as contained in national, regional and international instruments, to promote equitable distribution of
domestic work in the family, to combat sexist stereotypes in literature, the media and educational materials, and to provide a means of educating women on relevant issues.

**FOMWAN: The Muslim Women’s Response**

Thousands of Muslim women’s groups exist in different parts of Nigeria with some such as the *Yan turanc* established by Nana Asmau during the Sokoto Caliphate era dating back to pre-colonial Nigeria. Many of them developed from neighbourhood *Islamiyya* schools where women studies the Quran and Hadith and also organised community welfare services. As Western education spread to Muslim communities, all secondary and higher institutions had established branches of these religious students organisations known as Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN) or Sisters Organisation (MSO).

As these organizations continued to increase in and outside the Western and Islamic educational institutions, there was a felt need to establish a national organisation that would unite and bring the groups under a common platform for mutual encouragement, exchange of ideas, programmes and information. The efforts began in 1980, and by April 1985 representatives of Muslim women educated in both Islamic and Western system, from different parts of Nigeria met in Kano under the auspices of MSO and resolved to meet in Minna in October 1985 to establish The Federation of Muslim Women’s Association in Nigeria (FOMWAN).

The aim of FOMWAN is to empower Muslim women based on Islamically accepted methods that however meet the needs to modern society. The Federation of Muslim Women recognized the urgent need to end long-standing disregard for the views of the average Muslim woman in the formulation and implementation of national policy. Among the Federation’s objectives are:
i. to promote cooperation and communication among the Muslim 
   women's group in Nigeria; 
ii. to encourage and coordinate development of Islamic education 
    and awareness among women, and 
iii. to enable Muslim to express their views on national issues.

Since its establishment, the federation has undertaken various projects in health education, income generation and human rights. It has embarked on advocacy on women's rights and has expressed its concern about the invisibility of women in politics and public life. Although women constitute 60 percent of Nigerian voters and 49.7 percent of the total Nigerian population, they are politically marginalized in party hierarchy and in other decision making positions both elective and appointive. Women constitute only 0.7 percent of the elected representatives.

FOMWAN and some of its affiliate organisations have embarked on advocacy directed at mobilizing women for effective participation in politics and public life. They have initiated debate on gender and the role of Muslim women in politics at various conferences and are demanding that Nigeria as a signatory to the Beijing Platform for Action should adopt an affirmative action to get more women into elective and appointive positions in order to correct their marginalization.

Muslim Women and Politics

Long before Muslim women emerged as prominent political leaders, debate on the role they should or could play in politics and public life has elicited varying views. The acceptability or otherwise of Muslim Women's participation in politics has become the subject of discourse in various circles, particularly with the emergence of Muslim women leading countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Countries like Pakistan have witnessed Benazir Bhutto's two terms in office. She became the first Prime Minister
of an Islamic State. Bangladesh has seen Begum Khalida Zia and Sheikha Hassina Wajid, Turkey with its obsession with being recognized as a Western secular state had its Tansu Ciller: all Muslim women who won the confidence of Muslim men and women to emerge as leaders of their countries. Muslim women elsewhere have been affected by these developments which served as an impetus for them to re-examine their role in politics or even aspire to lead their countries. Reactions to this contemporary trend vary from support for politically active Muslim women to outright denunciation of women’s political activism in whatever form. Between these two are scholars who support activism and political leadership roles for women at all levels except that of a head of state. Those who subscribe to this school of thought argue that the head of state in an Islamic State is not a secular leader but also a spiritual one (an Imam) and Islam does not allow a woman to lead men in prayers as an Imam. They also cite a prophetic tradition (Hadith) which states that a nation will not prosper if a woman leads it.

Does this argument confine women to the political backwaters in Muslim states? What factors motivated these Muslim women to scale political hurdles and become leaders of their predominantly Muslim countries? If indeed Islam is an anti-women leader why did the Muslim men in these countries vote for women? Does Islam have political leadership roles for women? Answers to these questions must begin with an examination of the Qur’an and the Hadith, which together form the basis of Islamic law - Shariah - complemented by events that occurred during the life of the Prophet (SAW) when he established and led the first Islamic state in Madina.

Abu Bakrah narrated that when news reached the Messenger of Allah (SAW) that the people of Persia had made the daughter of the king of Persia their ruler, he said: “A nation which makes a
woman to run its affairs will never prosper.” (narrated by Ahmad, Bukhari, Nasa’i and Tirmidhi, and Tirmidhi, who said it is an authentic saying).

Some conservative scholars use this saying to prohibit women from holding all leadership positions. Ustaz Lawal Abubakar, a traditional alim, is one of them. A disciple of late Sheikh Mahmoud Abubakar Gumi he strongly supports women’s education, which is obligatory in Islam, and cites the role they played in the early days of Islam when “women were allowed to attend the sick, feed the soldiers and guard warriors provisions as their contribution to the military expedition”. He also conceded that women were allowed to play advisory roles in the affairs of state during that period and cited as an example Ummu Hani, the Prophet’s cousin and sister to the fourth Caliph Ali Ibn Abu Talib (RA). She led a group of people to the Prophet (SAW) and sought amnesty for them to prevent them from being taken prisoners by the Muslims during the conquest of Mecca. The Prophet (SAW) obliged, and shortly after announced a general amnesty for all the inhabitants of Makkah at the Holy Ka’abah. Ustaz Lawal recommends that today Muslim women must vote because “the only way to ensure victory for a desirable candidate is when Muslim women too cast their vote”.

However, there are many scholars, such Abu Hanifa who was the Imam of the Hanafi school of Islamic Jurisprudence who disagree with the conservatives. Imam Abu Hanifa ruled that a woman could be appointed as a judge and At-Tabari, another cleric also ruled that women can hold any position of leadership in the society (Ibrahim 1986:28-29). Dr. Usman Bugaje, an Islamic scholar and Secretary-General of Islam in Africa Organization, disagrees with Ustaz Abubakar and other scholars who use what has now become a controversial Hadith to prohibit Muslim women’s leadership. According to Bugaje, the hadith has failed three tests.
The first is that the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) has urged us to compare any controversial hadith with the text of the Qur'an, and if it contradicts the Qur'anic text, then we should reject it.

He cited Surat an-Naml in the Qur'an which narrated the story of Balqis the Queen of Sheba and it was a very favorable view of female leadership. The Qur'an 27:22 states, “With truthful news I come to you from Sheba. There I found a woman reigning over the people. She is possessed of every virtue and has a splendid throne.” Queen Balqis, who belonged to a nation of sun worshippers, was also portrayed in the Qur'an as a democratic ruler who consulted her nobles before taking decisions “Nobles, let me hear your counsel, for I make no decision except in your presence.” (Q: 27:33). Impressed by her competence and diplomacy, Prophet Suleiman invited her to accept Islam and Balqis became a Muslim. Bugaje argued that “it is not possible for a hadith to completely reject a phenomenon that received such a positive portrayal in the Holy Qur'an.”

Secondly, Bugaje cited a scholar, Mernissi (1993), who meticulously examined the hadith and applied the “two major fundamental criteria of accepting or rejecting hadith, ilm al Rijaal (the science or knowledge of the people in the chain of narration of hadith) and Asbab al-Wurud (the circumstances surrounding the narrated hadith). On the first issue, the character of the narrator was found wanting, having made qadhf' (false allegations) to Ibn Mas'ud, a leading companion of the Prophet. This is called technically an illah (element of weakness) for which the hadith stands rejected. On the second issues, the hadith was narrated in Basra after his town had been conquered, when the forces of the fourth Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib had defeated the forces of Aisha, the prophet’s wife in the battle of the Camel and the nobles were being searched out and their loyalty or otherwise to Caliph Ali was being ascertained. This statement made in such circumstances, makes the...
motive suspect, and such hadith is often rejected. Another scholar, (Siddique; 1988:58), views the hadith as “a slander against the integrity of the companions of the holy messenger” which must be rejected. He also raised doubts and imputed motives to the timing of the popularization of the hadith because “it implies that from the time of the Prophet through the Caliphs of Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman (three shining stars of Islamic firmament), this hadith was unknown till the time of assumption of leadership by Caliph Ali after the murder of Usman. Such assumption which imply that the early Muslims were ignorant of hadith “deserves to be rejected”

The third test which the hadith failed according to Bugaje and renowned jurist and scholar Muhammad Al-Ghazali (1990:44-69) and Kaukab Siddique (1988..) is that it goes “against the spirit of Islam”. Islam is flexible, and the rigidity that political leadership should be given to men only, mocks the flexibility that is inherent in the religion of Islam. The criteria for judging suitable leadership material in Islam should be temperament, virtue and other positive qualities. “Muhammad al-Ghazali also queried, how can the Qur’an narrate a story of a woman head of state, commending her for her virtue, political skills and sagacity only to have a hadith that cast doubts on the acceptability of women’s leadership? Dr. Ibrahim Suleiman, a writer, scholar and the Director of Centre for Islamic Legal Studies in Nigeria, notes that “Those great men know very well that an imposed regime of fixed ideas and unquestioned adherence can only lead a society to sterility.”

He attributes the perennial backwardness of the Ummah to the reservoir of knowledge and resources of the Muslim women which is lying dormant, and underdeveloped. Since Muslim women constitute at least half of the intellectual resources of the Muslim Ummah, this tremendous and irresistible energy and knowledge should not be confined to the home alone. It must find its level in our society and beyond (Suleiman, 1997).
A Pakistani law scholar, Shaheen Sardar Ali, concurs, stressing that the Pakistani Ulama and citizens believe that the Qur’an’s support for female leadership as narrated in Queen Balqis’ story guided their decision to vote for a woman prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, and later Islamists in neighbouring Bangladesh also elected two women prime ministers, Begum Khalida Zia and Sheikha Hassina Wajid (Sardar Ali, 1997). FOMWAN members and the progressive male scholars who presented papers on Muslim women’s role in politics at the Federation’s conference would agree that if Muslim women as political leaders can make all the difference, and provide Nigeria with the good leaders and good governance she lacks, so be it.

Women's Voices, Access and Actions

FOMWAN members emphasize that women in Madina, the ideal Islamic state, played important leadership roles and worked alongside their men to promote the Islamic state (Yusuf 1997, Okunnu 1997). They attended the mosques to pray and listen to sermons, they received lessons from the Prophet and sought his advice on public and personal issues. Hafsa, the daughter of Caliph Umar, was charged with the responsibility of keeping and collating the various items on which Qur’an was written in readiness for compilation, women performed the haji alongside the men and they recited the Qur’an and were versed in the hadith. Aisha, the Prophet’s wife, was a teacher and an expert in hadith and the Prophet (SAW) told his companions “to take half your religion from this girl.” (hadith) Siddique 1988.

Apart from being a teacher, Aisha (RA) was also a political figure who intervened in the political crisis that ensued during the era of Caliph Ali (RA). She led a troop in the Battle of the Camel. The woman from whom the Prophet (SAW) asked his companions
“to take half your religion” also participated in a battle. She led an army from Mecca to Basra in Iraq. What better endorsement do Muslim women need to justify their participation in public life? Women also visited the Prophet in delegations to give their oath of allegiance to him and he received them. Hind, the daughter of Uthba and wife of Abu Sufyan, a Meccan leader, led one of such delegations to the Ka’aba to meet the Prophet (SAW) after the conquest of Makkah. He accepted their allegiance as stated in the Qur’an (Q: 60:12). Pledging the oath of allegiance is also a political activity. Women also participated in the business and economic life of the society, and among the famous merchants of Madina was Qailah Umm-Bani Atmar, and Caliph Umar appointed as the supervisor and administrator of the market Shaff’a bint Abdullahi Ibn Abd Shams. The Caliph held her in high esteem and consulted her on issues. This tradition of women’s involvement in public life continued well into the era after the four Rightly Guided Caliphs. During the Muslim civilization in Spain (Andulusia), Ibn Hazm al-Hazm al-Andalusi (994-1056 AD) a Muslim scholar of the West, recorded that a woman called Thamal al-Qurhamana sat as a judge during the time of al-Muqtadir. In her presence sat the judges and jurists with her. Ibn Hazm’s views of women was also quite radical, stressing that “a woman could be a prophetess, such as Mary and Sarah, who spoke to the Angel; they could be rulers, though not as high as the rank of Caliph” (Laylah 1998:310).

Muslim ladies, according to Ibn Katheer, actually participated in the appointment of counseling and control officers in Madina (Turabi 91:19). They expressed their views in public and privately and they voiced their opinions before the Prophet (SAW) as Surah Mujadalah in the Qur’an confirms. A woman also openly challenged Caliph Umar in an open court and Umar declared “the woman is right and Umar is wrong”. So the public domain is an arena for capable women who are enjoined by Islam to also contribute to societal development. A balanced society in Islam can
only be achieved through the joint effort of men and women. As the Qur'an states "The believing men and women are friends of one another. Together they enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong."

In line with this Qur'anic injunction, the late Imam Khomeini the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stressed the role of Muslim women as builders of nations and the need for Muslim societies to ensure a balanced development by mainstreaming women into all facets of their activities. According to Khomeini "nations owe a debt of gratitude to men and women more. The Holy Qur'an builds up human beings and so do women. The duty of women is to build up man, if a nation is deprived of having such women, it is doomed to failure, to defeat and to decline. It is women who strengthen nations and embolden them; woman is exalted, lofty; women have a high status in Islam." The late Imam also believed that Islam has given women all those rights they require to fully participate in all sectors of the society. "Woman is equal to man, woman is free like man is to determine her own fate and decide her own activities. In Islam, in the manner that man is active in all ranks, woman is active as well, woman should play a role in the basic decision making of the country. In the Islamic system, woman as a human being can have active participation in the construction of the Islamic society." During the time of the Prophet (SAW) women even participated in military expeditions. Among those who did are Umm-Sinan Al Aslamiyah, Ummayah bint Qais, Hamna bint Jahash, al Robayye'a bint Mua'weth, Safiya bint Abdul Muttalib and Nusaybah bint Ka'b who according to (Tabaqa 91:15), Siddique 88:140, stood her ground and staunchly defended the Prophet (SAW) when the Muslims fled in disarray and exposed the Prophet to danger. The Prophet (SAW) told Muslim women that performance of hajj is their jihad, but he did not bar women who volunteered from participating in military expeditions. We must also learn a lesson from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
where “women play their full part in the daily affairs of Iran. Sisters in hijab can be seen in every office and department, and not just as secretaries. Some of them hold very senior posts. There is even a woman vice president.” Dr. Masoomeh Ebtekah.

However, Muslim women who participate in public life must abide strictly by Islamic mode of dressing, comportment, ethics and morality. They also need the support of Muslim men who are expected to maintain the same high standards of morality: lower their gaze when speaking to women and avoid touching and seclusion with women who are not their wives or Muharram, i.e. relations outside the marriageable degree such as mothers, daughters, sisters, aunts and step-mothers. Muslim women in public life are not supposed to loiter and wander aimlessly; when they go out they should go, fulfill their legitimate needs and return to their homes.

The Consensus: Muslim Women Should Participate in Politics

In 1988, before the Third Republic’s transition programme was released by the Ibrahim Babangida administration, concerned Muslim women under the auspices of the Federation of Muslim Women’s Association in Nigeria (FOMWAN) initiated a national debate on the role of Muslim women in politics. They sought the views of Islamic scholars and judges (Qadis) and published these in the first edition of FOMWAN magazine “The Muslim Woman”. The consensus among the scholars stressed the need for Muslim women to play an effective role in politics and public life. The views of the four Shariah court judges and university lecturers was captured by Qadi Abdulkadir Orire, who noted that “The field of politics now seems to be the only way through which a society is mobilized and governed, and since woman is part of that society, should she sit limbo and allow any type of political driver to drive her through the turbulent road of life without her say or approval? Or could she be a driver herself in matters that affect her human
existence, more especially now that men are no more like the men of the ideal era of early Islam?

Nowadays, most men have no knowledge of how to manage even their own homes, nor are they able to undertake the family responsibilities given to them by Allah, much less to manage the affairs of the nation. In the real sense, politics means the running of the affairs of one's country and directing them to what is honourable and pleasing to Almighty Allah. Since Islam is all embracing and a person will be rewarded whether his or her action is in the realm of worship, or in the realm of worldly transactions, it goes without saying that woman participates in politics and carries it out in the manner Allah wants; she is not doing wrong and she will be rewarded by Him.” (FOMWAN 1988:6).

Qadi Bashir Sambo recalled the role of the Prophet's wife Aisha in the attempt to resolve the political crisis that erupted regarding the appointment of a new Caliph after the death of Caliph Othman and ruled that “it is quite in order for a Muslim woman to exercise the right to make her views known on political matters including the choice of the headship of state.” He pointed out that the Nigerian state is not guided by Islamic ideology, and if Muslim women are barred from participating in politics and public life, their absence from this critical sector will be injurious to Islamic values. In such a situation it becomes incumbent on them to participate and hold all positions that will prove beneficial to societal development (Sambo 1988:5).

Muslim women in Nigeria have therefore resolved to direct their abundant energy to serve the society by actively participating in politics, public life and decision making. With the on-going transition to civil rule, the FOMWAN members again revisited the issue of Muslim women's participation in politics and public life which featured at their twelfth annual conference held in Oshogbo
in 1997. The theme of the conference was “Muslim Women as Khalifatullah on Earth”. The concept of human beings as Khalifatullah (God’s vicegerent on earth) is derived from the Qur’an and encompasses the multifarious roles of women and men in all aspects of life which comply with the Shariah. The conference provided a forum for the exploration of views and exchange of ideas among men and women, Islamic activists and scholars. The paper presenters, besides three women and three men (Bugaje, Okunnu, Lemu, Saheed, Yusuf and Mandara) all supported effective participation of women in politics and public life. This was echoed in the conference communiqué which observed that “although Allah (SWT) has enjoined Muslim women and men to work together as his vicegerents (Khalifatullah) on earth, various obstacles, especially ignorance of Islam, have hindered the realization of the full potentials of women in all sectors of society.

FOMWAN also acknowledged the role of Muslim women who laid the foundation for the participation of women in public life such as the Prophet’s wife Sayyida Aisha (RA) and the 19th century Nigerian woman Nana Asmau, the daughter of the Islamic reformer and leader of the Sokoto Caliphate, Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio and recognized that the current transition to civil rule government is an opportunity for Muslim women to correct their lethargy and indifference to societal development. Muslim women were then urged to “effectively participate in all the political processes”. FOMWAN members’ disenchantment with the level of corruption in politics and other aspects of life was reflected in their Qur’anic reminder to Muslims that as Allah’s vicegerents on earth they were “to enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong.” “Muslims should therefore fight corruption, entrench democracy, good governance, transparency and accountability in public and private life.”

The challenge facing FOMWAN members and the task to which they have directed energies is to bring Muslim women into
the political process and ensure that they play a role in decision making and even change the way decisions are made. If women succeed as permanent players on the political scene, will make it possible for women at the grassroots to make and shape policies, to get their voices heard on various issues from resource allocation and management to timing and siting of projects that have direct impact on their lives. FOMWAN recognizes that Muslim women need the knowledge of issues to efficiently address constituency needs and manage campaign funds. To achieve this, they are working within Muslim women’s groups, mainly the affiliates of FOMWAN and Muslim Sisters Organisation MSO, also within secular professional ones such as the Federation of Women Lawyers FIDA, National Association of Women Journalists (NAWOJ), community based groups such as Jam’iyat Matan Arewa, JMA, and other mixer groups in the society to broaden their platform.

**Muslim Women’s Political Mobilization Activities**

In the last quarter of 1995, concerned Muslim activists had met with others to discuss the political marginalization of women apparent in the apathy they had displayed to effective political participation in the past. Thereafter, they held a two-day meeting sponsored by the United Nations Fund for Women, UNIFEM and the Centre for Development and Population Activities CEDPA on February 1-2, 1996 in Lagos to discuss women, democracy and governance. The meeting and subsequent activities were coordinated by Gender and Development Action (GADA), a Lagos based non-governmental organisation. The meeting was attended by carefully selected women from varying backgrounds. Among them were full-time politicians at grassroots and national levels, non-partisan political activists, NGO representatives and other individuals actively involved in development issues and political mobilization of women in Nigeria.
The meeting was a forum for presentations, discussions, analysis and critical comments on women, democracy and governance. The report of the meeting highlighted the following issues:

1. The need to devise a framework for the discussion of an agenda for women’s role in politics and democratic governance;
2. To agree on immediate actions to be undertaken before a proper and acceptable agenda can be developed;
3. To form a consensus on the establishment of a coalition which will serve as a platform to address women’s political and related issues and to evolve the process to deal with them;
4. Identification of issues for programmatic attention based on an understanding of the prevailing concerns of women about politics and governance.

Coming after the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) held in Beijing, China, in September 1995, the meeting agreed to organise a post Beijing workshop for 100 women from all states of the federation. This was followed by another post Beijing workshop for 250 women drawn nationwide. Both were highly successful, and the participants after breaking up into committees deliberated on the key issues surrounding women’s action towards democracy and governance. They also adopted a document, Nigerian Women’s Political Agenda, which women nationwide could use as a blue-print for demanding the inclusion of women’s needs and concerns into policy the manifestoes and future policies of political associations and parties. Participants also resolved to return to their various states and set up machinery for involving 100 women at state level in political mobilization. These 100 politically mobilized women would in turn move to the local governments in each state and organise another 100 women for political mobilization. Each ward within the local governments throughout the federation would also organise and politically mobilize 100 women using existing community based organisations, and where
they are lacking create such organisations. As a coalition building team, all these 100 groups nationwide are to focus on democracy and governance and must remain non-partisan political groupings. Participants also resolved that political mobilization of women nationwide by 100 Group is to be pursued through the following activities:

a) Formation of advocacy and lobbying groups in all the key zones of the country
b) Establishment of a national women’s political coalition and the strengthening of women’s networks for political participation.
c) Organizing civic education for the politicians, military and the populace.
d) Training women political spokespersons who can advocate on behalf of women on a non-partisan basis.
e) Mass production and distribution of the women’s political agenda developed at the two post Beijing workshops by Nigerian women to guide women leaders and spokeswomen on women’s concerns.
f) Effective use of the electronic and printed media, pamphlets, posters, handbill, drama, songs, poetry, etc to campaign for women’s participation in decision making, democratic and governance process.
g) Supplying training tools, e.g. skills for development and publications that will assist in the promotion and articulation of women’s.
h) Establishing a network for broad based political women’s groups nationwide.
i) Establishing a trust fund to serve as a pool which women could tap into and subsidize expenses when the need arises.

It is gratifying to note that some of these activities are already being organised by various women’s groups. Shorts after the post Beijing meetings, a workshop on Public Life Skills was organised for women at the British Council in Kaduna. The 100
Group in Kano, Kebbi, Jigawa and Katsina states together with Muslim Sisters Organisation MSO and FOMWAN are fully involved in these political mobilizations of women. They have organized political fora where officials of the registered political parties addressed the women and highlighted their parties' women programmes. A debate on women's needs and concerns also took place with women demanding that any party that wants women's votes must incorporate their needs and concerns in its programmes. Other states are also undertaking various activities with networking among the zones nationwide, and will later reveal for members to learn from the experiences of others.

Conclusion

It is obvious from these developments that Muslim women in Nigeria have taken up the challenge of defining African feminism and using culturally sensitive and appropriate methods of advocacy to claim their rights under Islam. This discourse started with an overview of Islam and gender, outlining the sex and gender roles assigned to Muslim women. The views of various scholars on the acceptability or otherwise of Muslim women's participation in politics and public life were discussed. While rejecting Western feminism due to its historical and cultural irrelevance to Muslim societies, the conservative view that Muslim women must remain uneducated, secluded, voiceless and ignorant of development issues was rejected as a misinterpretation of Islam. The discourse highlights the political education activities undertaken by Muslim women who are also reaching out to all women in Nigeria to work for common agenda. The general empowerment of women and their visibility in politics and public life is priority for women's groups.

As Nigeria returns to democratic rule in May 1999, after the military's domination of the political space, having ruled the country for 28 out of the 38 years of independence, these activities embarked upon by women are expected to translate into effective participation of women in all sectors of the society.
End Notes:
(1) For details of Ustaz Lawal Abubakar and Dr. Usman Bugaje’s interviews, see “Sister to Sister” News-magazine, Vol. 1, No.4 March, 1997 PPs 1-3.
(4) Three founding members of FOMWAN, Alhaja Lateefa Okunnu, Zainab Kabir and Bilkisu Yusuf are members of this GADA Strategy Committee.

References:
• Azizkwe, Uche - 1997 - “Mobilizing Women for Politics: Problems and Strategies” Paper presented at the workshop organised by the Centre for Research and Documentation, Kano, 24/11/97.
• Belen, Aosta, Edina and Rose, Christine E. - 1990 - “From Structural Subordination to Empowerment: Women and Development in Third World Contexts”. In Gender and Society, Vol. 4 No. 3, September 1990.
• Bugaje, Usman - “Muslim Women and the Question of Politics”. Paper presented at the 12th FOMWAN annual conference, August 22-24 at Oshogbo.
• Cole, Catherine and Mack, Beverly - (eds) 1991 - Hausa Life and Times of Nigeria’s Twentieth Century, University of Wisconsin Press.
• Lemu, Aisha B. - 1987 - The Ideal Muslim Husband. Islamic Education Trust. Minna, Nigeria.


**Documents**

### Appendix 1

**Strategies to Improve Equity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-Down Strategies</th>
<th>Bottom-Up Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top-Down Strategies promote gender equity in institutions and agencies through:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bottom-Up Strategies are directed at women and support their entry into the mainstream of society through:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness: International Conference that includes gender issues.</td>
<td>• Access: removing international and national legal and social barriers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advocacy: Campaigns to convince agencies about the importance of gender.</td>
<td>• Empowerment: Efforts enabling women to take initiative for involvement in development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tools: Gender analysis, frameworks, guidelines.</td>
<td>• Support: Financial and technical assistance to women's groups to give women access to and control over technology, money, credit, training and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structure: Staff appointments, financial allocations, internal mandates, gender training.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Religion:
Between the Phenomenon of Violence and The Concept of Peace
1990/2000 A.D.

By Dr. Hassanat Awad Satı*,
Translated by Eltayib Mohamed Osman Babiker **

This paper is intended to examine the relationship between Islam and some concepts like War, Violence and Peace.

The main theme of the paper is to give an answer to the question: Whether there is a relationship as internationally propagated, between religion, namely Islam, and the revolutions, wars and conflicts that took or are taking place in some of the communities and nations of today’s world. Or are there some other factors leading to these wars, while this alleged connection is just used as a cover in order to defame Islam, thus causing people to turn away from it?

Why tackle this question now?

Because of the so many accusations broadcast on international media, and because of the explicit and implicit insinuation that Islam has got a direct relationship with the violence instances that take place in the Middle East and African countries like Algeria, Nigeria and the Lakes Area.

Religion, whether it is Islam, Christianity or Judaism, is a global social human phenomenon that attracts the attention of millions of people, and that has its relevant social phenomena consistently affecting human life for hundreds of decades, as the torch of religion with all its virtues has been continually carried through from one generation to another with perseverance and determination. Had there been any defect in religion, human nature would have abhorred it and Man would have discarded it, as he did with many man-made philosophies and fads.

Amongst the values and virtues that religion has always called for, peace and avoidance of conflict stand as the most prominent. The three divine books only speak about fighting as an inevitable measure

*Head, African Studies Department, Centre for Research and African Studies, International University of Africa.
**Lecturer, Faculty of Education, IUA.
for guaranteeing the survival of the faith and the faithful, specifically
determining and restricting the cases when, why and how war might
be waged.

On the other hand, considerably extensive room in the three
divine books has been allotted to preaching peace, peaceful co-
existence and avoidance of fighting, except when inevitable.

Below, are discussed some of the concepts that clarify these facts.

The Concept of Peace in Islam:

ASSALAMU ALAIKUM (Peace be upon you), is the standard
Muslim salutation, and indeed the salutation and greeting of all
previous prophets, because it is a prayer or good wish of peace, good
health and security. It is at the same time a gesture and an undertaking
unto the greeted party that the greater means nothing but peace.

Instances of such meanings and usage are abundantly met with
in the Quran, e.g. (And they call unto the dwellers of the Garden:
Peace be upon you) Quran 7, 46.

(ودادوا أصحاب الجنة، آن سلام عليكم) الأحزاب 46

Also, (Lo! Those who ward off (evil) are among Gardens and
watersprings. (Their greeting will be): Enter ye here in peace and
security) Quran 15: 46

(إن الذين اتقوا في حبات يعوون اخليهم بنغملهم) الحجر 46

A third example is (Their salutation on the day when they shall
meet Him will be: Peace. And He hath prepared for them a goodly
recompense). Quran 33: 44.

(فيهم يوم يقومون سلام وعد هم أبداً كربة) الأحزاب 44

And a fourth example is (And our messengers came unto
Abraham with good news. They said: Peace! He answered: Peace!
and delayed not to bring a roasted calf) Quran : 11, 69.

(وألا حقاً جابت رسالتنا إبراهيم بالبشرى قالوا سلام وسلام مما لبث أن جاء تمتع حينها) هود 69

Jesus’s first miracle, after his miraculous birth, was that he
spoke in his cradle, on the first day. One of his first utterances was :
(Peace be on me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I shall
be raised alive). Quran 19 : 33.

(والسلام علي يوم ولدت يوم أموت يوم أبعث حياً) مريم 33

192
The Concept of Peace in Judaism and Christianity:

The same root of the word SALAM is used in the Bible in the same meaning: (peace), and for the same purpose: salutation; but the root here is a bit modified to be pronounced SHALOM. It should be noticed that (sh) (ش) is systematically used in Hebrew as a substitute for (s) (س) in Arabic, in words that are common between the two languages.

One of the instances where the word occurs in the Bible is (And the old man said: Peace (be) upon thee; howsoever (let) all thy wants (lie) upon me) Judges 19:20. A second example is (And said: O man greatly beloved, fear not; peace (be) unto thee) Daniel 10:19.

Thirdly, we read in the Second Epistle General of Peter, Chapter 14: (Wherefore, beloved, seeing that ye look for such things, be diligent that ye be found of him in peace, without spot and blameness), meaning: in peace, security and safety; which is the same salutation uttered by Jesus on Easter Day, and which thereafter has become an integrate part of Christian rituals, especially at festivals. The Christian motto, or salutation, nowadays is: (Glorious to God in his highest, heaven peace on earth to those with whom he is pleased). Luke 1:4.

The concept of Peace and the Law of War in Divine Religions:

Islam calls for peaceful co-existence, rejects violence, acknowledges other divine religions, and has set specific rules and manners for treating their adherents. Names of the other prophets are mentioned in the Quran with much respect and reverence; so are their life histories and the principles and virtues they called for. All Muslims acknowledge, respect and are keen to know as much as possible about all prophets. Islam also prohibits harsh arguments and disputes that may lead to fight, which shows how keen Islam is to close all the ways and means that lead to enmity with the followers of other religions. So states the Holy Quran: (And argue not with the People of the Scripture, unless it be in (a way) that is better, save with such of them as do wrong; and say: We believe in that which hath
been revealed unto us and revealed unto you, our God and your God is one, and unto Him we surrender): Quran 29: 46.

 Reasons for fighting are clearly specified in the Quran: (Fight in the cause of Allah against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressors): Quran 25: 190.

 (وَقَالَتْ اِمْرَأَتُ الْمَلِكِ يَقِنُوتُونَمُنْذَ لاَ تُبْعِثُونَ إِلَىِّ الْأَرْضِ.)*

 Similarly: (If they withdraw not from you nor give you (guarantees) of peace besides restraining their hands, seize them and slay them wherever you get them: In their case we have provided you with a clear argument): Quran 4 : 91.

 (فَإِنَّهُمْ لَا يَلْبِسُونَكَ وَيُقَلِّبُونَ الْخَيْرَ الْكِرَامَ كَيْفَ يُقْطِعُوا سَعْيَهُمْ ١٩١.

 وأرثكم جعلنا لكم عليه سلطاناً مبيناً) النساء 91.

 These Ayats clearly specify the reasons for fighting, restricted to provocation, hostility, aggression, harassment, self-defense and defence of property and land. Sayeth Allah in the Quran: (If then anyone transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress you likewise against him; but fear Allah and know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves). Quran 2 : 194.

 (وَقَالَتْ اِمْرَأَتُ الْمَلِكِ يَقِنُوتُونَمُنْذَ لاَ تُبْعِثُونَ إِلَىِّ الْأَرْضِ.)*

 Islam prohibits aggression, and calls for good social relations, love and compassion between the People of the Book. A Muslim is allowed to marry their women and eat their carcasses: (Allah forbids you not, with regards to those who fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just): Quran 60 : 8.

 (لا يَبْنِيهَا كَمَا يَبْنِيهَا قَانُونُ اللَّهِ وَإِنْ أَخْفَفْتُمْ مِنْ حَرْجٍ فَأَخْفَفْنَاهُ وَتَفْسِيرًا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عِنْدَكُمْ مُتَّبِعُ الْمُفْطَرِينَ) المنحة 8.

 A Muslim is strictly forbidden to wage war against those who refrain from fighting him: (Therefore if they withdraw from you and fight you not, and send you peace, then Allah has opened no way for you (to war against them): Quran 4 : 90.

 (إِنْ اخْرَجُوكُمْ وَلَا يَخْرُجُوكُمْ وَلَا يُقَلِّبْكُمْ إِلَّا لأَيْضَاءَ الْأَرْضِ ۚ فَسَحْلَ اللَّهُ أَنْ خَلَقَكُمْ سَيْءًا لِلسَّيَاهِ ۚ) النساء 90.

194
Abu Bakr, the first caliph of Prophet Mohamed (SAW), in his farewell speech to the Muslim army leaving for Tabouk, which was led by Usama Ibn Zaid, said:

"Listen, o folks; I give you ten pieces of advice to carefully observe while on your mission:

"Do not betray, nor embezzle; commit no atrocities; don’t kill any small child, any aging man nor any woman; don’t cut down any palm tree nor set fire to it; don’t cut down any fruitful tree; slaughter no sheep, cow or camel except at the consent of its owner.

"You will pass across people who have confined themselves to their hermitages; leave them to what they have chosen to dedicate themselves to. You will pass across people who will invite you to tables of assorted foods; mention the name of Allah when touching any of these foods."

The same reasons specified in the Quran for rendering war lawful are reiterated in both Judaism and Christianity in the Old and New Testaments, where we read in the Book of Deuteronomy, Chapter 20:10-14: (When thou comest right unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of Peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it. And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it unto thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword, But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God hath given thee.)

You can also read in the Quran: (Hast thou not turned thy vision to the chiefs of the children of Israel after Moses; they said to a prophet among them: Appoint for us a king that we may fight in the cause of Allah. He said: Is it not possible, if ye were commanded to fight, that ye will not fight? They said: How could we refuse to fight in the cause of Allah, seeing that we were turned out of our homes and our families?) : Quran 2 : 146.
And in the Old Testament we can also read in the Book of Malachi, Chapter 2:4-6: (And ye shall know that I have sent this commandment unto you, that my covenant might be with Levi, saith the lord of the hosts. My covenant was with him of life and peace; and I gave them to him for the fear wherewith he feared me, and was afraid before my name. The law of truth was in his mouth, and inequity was not found in his lips: he walked with me in peace and equity, and did turn many away from inequity.)

It is clearly stated here that the code between God and his prophets is to live in peace, which could only be achieved through piety, God-fearing and strictly observing the sharia (whose specific lexical meaning is the ‘straight path’ that leads people away from friction and animosity).

In the New Testament, Jesus says: (Never think that I have come to lay peace on the land, but to lay a sward).

This does not contradict Jesus’s call for peace; he only meant to raise high the banner of Jihad amongst the masses who had succumbed to servitude and to the Roman colonisation, and to implant into the hearts of his people self-confidence and trust in their religion and their God, so that they can move to free their faithful country and fight for the implementation of God’s code. Jesus is thus declaring the end of the era whose motto was: (Love your cursers, and bless your enemies), and the beginning of a new era of holy struggle and fighting for God’s cause. The new motto will be: (Anyone who has got no sword should sell his garment and buy a sword).

To conclude this discussion, we can say that: it is clearly stipulated in the divine books that all the sons of Adam can, and must live together in peace, and that difference of religion or faith can never be a reason for fighting.

Political Islam: Fundamentalism, Violence, and Revolution:

In spite of the fact that divine religions have called for tolerance and prohibited fighting and violence, a number of wars
actually erupted between different religions, or even between different sects within the same religion. A typical instance of the first kind is the Crusades, which were a long series of wars between Christians and Muslims that continued through the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries. There is now sporadic fighting between Muslims and Hindus in India, and between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and in some other parts of the world.

For a long time before, a vehement conflict has been going on between the church and the state in Europe. During the Middle Ages, the clergymen had a strong influence on kings and statesmen; besides, they never stomached scientists; they protested to applied sciences, logic and philosophy, which sometimes arrived at conclusions that contradicted the church’s theological doctrines. This strife led to the reformation movement in Germany led by Martin Luther (1483-1546), who called for getting rid of the Pope’s strong grip on religion, and gave new interpretations of the Bible in what was afterwards known as Protestantism. Since Luther’s Reformation, the Pope’s predomination on the state began to wane, and continued to wane even more in the Renaissance era, and then in the Industrial Revolution era, leading to a divorce between religion and the state in Europe; and the ruling regimes in Europe stopped to worry about religion.

The industrial and technological progress in Europe coincided with the degradation of the Islamic Caliphate in Turkey that ended with its fall in 1924; and Europe then snatched the chance to advance southward into Africa and the Islamic World, where Islam had formed a belt or curve extending from Eastern Europe (the Balkan and the Ottoman Sultanate) in the east to Morocco and Tangier in the west, then going southward into the heart of Africa - a belt or curve that hampers the strategic goals and interests of Europe in the Arab World and Africa. So Europe did its best to trap the Muslims in the area in a paramount siege affected through the missionary activities, which were initiated by the European explorers and then completed by the military colonization that strongly dominated the Islamic World.

Before rejoicing the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in Turkey, thinking that the world had submitted to it; the West was faced by a new unexpected hazard: the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, which convulsed the world and changed all its power balances. It was a violent and bloody revolution whose address rejected the capitalist
secular thought. It did not only call for the separation between state and religion as other European regimes did, but went even further to totally reject and deny it, and crush the followers of both Islam and Christianity. They were killed, tortured or made homeless. Mosques and churches were violated. Russia entered into an atomic armament race with the USA, competed with the great powers in a race for colonization, specially in the wake of the Second World War, when Hitler’s legacy was shared out. Russia also expanded its political and ideological influence throughout the world. A number of the East European, Asian, Latin American, African and Arab countries sided with her. The result was that the world divided into two camps: the Western Capitalist camp, led by the USA and the West European countries, and the Eastern Socialist camp, led by Russia.

For the purposes of this paper, we are mainly interested in the fact that a good number of the newly independent Arab and African countries adopted the socialist theory as a political and economic ideology, which highly upset the Western camp; and a feverish race began between the two camps for annexing colonies, specially in Africa and the Arab world, particularly in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and the African countries south of the Sahara, where there was an abundance of raw materials, mineral resources, products markets and water passages.

After independence, no improvement was affected in these countries in the political, economic or social fields. The situation was even worse. As the colonizing powers, socialist or capitalist, did their best to separate these communities from their Islamic civilization roots, financial and moral corruption spread. Yet the colonizers were convinced that it was impossible to sever these Muslims from their Islamic origins, specially in the presence of considerable groups in these societies who rejected and resisted Western assimilation, linguistic, be it or cultural. These groups were able to get some simple guidance in Islamic teachings that gave power and fortitude to their resistance. They built up a broad front that threatened the colonial efforts to assimilate the Muslim societies.

To abate the influence of these enlightened groups, the colonizers had to resort to the encouragement of the negative Islamic practices, such as isolationistic sufism, that gave much care to heresies and tombs celebrations, thus distracting its followers from their real
interests. Colonisers also encouraged Muslims to adopt new concepts like patriotism and nationalism as a substitute of the Pan-Islamic unionist concepts. And people began to hear names reflecting the new trend, like ‘Young Turkey Movement’, which was adopted by the ‘Unity and Progress Party’.

In the intellectual field, colonising countries tried to sell their cultures and languages. They encouraged Arab citizens to use their local colloquial Arabic instead of classical Arabic, which will by time result in their alienation to their divine book the Quran; they also persuaded them to neglect their Islamic heritage and history and pay attention to local national history. But, thank God, this universe goes according to a divine code, and things do not always go as the great powers wish. For suddenly Communism crashed down within its stronghold, and eventually in the rest of the world, and one of the two great powers disappeared. In the meantime, the movements calling for religious revival were witnessing an astonishing boom as a natural result of the growing public hostile feelings towards the colonisers’ plans to curb Islam.

The West knew that the vacuum left by the fall of Communism could only be filled by the Islamic group of countries, which came up as a new great power, specially after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and formidable held out against its enemies, thus becoming the foremost concern of Western world, which took to dubbing Islam the religion of violence and terrorism, and describing its followers as fundamentalists, depriving them of any claim to tolerance or free thinking, with all the negative connotations in the Western mind. H.R.H. Prince Charles, in his address as patron of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies at Oxford, on October 27, 1993, elaborated on this Western misconception. Here are excerpts from his lengthy speech :

"The depressing fact is that, despite the advances in technology and mass communications of the second half of the 20th century, despite mass travel, the intermingling of races, the ever growing reduction - or so we believe - of the mysteries of our world, misunderstanding between Islam and the West continues. Indeed, they may be growing. As far as the West is concerned, this cannot be because of ignorance."
The degree of misunderstanding between the Islamic and Western worlds remains dangerously high.

Islam is all around us; and yet distrust, even fear, persist.

But even now our common attitude to Islam suffers because the way we understand it has been hijacked by the extreme and the superficial.

But because we have tended to see Islam as the enemy of the West, as an alien culture, society and system of belief, we have tended to ignore or erase its great relevance to our history.

But if we are to understand this important (revivalist) movement, we must learn to distinguish clearly between what the vast majority of Muslims believe in and the terrible violence of a small minority among them ...

In the words of that marvelous seventeenth century poet and hymn writer, George Herbert:

A man that looks on glass,
On it may stay his eye;
Or if he pleaseth, through pass,
And then the heaven espies:

It is odd, in many ways, that misunderstanding between Islam and the West should persist. For that which binds our two worlds together is so much more powerful than that which divides us. Muslims, Christians and Jews are all (Peoples of the Book). Islam and Christianity share a common monotheistic vision, a belief in one divine God, in the transience of our earthly life, in our accountability for our actions, and in the assurance of life to come.

Our history has been closely bound up together. There, however, is one root of the problem. For much of that history has been one of conflict.

To Western school children, the two hundred years of the Crusades are traditionally seen as a series of heroic, chivalrous exploits in which the kings, knights, princes – and children – of Europe tried to wrest Jerusalem from the wicked Muslim infidels. To Muslims, the Crusades were an episode of great cruelty and terrible plunder of western infidel soldiers of fortune and horrific atrocities.

Western mass media, on the other hand, had consistently kept describing Islamic movements, e.g. Mohamed Ibn Abdul-Wahab’s movement in the Arab Peninsula and the Mahdi’s revolution in Sudan,
as rebellious and violent. In addition, the Western imagination was reminiscent of the bitter Crusades in the Middle Ages. And by accumulation through the time, these connotations became indubitable facts, and the word ‘Muslim’ became synonymous to the word ‘pirate’, and Islam became a synonym of fanaticism, violence and tyranny. The Western colonizers did their best to detach the fundamentals of Islamic teachings from Muslim life, attributing to them the backwardness of Muslim societies. The civilization, cultural and technological shock that the colonized countries suffered at the first confrontation between the two civilizations helped with this trend as the Muslim nation discovered how backward and ruined it was when compared with the Western advanced nations, which had developed militarily and established efficient, well-disciplined armies and sophisticated war machinery. They had provided these armies with specialized experts in all fields to uplift their competence. These Western countries had also established economic, monetary and commercial systems that guaranteed for them a worldwide investment in different fields, which led to the development of infrastructures, education, health and other vital services in the European countries.

Appalled by what they had seen, the Muslim youth who had had Western education, in an effort to catch up with Europe, turned to imitate the Europeans and, consciously or unconsciously, copy their experience without any discrimination between positive and negative aspects. Unfortunately, this copying was not restricted to the fields of politics and administration, but extended to include spiritual and behavioral aspects. Atatürk and the Shah of Iran, for example, decreed it unlawful for a woman to wear a veil, and unlawful for men to grow beards; Bouraïba of Tunisia encouraged people to abstain from fasting in Ramadan and closed up religious education institutions.

These efforts by rulers to detach people from their religion highly provoked people’s emotions. The situation was even worsened by the great failure of these rulers in developing their countries and providing people’s basic needs. There was a complete economic collapse. The Muslim disappointment and discouragement got to its highest with the Arab’s defeat by Israel in the 1967 war, which was accompanied by the one party comprehensive rule and the complete absence of democracy.
The result was a highly voiced opposition calling upon the rulers to restore the Quranic teachings and the fundamentals of the religion as a reference for the community and government.

This common tendency developed into Islamic movements and organizations. The most famous among these was the one led by Skaikh Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Shaikh Mohamed Abdu, which called for social reformation as a basis for the required change. On the other hand, Shaikh Abul-Aala Al-Mawdoudi and Shaikh Abul-Hassan An-Nadawi restricted their activities to the intellectual field. But the most recent of the contemporary movements and organizations, like Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia, were distinguished for being revolutionary and for calling for the Islamization of the ruling system and the political practice.

The violent attempts by the ruling regimes to deter these movements resulted in counter-violence. These movements became a real hazard not only to the ruling regimes, but also to the strategic interests and vital goals of imperialist countries, including Israel, as these countries' economies depended to a great extent on the raw materials and natural resources in Africa and the Arab World. In addition, these Islamic organizations gave much attention to issues of social justice and corruption fighting. The masses were highly responsive to this trend, because it addressed their spiritual aspirations and reinstated their identity, which the colonisers did their best to obliterate.

The emergence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, for example, gave a tremendous push forward to an Islamic revivalist movement, proving the possibility of the establishment of an Islamic political regime that can meet contemporary requisites.

At the same time when the Communist camp was collapsing and Communism was crashing throughout the world, the opposite was taking place in the Islamic world, i.e. the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran and Sudan, the atomic bomb in Pakistan, rapid ascension of the Islamic organizations throughout the world in Asia (especially Malaysia) and in Africa (in Algeria and Tunisia).

The Western countries then felt the growing menace of Islam. Before, all their antagonism and caution had been directed towards Communism, but then the Islamic group was the new competing super power and the new approaching danger. The leaders of the Islamic
organisations were the elite and the cream of the societies. Armed with Western education, they were the new charismatic leadership with a considerable international political awareness, a great influence on the masses, and an ability to agitate the streets. They directly set out to organise military training for their cadres, depending on the concept of Jihad, and holding to the Islamic fundamentals as their prior and foremost reference in everything they did. Driving forth with a great spiritual force and Jihadi motives, the Islamic organisations, no matter what ethnic or geographical differences there were among them, were all united under the banner of Islamic cause.

Referring to these organisations, Francois Burjois said, ‘It is a current or wave that calls for the return to Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions as the ethical basis for the progress of Islamic societies. They believe in their right to acquire power from above, and to bridge the rift that has happened between the state and the society during the second half of the last century. They try to achieve all that through an Islamic-based thought, backed by the fact that this trend has generated entities that are intact and homogeneous. Political Islam is trying to establish an Islamic project.’

But the West would not look on passively with its hands crossed on its chest while the Islamic civilization was again extending its shadow over considerable parts of the globe. In addition, the Jews, after the declaration of the Hebrew state in 1948, had shown up in the international scene, and Israel had entered in the global conflict of civilizations in a desperate attempt to rebuild David’s Kingdom and Solomon’s glory and with a keen desire, or say strategic aims and major interest, to control the sites of mineral resources, raw materials, water passages and water springs. All these strategic interests were in the vicinity of the Arab world, North Africa and the Horn of Africa, which were all witnessing an astonishing activity of Islamic revivalism.

In spite of the Jews’ historical enmity with both Muslims and Christians, they chose to make an alliance with Christians to fight the Muslims. The Jews succeeded in forcing the Vatican to issue a declaration quitting them from muddering Jesus, though this is against the Church’s doctrine; they were also able to infiltrate into the Church and judise it. There is now an alliance of the Radical Christians, who
believe in the Old Testament’s prophecies, call for the rebuilding of Solomon’s Temple and speak about the Global War (the Harmagadoun). It was the Jews themselves who in the past gave full support to Martin Luther’s reformist movement, thus giving a strong blow to the Catholic Church, which was anti-Jewish.

In short, of a good number of concerted stances on the international political arena, and a coordination of roles in the third world, especially Africa. This alliance acquired a strategic dimension after the collapse of the Communist group and the emergence of the Islamic group as a (fundamentalist) strong power with roots that go deep into the Muslim societies.

**Africa: the fall of Communism, Uprising of Islam and Hesitancy of the Arabs:**

Islam plays a vital role in the everyday life of African societies. It is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the African population. Its civilization is still alive and vigorous. The West tried to obliterate it, or at least keep it away from the life of the masses by all possible means, but the Islamic consciousness in the African societies revolted against all these attempts, and the political Islamic current strongly resisted the pro-Western ruling regimes.

The language and methods that the Islamic political current used formed an immediate minace to the West and its interests in the area. That current also considerably succeeded in shifting the power balance in the interest of Islam.

The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria is a good example. It won the 1991 elections in spite of the so many obstacles put in its way by the ruling regime. In Tunisia, too, the Islamic Revival Party was successful in the April 1989 elections, which reflected the party’s deep and extensive relation with the masses.

A third example is the Salvation Revolution in Sudan, which survived the international economic and political sanctions and came out healthy and intact.

In Egypt, the Islamic trend was a real obsession to the ruling regime through its revolutionary movements and persistent operations.

As mentioned before in this paper, the strong, experienced leaderships of the Islamic movements in these countries succeeded in overcoming all the hurdles put in their way, thereby forcing the West to reconsider its strategies in Africa.
In the following paragraphs I shall lengthily quote Karim Bagradoni, the Lebanese journalist, in his analytic essay in the London-based daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat:

‘After the fall of Communism, America holds the threads of the game. She has set the African countries on the path of war and conflict, so that the field will be set for her to predominate the region. The application of this theory can clearly be seen in the case of the Sudan, where America is practicing her policy of dual disintegration after the fashion of dual containment she is practicing in the Gulf.

‘The disintegration policy necessitates the separation of the south of the Sudan, which practically means separating the African World from the Arab World.

‘To set this strategy working, it is necessary to ignite all interior and exterior contradictions together with Arab-Negro, Islamic-Christian, and all tribal susceptibilities.

‘The conflict between Sudan and its African neighbours apparently takes the shape of a war waged by Christian Africans against the Islamic regime in Sudan, i.e. an attack by Uganda in an attempt to capture Juba and get to Rosseiris Dam, which supplies Khartoum with electric power, Ethiopia attacking eastern strategic regions like Damazin; Eritria trying to cut off the highway to Port Sudan, the only seaport of the country; all these offensives carried out simultaneously in a concerted plan to separate the south of the country and eventually do away with the ruling regime.

‘The Western media tries to picture the Arabs as the new colonisers, while the Israelis are shown as the efficient experts with the specific technical know-how that the continent needs for its development. It is an open invitation to the Africans to turn down the Arabs, who share the continent with them, and, instead, cooperate with the Israelis.

‘The everyday exceeding awareness in the Sudan, which is also spreading in the black continent, hampers the interests of the great powers. The significance of the Sudan lies in the fact that this country has the necessary requirements for the success of the project for establishing a contemporary Islamic state, namely a capable ruling regime and the economic potential. It is a project which is the fruit of Islamic revolutionary thought, and which is doing its best to affect new regional balances. This awareness singles out the Sudan as a real
example of an independent nation depending on its own potentials and its people's solidarity.

'What concerns the West in the first place about the Sudan is that it has the material potentials, which will enable it to execute its project.

'The Sudan possesses three important fundamental-commodities, namely wheat, oil and water, besides gold. If the Sudan happens to succeed in carrying out its plans, it will automatically qualify within a few years to be a significant power on regional and international levels that cannot be ignored.

'The Sudan has also succeeded in introducing new players into the field, besides succeeding in changing the rules of the game when it played on the British-French undeclared differences and entrusted the oil production to China and Malaysia, while contracting French companies for gold mining. China is considered a powerful international partner who can coin the minimum possible balance with USA.

'What goes on now in Somalia, Liberia and Zaire is connected to what is happening in the Sudan. The two-pronged disintegration strategy also aims at driving the French influence out of the continent, which is now witnessing a silent conflict between Anglophonism and Francophonism that embodies both political and economic aspects. Washington supported Loran Kabila, while the French on the other side gave their support to Muboto's government. It is generally known that there is a strong relation between Museveni, Kabila and Garung, besides their Marxist connections and Israeli links. America once used some Islamic movements and groups in some Islamic areas to resist Communism, and now USA is arming some old Marxists like John Garung to halt the Islamic expansion.'
General Index

Figures refer to pages number

Abdel Aziz Haj Ahmed (Somali leader) 93
Abdel Rahman Malalim Badir (The chairman of Somali Council for Reconciliation) 98
Abiola, Mashood 10, 11, 50
Abuja Declaration 153
Access 158
Action 160
Afghanistan 156
African American 1, 4, 5, 9, 17
African Americans family 3
African Americans heroes 5
African -Atlanticism 4
African Continent 49, 149
Africa Debts 5, 17
Africa, Defining the State 33
African Exploitation 53
African export trade 51
African family 3
African heritage 33
African hydrographic regions 117
African language 3
African Muslim Societies 9, 150
African Political leaders 52
African River Basin 135, 143
African River System 115
Afro -Atlantic Paradiagon 2
Afro- world wide est 3
Aid 51
Aids 85
Air embargo 89
Air raids 77
Al-Ahram 16
Ali al - Dosogi (Scholar) 95, 100
Ali Al- sheikh Abu Bakr (Somali intellectual) 90
Ali Mahai (Somali leader) 96
Al - Ihad al- Islami 97
Alternative Power for Democracy and Peace in Ethiopia (APOP) 76
Amado Diallo 4
Amadou Mokhtar M'Bow Unesco ex-secretary 6
Amedu Sekotoury (President) 52
American Africans 4
American capitalism 2
American Congress 59
American democracy 2
American experience 2
American liberation 3
American mediation 83
American- Rwandan mediation 73, 74
Amharic language 61, 64
Amnesty International 80
Anathema 33
Antony Lake 60, 83
Apartheid 30
Arab League 90
Armed violence 132
artificial Lakes 121
Asmara 72
Assab Agreement 65
Assab Refinery 68
Association of the Islamic Conference 90
Aswan High Dam 131
Australia 7, 51
authoritarianism 44
Azzeldine Al-Aragi (Morocco) 9
Bachelor Dam 132
Badame (Somalia) 63, 70, 71
Baidawa 98
Bandung (conference) 23
BBC 5, 14
Beijing, China 183
Federalism 45
Federation of Muslim Women’s Association in Nigeria (FOMWAN) 170, 176, 179, 180, 181
Federation of Women Lawyers 182
feminist theory, liberal 167
feminist theory, radical 166
feminist theory, socialist 166
feminist theory, Western 165
Forces of the West African Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) 134
foreign aid 24, 25, 66
foreign intervention 53
Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) 183
Franco-Belgian Vivendi (FBMV) 130
Fredrick Jackson Turner (1861-1932) 2
FRIEND/nile group 141
FRIEND group 140
fundamentalism 92
Gadzey 36
gender 157
gender and development (GAD) 151, 152, 153, 182
gender and Islam 153
gender relation 153
gender roles (Qur’an) 155
gender studies 149, 151
Globalization 1, 7, 10, 11, 49, 55, 57
global Africa 1, 7, 9
global market 18
global organization 5
global structure 18
global ummah 7
global village 1
Global Woman’s Movement 149
global war 21
Great Lakes 43, 130, 122, 133
green cards 5
Gregory Comply 60
Group of 77 57
Gulf Arab States 51
Hajara (Hager) 154
Hailaselase 59, 60
Hamid Al-Gabid 9
Harvard Model 157
Helsinki Rules (1966) 116
Hennesh Island 67
High Dam 129
Hirsch 89
Hitler 198
Hizbullah 93
Horn International Bank 68
Horn of Africa 60, 70, 82, 99, 135
Hosni Mubarak 62, 128
human rights 76, 81
hydrological regimes 120
hydrology 121, 124
Hydromet Survey Project 1967 138
hydropower 121
James Foley 81
Jerry Railings 12
Jesse Jackson 10
Jesus 154
Jews 9, 10
Jihad Al-Islami 99
John Locke 2
Jongeli Canal 124, 133
Judaism 191
Judaism, concept of peace 193
Julius Nyerere 5
Ibrahim Sheik Mohammed al-Dosogi 90
IBRD 37
ideology 33
ideologies, legitimizing 149
Idere Gorge dam 132
IGAD 123, 141, 144
Ija (Somalia) 76
Iltina (Somalia) 76
illusion of globalization 29
IMF 37, 55, 69
independence 33, 52
India 6
import substitution 35
institutionalized cooperation 136
international churches 61
international cooperation 118
International Court of Justice 6, 8
international forces 100
International Rivalry 38
international rivers 126
international river basin 124
international strategies 41
international Strategic Forum (ISF) 59
international Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) 59
International Water Convention 118
Internet revolution 1
Islam, the concept of peace 192
Islam and the West 5, 199
Islamic Aid Organization 91
Islamic constitution 94
Islamic empowerment Framework 157
Islamic Fundamentalism 63, 90
Islamic groups, efforts for peace 93
Islamic Jihad 79
Islamic identity 150
Islamic Khilafah 79
Islamic law 150
Islamic movement 89, 95, 96
Islamic movement in Somalia 97, 100
Islamic thought 57
Islamic Union 62
Islamist 89
Ismail Omar Jolly 84
Ismail Serageldin 6, 8
Kabila (president) 81
Kabira (1993) (author) 153
Kagera River Basin 142
Kagera River Basin Organization 137, 138
Kampala Document 153
Kariba Dam 131
Kennedy, J. F. 57
Kiiva Basin Comissioin Member 133
kinship structure 150
Kofi Annan 5, 6
Kwame Nkrumah 5
Labour Party 6
Lakes 70, 81
Lake Baikal 120
Lake Malawi 120
Lake Tanganyika 120, 130, 131, 133
Lake Victoria 120, 130, 131
lamsa (Somalia) 76
language of tolerance 29
League of Arab States 137
Least developed countries 35, 36, 57
Leopold Senghor 12
London Based African rights Organization 40
Louis Farakhan 5, 8
Lustopheine Africans 3
Madeline Albright 71
Management of water resources 135
Mano River Union (MRU) 134
Maoism 33
Marginalization of Africa 37
Marlborough house 6
Martin Luther King 5
Mármán Badr 129
Marxism 33, 34, 35
Medley 40
Mengisto 71
Michael Tordan 5
Middle East 1, 137
Military assistance 89
Military dictatorship 25, 30
Ministerial Council 74
Modibo Ketta (politician) 52
Montesquieu European Americans 2
Muhammed Ali Kli 5
Muhammed Bedjaui 6
Muhammed farah Aidid 91, 92, 96
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>92, 97, 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Companies</td>
<td>33, 52, 54, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museveni</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim identity</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Sisters Organization</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim societies</td>
<td>138, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Somali Nation</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim way of life</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim women</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Women in Nigeria</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Women Political Mobilization Activities</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacfa (Eritrean Currency)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Women Journalists (NAWJ)</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nation building</td>
<td>34, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national integration</td>
<td>34, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national security</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national reconciliation</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national security council</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national unity</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural lakes</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural resources</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazis in Europe</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>5, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Age Religion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New World Order</td>
<td>28, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>38, 40, 41, 69, 141, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs in rebel held Sudan (table)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger Basin Authority</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Women’s Political Agenda</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile Basin</td>
<td>128, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile Hydrology</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile River Basin Action Plan</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile Water</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkrohmuah</td>
<td>23, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>8, 74, 75, 81, 82, 94, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun Oshun River Basin</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one party system</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for the Development of Senegal River (OMVS)</td>
<td>136, 137, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
<td>9, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromo</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
<td>62, 78, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanism</td>
<td>33, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliamentary democracy</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrice Lumumba</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Howell</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peaceful co-existence</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peoples of the Book</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Joint Technical Committee of the Nile River</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political assassination</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political awareness</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political instability</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political institutions</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political Islam</td>
<td>93, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political Islam, fundamentalism</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political Islam, Revolution</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political marginalization</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political nationalism</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political orientation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political parties</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political structure</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political systems</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for Liberation of Eritrea</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front regime</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population of Jews</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prince of Wales</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Bunche</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reconstruct the state</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea Coast</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>referendum</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion, concept of peace</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion, phenomenon of violence</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Nile</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rivers system (data) 119
Robert Dahl 44
Robert Mugabi 52, 74
Rusumo Agridént 137
Salim Ahmed Salim 8, 74
Sani Abacha 11
Second World War 198
Security Council 75
Sekou Touré 5
self-development 22
self-determination 40, 61
self-protection 54
Senegal River 130
Shaheen (1993) 150, 156
Sharia Courts 97
Shehu Usman Dan Fodio 158
Sheikh Muhammad Omar 97
Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory 82
Siyyad Barre 89, 90, 95, 96
social change 149
Akofo 166, 167
Sokoto River 132
slave labour 10
Somalia, intervention in 89
Somalia National Alliance 91, 92
Somali Islamic Movement 95
Somali National Movement 94
Somali, relations with US 89
Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) 22, 134, 139, 140, 144
SPLM/A 40, 133
state formation 33, 35
Stockholm Bas of Global Water Partnership (GWP) 141
structural functionalism 34, 35
sub-regional integration 54
Sub-Saharan Africa 123
Suez Canal 60
Suzan Rice 60, 72,
Tansu Ciller (Turkish) 172
Technical Committee for the Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCO-NILE) 138, 139
Thomas Jefferson 2
Thomas Montgomery 96
Thorne 60
Tigri 80
Tigri Liberation Front 71
Trade and Development 50
transition to democracy 44
tribalism 53
Turabi, Hassan abdalla, 159, 161, 164, 177
UNCTAD 51, 53, 56
UNDP 123, 140
UNESCO 6, 7, 8, 140
UNHCR 69
UNOSOM 91, 92, 96
United Nations Fund For Women 182
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) 159, 161
water management 126, 142
water population ratio 125
water related conflicts 127
water related institutions 135, 141
water related organization 142
water resources 125
water rights and boundaries 127
water scarcity 143
water utilization 117
weland 123
Wole Soyinka 5
World Bank 6, 8, 55
World Meteorological Organization 119
women, biological 156
women in Nigeria 169
women's voices, access and action 176
World Trade Organization (WTO) 54, 55, 56, 58
Zalibisa (Somalia) 70
Zambesi River 130
Zambesi River Action Plan 140
Zambesi River Authority 140